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ABSTRACT 
The average duration of Active Shooter incidents in Institutions of Higher Education 
within the United States is 12.5 minutes. In contrast, the average response time of campus 
and local law enforcement to these incidents is 18 minutes. In the majority of Active 
Shooter incidents affecting U.S. IHEs, the emergency response time greatly exceeds the 
incident duration and affords law enforcement authorities no opportunity to interdict the 
shooter or prevent further casualties. This stark contrast between response requirements 
and response capability produces a considerable delta of dead, injured or potential 
victims and provides the unfortunate motivation for this project. The primary focus of 
this project is aimed at reducing the Rate of Kill of Active Shooters in U.S. IHEs. This 
thesis contains 14 case studies that examine lethal Active Shooter incidents that occurred 
in U.S. IHEs, as well as the Oslo and Utoya Island Active Shooter event that occurred in 
Norway. Data analysis on each of these incidents revealed facility composition as a 
critical vulnerability common to all of these incidents. Accordingly, the recommendations 
included in this thesis suggest a practical implementation of facility upgrades capable of 
mitigating the deadly effects of Active Shooters. 
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DEFINITIONS 
“5 C’s” Basic principles that dictate actions by the first 
responders specifically related to an Active 
Shooter incident. The “5 C’s” refer to the 
principals of Contain, Control, Communicate, 
Call SWAT and Come up with a plan.2  
Active Shooter An individual actively engaged in killing or 
attempting to kill people in a confined populated 
area typically using firearms.3 
Affected Area (AA) Tertiary space defined by the Active Shooter’s 
capability to cause harm outside of the Threat 
Zone.4 
Affected Personnel (AP) All personnel within the Affected Area.5 
Conditional Threat Is the type of threat often seen in extortion cases. 
It warns that a violent act will happen unless 
certain demands or terms are met.6 
Direct Threat Identifies a specific act against a specific target 
and is delivered in a straightforward, clear, and 
explicit manner.7  
Emergency Response Team (ERT) Emergency Response personnel capable of 
responding to the Active Shooter incident 
consisting but not limited to, HOF Security, 
Police, SWAT, Fire, Rescue, and other specially 
designated response assets. 
                                                 
2 Texas State University, Advanced Law Enforcement Rapid Response Training (ALERRT) Manual, 3. 
3 Department of Homeland Security, Active Shooter: How to Respond,” October 2008, 7. 
4 Sean K. Hubbard and Charles E. Ergenbright, “Defeating the Active Shooter: Applying Technology 
to Reduce the Capability of Armed Shooters in High Occupancy Facilities” (master’s thesis draft proposal, 
Naval Postgraduate School, 2011), 5. 
5 Hubbard and Ergenbright, “Defeating the Active Shooter: Applying Technology to Reduce the 
Capability of Armed Shooters in High Occupancy Facilities,” 5. 
6 Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation, The School Shooter: A Threat Assessment 
Perspective, Quantico, VA: FBI Academy, 7. 
7 Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation, The School Shooter: A Threat Assessment 
Perspective, 7. 
 xviii 
High Level of Threat A threat that appears to pose an imminent and 
serious danger to the safety of others.8 
High Occupancy Facilities (HOF) A public or private facility containing 100 or 
greater occupants or supporting a daily patron 
throughput of 100 or greater.9 
IHE Campus / Facility IHE grounds, parking lots, buildings (e.g., 
classroom buildings, dining halls, student unions, 
research centers, dormitories, fraternity/sorority 
houses, other university-sponsored student 
housing), and built venues (e.g., stadiums) that are 
owned, leased, operated, or reserved by the IHE 
for permanent or temporary use.10 
IHE Employee Member of an IHE’s faculty, staff (e.g., mental 
health counselors, building maintenance 
personnel, campus law enforcement, financial aid 
counselors, medical personnel), or administration 
(e.g., dean, president, provost, vice president), an 
IHE contractor, or an individual employed by an 
IHE contractor.11 
IHE Event IHE sporting, ceremonial (e.g., graduation, award 
dinners), entertainment, and educational activities 
(e.g., student government meetings) sponsored or 
sanctioned by the IHE or an association affiliated 
with the IHE.12 
 
 
                                                 
8 Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation, The School Shooter: A Threat Assessment 
Perspective, 9. 
9 Hubbard and Ergenbright, “Defeating the Active Shooter: Applying Technology to Reduce the 
Capability of Armed Shooters in High Occupancy Facilities,” 5. 
10 Diana A. Drysdale, William Modzeleski and Andre B. Simons, Campus Attacks: Targeted Violence 
Affecting Institutions of Higher Education, U.S. Secret Service, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 
Office of Safe and Drug-Free Schools, U.S. Department of Education, and Federal Bureau of Investigation, 
U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, DC, 2010, 16. 
11 Drysdale, Modzeleski and Simons, Campus Attacks: Targeted Violence Affecting Institutions of 
Higher Education, 16. 
12 Drysdale, Modzeleski and Simons, Campus Attacks: Targeted Violence Affecting Institutions of 
Higher Education, 16. 
 xix 
IHE Student Individual enrolled in a college or university (e.g., 
undergraduate, graduate, full- and part-time). The 
student may still be enrolled at the IHE even 
though he or she is not registered for classes at the 
time of the incident.13 
Incident Command Center (ICC) A manned Communication and Control (C2) 
Center.  
Incident Duration (ID) Elapsed time from Active Shooter’s first shot 
fired to threat mitigation.  
Indirect Threat Tends to be vague, unclear, and ambiguous. The 
plan, the intended victim, the motivation, and 
other aspects of the threat are masked or 
equivocal.14 
Institution of Higher Education (IHE) A postsecondary Title IV degree or non-degree 
granting institution15 
Kill Ratio The Kill Ratio (KR) has been defined in this 
project as the Law Enforcement Response Time 
(RT) compared to the Active Shooter Incident 
Duration (ID). 
Low Level of Threat A threat that poses a minimal risk to the victim 
and public safety.16 
Medium Level of Threat A threat that could be carried out, although it may 
not appear entirely realistic.17 
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Potential Victim (PV) Personnel within the Target Area or Threat Zone 
who have not been injured or killed.18 
Rate of Kill (RT) Rate at which victims are killed by an Active 
Shooter during a given incident. 
Response Time (RT) Elapsed time from Active Shooter’s first shot 
fired to when first responders are capable of 
mitigating the threat.  
Target Area (TA) Primary space defined by the range of the Active 
Shooter’s capability to injure or kill.19 
Targeted Violence Any incident of violence where a known or 
knowable attacker selects a particular target prior 
to their violent attack.20 
Threat Zone (TZ) Secondary space defined by the Active Shooter’s 
capability to relocate in order to injure or kill.21 
Veiled Threat One that strongly implies but does not explicitly 
threaten violence and clearly hints at a possible 
violent act, but leaves it to the potential victim to 
interpret the message and give a definite meaning 
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 xxi 
Victim Initiated Mitigation (VIM) A mechanism by which a victim or potential 
victim can initiate a combination of immediate 
mechanical lockdown responses accompanied 
with a standardized emergency response resulting 
in the containment and control of Target Areas 
and Threat Zones, as well as activation of a 
standardized Emergency Action Plan.23 
Victim Personnel within the Target Area who have been 
injured or killed.24 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. BACKGROUND 
At 7:15 on a snowy April morning, a lone gunman entered West Ambler Johnston 
Dormitory, proceeded to Room 4040, and killed two students. Two hours and 25 minutes 
later, the same gunman, armed with two semi-automatic pistols entered Norris Hall and 
fired 174 rounds killing 33 and seriously injuring 17 students and faculty members in a 
terrifying 11-minute rampage spanning five classrooms. Although 14 campus security 
officers are on duty at the time of the incident, and the local police department, consisting 
of 56 officers, was located 0.7 miles from the incident, authorities were helpless to 
interdict the shooter for the entire duration of the incident that lasted two hours and 36 
minutes. As the gunman continues to hunt and fire upon new victims throughout the halls 
and classrooms of Norris Hall, students and faculty had no means to stop the massacre. 
This terrifying event only ended when the gunman finally turned one of his weapons on 
himself and committed suicide.  
Tragically, the above summary of events is not a fictional account. The gunman 
described was Seung Hui Cho, the university depicted is Virginia Tech, and the 33 dead 
and 17 injured students and faculty constitute the unfortunate reality of the deadliest 
school shooting in American history. Equally as alarming as this account, is the fact that 
this is not a singular instance but rather one instance in a series of preventable tragedies 
of this magnitude. In fact, instances of targeted violence in American Institutions of 
Higher Education (IHE’s) are a growing phenomenon.25 While this violent trend has 
experienced a sharp increase in recent years, there has been no introduction of new 
technology or tactics capable of mitigating the effects of an Active Shooter, such as Cho. 
These effects are devastating and threaten every student in America. Although this issue 
has received much greater attention from Law Enforcement and educational authorities, 
the primary focus of Active Shooter mitigation in American IHEs has been on 
improvements regarding preemptive mental health capabilities, alerting infrastructure and 
                                                 
25 Drysdale, Modzeleski, and Simons, Campus Attacks: Targeted Violence Affecting Institutions of 
Higher Education, Table 3. 
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procedures, and Law Enforcement force structure and tactics. The intent of this project is 
not to take away from any of these valuable and necessary improvements to IHE 
prevention and response security measures. Instead, the primary contention of this 
research is that although these improvements may afford the IHE considerable gains in 
general security and alerting efficiency, none of these improvements are likely to be 
effective at mitigating the effects of an Active Shooter. Furthermore, this research 
indicates that the only effective means of reducing the effects of an Active Shooter is 
with implementation of a Victim Initiated Mitigation (VIM) system accompanied by a 
prescribed set of automated and standardized responses.  
B. SCALE OF THE PROBLEM  
Since 1909, there have been 272 acts of targeted violence on 218 different college 
and university campuses throughout the U.S. These incidents resulted in 279 deaths, 245 
injuries, as well as millions of dollars in civil service expenditures.26 With over 6,500 
postsecondary Title IV Institutions of Higher Education (IHEs) in the United States; a 
total of over 17.8 million students and 3.6 million staff, faculty, and visitors are at risk of 
becoming potential Active Shooter victims.27 The average duration of an Active Shooter 
incident in U.S. IHEs is 12.5 minutes. In contrast, the average response time of campus 
and local law enforcement to each of these incidents was 18 minutes. 28 In the majority of 
Active Shooter incidents affecting U.S. IHEs, the emergency Response Time greatly 
exceeded the Incident Duration affording law enforcement authorities no opportunity to 
interdict the shooter or prevent further deaths or injuries sustained by university students, 
staff and faculty. This stark contrast between response requirements and response 
capability produces a considerable amount of dead, injured or potential victims and 
provides the unfortunate motivation for this project. The primary focus of this project is 
                                                 
26 Drysdale, Modzeleski, and Simons, Campus Attacks: Targeted Violence Affecting Institutions of 
Higher Education. 
27 Thomas D. Snyder, Sally A. Dillow, and Charlene M. Hoffman, “Digest of Education Statistics 
2008,” (NCES 2009-020), Washington, DC: National Center for Education Statistics, Institute of 
Education Sciences, U.S. Department of Education, March 2009, http://nces.ed.gov. 
28 Drysdale, Modzeleski, and Simons, Campus Attacks: Targeted Violence Affecting Institutions of 
Higher Education, Table 6. 
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aimed at reducing the Kill Ratio of Active Shooter incidents in U.S. IHEs. The Kill Ratio 
(KR) has been defined in this project as the Law Enforcement Response Time (RT) 
compared to the Active Shooter Incident Duration (ID). 
C. SCOPE 
The Active Shooter threat is a potential danger to all who occupy IHEs and HOFs 
both domestically and internationally. In order to formulate any reasonable 
recommendations based on commonalities identified through detailed analysis of factors 
pertaining to Active Shooter incidents, the scope of this research must be focused. First, 
the scope of research was restricted to Active Shooter incidents occurring in U.S. IHEs 
only. IHEs were selected as the refined scope environment because the majority of 
compiled data and the greatest number of single incident fatalities in reference to Active 
Shooter incidents pertain to incidents that have occurred in educational institutions. 
Additionally, this project’s research scope was confined to IHEs in order to incorporate 
the full spectrum of variables for Active Shooter incidents and to collect data that is 
representative and relevant to the widest variety of building types and institutions with 
varied and complex facility blueprints, as well as different campus configurations. The 
purpose for limiting the research scope of this project to only U.S. IHEs was to 
standardize as many environmental variables as possible. This standardization is 
accomplished within U.S. IHEs through fire code compliance, building code compliance, 
and common language. In an effort to achieve the end state of this research, which is to 
present a feasible solution capable of reducing the Rate of Kill of an Active Shooter 
incident, the research scope was again refined to only lethal Active Shooter incidents in 
IHEs. In an effort to separate instances that represent the Active Shooter problem from 
accidental and common criminal shootings occurring in IHEs, the research scope was 
again limited to Active Shooter incidents occurring in U.S. IHEs resulting in two or more 
fatalities. This final narrowing of the research scope resulted in identification of 14 IHEs 
that met the initial selection criteria. 
Although this refined research scope is used to limit the conceptual scope of this 
project to U.S. IHEs, the Active Shooter threat exists in environments other than strictly 
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university campuses and IHEs to include any High Occupancy Facility. Therefore, the 
application of the proposed Victim Initiated Mitigation (VIM) system may be highly 
exportable and capable of achieving the same effects in a myriad of facilities and 
environments. As a result, this project will routinely compare events and findings 
associated with IHEs to High Occupancy Facilities (HOFs) in order to demonstrate the 
exportability of this concept.  
 
High Occupancy Facility (HOF) Relevance: 
 
Figure 1.   Active Shooter Relevance Chart, Depicting Relevance of the Active 
Shooter Problem and Exportability of the Solution to All High Occupancy 
Facilities 
D. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
In consideration of the significance and scope of Active Shooter mitigation 
requirements, we propose the following research question: 
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• Can a victim-initiated system accompanied by a prescribed set of 
automated and standardized responses reduce the Rate of Kill of an Active 
Shooter? 
Current control measures for Active Shooters are not sufficient to reduce the Rate 
of Kill, nor have they proved any more useful in improving the Response Time of local 
Law Enforcement. With those two factors remaining relatively constant over time, 
despite implementation of improved control measures at university campuses; the Active 
Shooter Incident Duration has remained virtually unaffected. Therefore, if the Incident 
Duration remains unaffected, and the Response Time remains greater than the incident 
itself, it is reasonable to infer that the only current variables capable of affecting the Rate 
of Kill are the motivations and capabilities of the Active Shooter. As a result, current 
security measures must be augmented or reinforced in some new way in order to decrease 
Response Time and Incident Duration of Active Shooter scenarios in order to provide an 
appropriate level of security for students, faculty and staff in American colleges and 
universities. This project proposes an augmentation to the current Active Shooter 
response Standard Operating Procedures involving facility upgrades sufficient to meet the 
changing security requirements of U.S. IHEs.  
 6 
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II. METHODOLOGY 
This project will examine historical examples of Active Shooter scenarios in 
Institutions of Higher Education (IHEs) in order to identify common variables and 
contributing factors that either increased or decreased the Rate of Kill in each of the 
selected case studies. To conduct this comparison, historical case studies representing the 
full spectrum of variables and contributing factors were selected. Once selected, all case 
studies were examined individually, as well as compared to each other in order to 
determine variable similarity and relative effect on the Rate of Kill.  
A. CASE STUDY SELECTION 
Case study selection was a four-phase process. First, the scope of research was 
refined to Active Shooter incidents occurring in U.S. IHEs resulting in two or more 
fatalities. The second phase of case study selection consisted of variable identification. 
As the result of an exhaustive literature review of Active Shooter incidents occurring in 
U.S. IHEs, no list of common variables or credible comparison with relevance to 
affecting the Rate of Kill for lethal Active Shooter incidents occurring in IHEs was found. 
Therefore, we identified and selected variables that directly contributed to fatalities in all 
of the case studies within the refined research scope. The third phase of case study 
selection included data entry and application of utility theory in order to assign lethality 
ratings to each of the selected case studies. In the fourth phase of case study selection all 
case studies meeting the parameters outlined in our refined research scope were 
compared and ranked from least lethal to most lethal. As a result, case studies were 
selected based on the relative “lethality” of each incident. The question driving this 
comparative research is, “what makes one Active Shooter incident more lethal than 
another?” In an effort to answer this question, the initial list of 11 Lethality Comparison 
Variables listed in Table 2 were determined by extracting influential variables from the 
Report of the Review Panel presented to Governor Kaine of the Commonwealth of 
Virginia in August of 2007 regarding the Mass Shootings at Virginia Tech. Additionally, 
through the application of Utility Theory, weighted or ordinal values were also assigned 
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to these variables based initially on the authors’ professional experiences gained through 
a combined 31 years of military service, 14 years of Army Special Forces tactical 
experience, and conduct of numerous Threat Vulnerability Assessments on Forward 
Operating Bases, foreign military installations, and U.S. embassies. These variables were 
then validated at the 2011 ALERRT Active Shooter Conference in San Marcos, Texas. 
These variables are listed in order of their relative effect on the lethality of each incident 
(11 = Highest, 1 = Lowest). Based on the lethality comparison and resulting “Lethality 
Rating,” Virginia Tech was selected as our baseline case study.  
 
Initial Lethality Comparison Variables 
Variable Ordinal Value 
Number of Persons Killed  11 
Number of Persons Injured  10 
Number of Shots Fired  9 
Active Shooting Duration (Min)  8 
Number of Rooms Affected  7 
Number of Buildings Affected  6 
Number of Shooters Affected  5 
Incident Duration (Min)  4 
Response Time (Min)  3 
Alert Time (Min)  2 
Emergency Response Team Notification (Min)  1 




*Lethality Rating is a numerical value assigned to each university as a result of Utility Theory application. 
Figure 2.   Lethality Rating Chart Depicting Relative Incident Lethality Utilizing 
Utility Theory to Compare All Selected IHEs Meeting the Perimeters of 
the Refined Research Scope.  
B. CASE STUDY COMPARISON 
The selected case studies were compared in a three-phased analysis utilizing 
Utility Theory in order to identify the relative vulnerability of each case study. First, a 
comprehensive list of variables that contribute to the vulnerability of IHEs to Active 
Shooter incidents was developed, weighted and validated in the same manner as the 
lethality variables. Second, these variables were assessed through the application of 
Utility Theory to all selected case studies in order to gain an accurate perspective and 
assign an Initial Vulnerability Rating of each IHE prior to the incident. Finally, these 
variables were again assessed in each case study through the application of Utility Theory 
in order to reflect potential vulnerability incorporating the proposed facility upgrades and 
automated response included in the recommended Victim Initiated Mitigation system and 
assign a Predicted Vulnerability Rating. The variable categories for this comparison were 
divided into categories and include: 
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Vulnerability Variable Comparison 
Variable Ordinal Value Variable Ordinal Value 
Communicated Threat  TBD  Number of Persons Killed  TBD  
Physically Aggressive Acts  TBD  Number of Persons Injured  TBD  
Alarming Behavior TBD  Number of Shots Fired  TBD  
Mental Illness/DSM 
Diagnosis/Medications  
TBD  Active Shooting Duration 
(Min)  
TBD  
Drug Abuse  TBD  Number of Rooms Affected  TBD  
Number of Shooters  TBD  Number of Buildings 
Affected  
TBD  
Shooter Demographics  TBD  Number of Shooters 
Affected  
TBD  
Campus Demographics  TBD  Incident Duration (Min)  TBD  
Campus Police Emergency Response 
Capability  
TBD  Response Time (Min)  TBD  
Local Law Enforcement Emergency 
Response Capability 
TBD  Alert Time (Min)  TBD  
University Violent Crime Rates  TBD  Emergency Response Team 
Notification (Min)  
TBD  
Local Violent Crime Rates  TBD    
University Security Level  TBD    
Table 2.   Vulnerability Comparison Table Depicting the Categories of Comparison for 
Assignment of Vulnerability Ratings to Case Studies 
The goal for this comparative research is to identify variables that directly affect 
the Rate of Kill of Active Shooter incidents and to highlight a feasible solution capable of 
enhancing or reducing those variables. Additionally, the IHEs and HOFs included as case 
studies for this project will be used to represent the full spectrum of data needed to 
accurately analyze the proposed hypotheses of this project and make meaningful 
recommendations. In order to accomplish this, the unfortunate stories of each of these 
incidents need to be told and analyzed. In the process, hard questions will be asked and 
uncomfortable realities may be revealed. However, the intent of this project and the 
research that supports it is only to prevent or reduce similar future incidents and is 
collected and presented with somber remembrance of the victims of each incident. In no 
way do we intend to defame, discredit, or assign blame to anyone involved in these 
incidents.  
C. LITERATURE REVIEW SUMMARY 
A wide separation of thought exists concerning mitigation of the Active Shooter. 
The principle proponents of thought relating to Active Shooter mitigation include Law 
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Enforcement agencies and organizations, the FBI, the Department of Homeland Security, 
the U.S. Secret Service and finally, the Department of Education and the Department of 
Justice. Each agency has its own methodology for mitigating Active Shooters in IHEs 
and HOFs and, as a result, three primary positions emerge. 
1. Prevention/Preemption and Mental Health Intervention 
The U.S. governmental proponents of prevention/preemption and mental health 
focused intervention for Active Shooter mitigation are the U.S. Department of Education, 
U.S. Department of Justice, U.S. Secret Service, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation. 
The U.S. Department of Education’s support of a preventative and preemptive strategy 
with strong emphasis on mental health intervention as the most effective means of 
mitigating Active Shooters in IHEs is clearly stated in the Action Guide for Emergency 
Management at Institutions of Higher Education.29 The recommendations made by the 
Department of Education in this Action Guide are further supported by the National 
Institute for Mental Health, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, U.S. 
Department of Defense, U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs, U.S. Department of 
Justice, and the American Red Cross in their report on Evidence-Based Early 
Psychological Intervention for Victims/Survivors of Mass Violence.30 Accordingly, in 
response to the increasing threat of targeted violence in schools, the DOE designed their 
Emergency Action Plan in accordance with FEMA’s four phases of emergency 
management; of which, phases one and two consist of prevention and preemption 
methods and mental health focused intervention.31  
The U.S. Department of Education also worked closely with the U.S. Secret 
Service in order to establish a practical approach to Active Shooter mitigation in IHEs 
and this effort resulted in the Safe Schools Initiative. The preventative and preemptive 
focused threat mitigation objectives and recommendations of the Safe Schools Initiative 
                                                 
29 U.S. Department of Education, Office of Safe and Drug-Free Schools, Action Guide for Emergency 
Management at Institutions of Higher Education. 
30 National Institute of Mental Health, Mental Health and Mass Violence: Evidence-Based Early 
Psychological Intervention for Victims/Survivors of Mass Violence. A Workshop to Reach Consensus on 
Best Practices, 8.  
31 FEMA’s State and Local Guide SLG 101: Guide for All-Hazards Emergency Operations Planning. 
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are clearly articulated in the USSS publication entitled The Final Report and Findings of 
the Safe School Initiative: Implications for the prevention of School Attacks in the United 
States.32 The basis for the USSS preemptive Active Shooter mitigation strategy is 
focused on disrupting the Individual Violence Process before intense feelings manifest 
into ideas of justified violence and violent action.33 Both the USSS and the DOE posit 
that disruption of this process for potential Active Shooters in U.S. IHEs can be 
accomplished by identifying pre-attack behaviors and communications that could be 
detectable for future attacks. Much of the USSS literature regarding Active Shooter 
mitigation identifies incident prevention as the primary means by which the effects of an 
Active Shooter can be mitigated or avoided. This level of prevention is sought through 
profiling, detailed threat assessments and preparation aimed at reducing the response time 
of law enforcement.34 This methodology is in keeping with the US Secret Service ability 
to protect dignitaries, but is very resource intensive.  
The USSS developed three assessment approaches as methods of identifying these 
behaviors and disrupting the Individual Violence Process for potential Active Shooters in 
IHEs. These assessment approaches, consisting of profiling, guided professional 
judgment, and automated decision making, are clearly defined and analyzed for 
effectiveness and feasibility by the USSS and the DOE in the publication entitled 
Evaluating Risk for Targeted Violence in Schools: Comparing Risk Assessment, Threat 
Assessment, and Other Approaches.35 Although preemptive measures, such as the ones 
outlined in the USSS’ three assessment approaches have many potential benefits, the 
DOE, DOJ, as well as many other education and mental health organizations denounced 
some of these practices in their published action guide entitled Early Warning, Timely 
                                                 
32 United States Secret Service, United States Department of Education, The Final Report and 
Findings of the Safe School Initiative: Implications for the Prevention of School Attacks in the United 
States, ii.  
33 Mayhugh, “Active Shooters: Behavior, Conditions, and Situations.” 
34 Drysdale, Modzeleski, and Simons, Campus Attacks: Targeted Violence Affecting Institutions of 
Higher Education, 19–22. 
35 Reddy, “Evaluating Risk for Targeted Violence in Schools: Comparing Risk Assessment, Threat 
Assessment, and Other Approaches.” 
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Response: A Guide to Safe Schools.36 Further criticism of these practices regarding 
Active Shooter profile reliability is addressed by the USSS, DOE, and FBI in their 
collaborative publication entitled Campus Attacks: Targeted Violence Affecting 
Institutions of Higher Education.  
Despite the many advantages afforded by a properly implemented and resourced 
prevention/preemption strategy and effective early intervention of Active Shooters 
through IHE mental health augmentations, many limitations also restrict this 
methodology. Some of the resource limitations encountered with implementation of a 
mental health focused preventative and preemptive strategy in IHEs are outlined by the 
Suicide Prevention Resource Center in their publication entitled, Promoting Mental 
Health and Preventing Suicide in College and University Settings.37 Further limitations 
to such practices regarding civil liberties and Privacy Act considerations for students, 
staff and faculty members of IHEs is detailed by the Family Policy Compliance Office, a 
sub-committee of the DOE, in their guide entitled Balancing Student Privacy and School 
Safety: A Guide to the Family Education Rights and Privacy Act for Colleges and 
Universities.38 As a result of these obstacles, and the lack of empirical research related to 
risk factors regarding targeted school violence, the USSS and DOE admit that a 
preventative and preemptive strategy supported by effective mental health capabilities 
will be difficult to implement or sustain as an effective means of early intervention of 
Active Shooters in IHEs.  
The U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) focuses its research in the mental health 
sector and maintain that the ability to identify or rehabilitate potential active shooters is 
the optimal method for mitigating or preventing the effects of an Active Shooter.39 The 
DOJ, Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Critical Incident Response Group (CIRG), 
                                                 
36 Dwyer, Osher, and Warger, Early Warning, Timely Response: A Guide to Safe Schools, 7. 
37 Suicide Prevention Resource Center, Promoting Mental Health and Preventing Suicide in College 
and University Settings, 20. 
38 U.S. Department of Education, Family Policy Compliance Office, “Balancing Student Privacy and 
School Safety: A Guide to the Family Education Rights and Privacy Act for Colleges and Universities.” 
39 Michael O. Leavit, Alberto R. Gonzales, and Margaret Spellings, “Report to the President: On 
Issues Raised by the Virginia Tech Tragedy,” Department of Human Services, Department of Education, 
Department of Justice (June 2007): 10–16. 
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and the National Center for the Analysis of Violent Crime (NCAVC) also present a threat 
assessment model in their collaborative publication entitled The School Shooter: A Threat 
Assessment Perspective.40 However, this recommendation is subject to criticism as well 
regarding the discrepancy between the total number of incident of targeted violence on 
U.S. IHEs and the low occurrence of issued threats prior to the incident. This criticism 
was addressed by the DOE, DHS, FBI, and Secret Service in their collaborative review 
entitled Campus Attacks: Targeted Violence Affecting Institutions of Higher Education.41 
The DOJ and FBI also further elaborate on the shortages and limitations of a mental 
health focused method of Active Shooter prevention/preemption that make many of the 
recommendations included in the preceding documents impractical.42  
2. Tactical Intervention  
The state and federal organizations and associations who assert that a tactical 
response is the most effective means of Active Shooter mitigation in IHEs include local 
Law Enforcement agencies, as well as police tactical organizations, such as the National 
Tactical Officer’s Association (NTOA) and the North American S.W.A.T. Training 
Association (NASTA), and Active Shooter response training organizations, such as 
Advanced Law Enforcement Rapid Response Training (ALERRT). The argument for 
tactical intervention of Active Shooters in IHEs as the most effective form of mitigation 
is centered on the ability to impose the “5 C’s”: Contain, Control, Communicate, Call 
SWAT and Create an immediate action plan.43 This strategy is focused on maximizing 
the effectiveness of Law Enforcement and campus police in order to quickly interdict the 
active shooter. The need for this measure of tactical response was identified during the 
University of Texas Tower shooting in 1966 and Law Enforcement agencies have 
continually evolved and improved their tactics and Standard Operating Procedures to 
                                                 
40 Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation, The School Shooter: A Threat Assessment 
Perspective, iii–7. 
41 Drysdale, Modzeleski, and Simons, Campus Attacks: Targeted Violence Affecting Institutions of 
Higher Education, 10. 
42 Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation, The School Shooter: A Threat Assessment 
Perspective, 6–26. 
43 Texas State University, Advanced Law Enforcement Rapid Response Training (ALERRT) Manual, 
3. 
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meet the emerging Active Shooter threat ever since. Current tactical response standards 
and recommendations regarding tactical intervention of Active Shooters in IHEs were 
published by the International Association of Chiefs of Police and the Bureau of Justice 
Assistance, and the U.S. Department of Justice in their guide entitled Guide for 
Preventing and Responding to School Violence.44  
However, disproportional preparation and preparedness for the Active Shooter 
threat versus other persistent threats in IHEs preclude this strategy from effectively 
reducing the Rate of Kill in Active Shooter scenarios. This discrepancy is highlighted in 
LTC(R) Dave Grossman’s critique of IHE preparedness for Active Shooter threats as 
compared to fire prevention and mitigation measures currently implemented in IHEs in 
his article entitled School Shooting Contingency Plans & Considerations.45 As a result, 
no current policy, alerting procedure, or active control measure has been able to assist 
Law Enforcement in the mitigation of the Active Shooter threat. Accordingly, the DOE 
places no emphasis on Law Enforcement tactical response and integration with campus 
police or SROs as part of a crisis response plan their publication entitled Creating Safe 
and Drug-Free Schools: An Action Guide.46 Additionally, no current national standard 
exists for the hiring criteria or training requirements for campus law enforcement 
officers.47 Further limitations of this strategy are also identified by the U.S. Department 
of Homeland Security and the Federal Emergency Management Agency in their guideline 
for the National Incident Management System.48  
3. Research Void: Victim Initiated Mitigation 
As a result of this comprehensive literature review, which considers the principle 
positions of every relevant U.S. authority regarding Active Shooter mitigation in IHEs, 
prevention/preemption and tactical intervention emerged as the two primary arguments 
                                                 
44 Kramen, Massey, and Timm, Guide for Preventing and Responding to School Violence, 24. 
45 Grossman, “School Shooting Contingency Plans & Considerations.” 
46 U.S. Department of Education, U.S. Department of Justice, “Creating Safe and Drug Free Schools: 
An Action Guide,” September 1996, http://www.ed.gov. 
47 Bromley, “Policing Our Campuses: A National Review of Statutes,” 7. 
48 Department of Homeland Security, National Incident Management System, 24.  
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for effective mitigation. However, the research void regarding Active Shooter mitigation 
in IHEs and HOFs identified by this project is the lack of a victim initiated means of 
Active Shooter mitigation. Although the U.S. Department of Homeland Security 
identifies the potential victim as the most influential factor for mitigation or defeat of an 
active shooter, they also call attention to the fact that victims and Potential Victims are 
the least prepared or capable first responders and only recommend victim action as a last 
resort.49 DHS further outlines their recommendations for actions to be taken in the event 
of an active shooter incident in order to facilitate survivability in their guide entitled 
Active Shooter: How to Respond.50 When compared to other persistent threats in U.S. 
IHEs, such as fire, although a similar argument could be made regarding the inability for 
victims and Potential Victims to respond as most are not qualified fire fighters, when 
President Truman convened the President’s Conference on Fire Prevention; victim 
initiated response measures were identified as critical components to an effective threat 
mitigation plan.51 The level of effectiveness experienced in IHEs regarding fire 
prevention and mitigation that reduced fire casualties from 10,000 annually in IHES and 
HOFs prior to 1946 to zero after 1958 was articulated by DHS and the U.S. Fire 
Administration National Fire Data Center in their publication entitled School Fires.52 
After considering this dramatic effect, the lack of a victim initiated means for mitigating 
the current threat of Active Shooters in IHEs is apparent and provides the focus for the 
recommendations made in this thesis. The remainder of this thesis will present arguments 
against the prevention/preemption and tactical focused means of mitigation, expound on 
the methodological void identified by the literature review, and argue for a victim-
initiated system coupled with standardized and automated responses as the most effective 
means of reducing the Rate of Kill in Active Shooter scenarios. 
                                                 
49 Department of Homeland Security, Active Shooter: How to Respond, 9.  
50 Department of Homeland Security, Active Shooter: How to Respond, 7. 
51 Fleming, The President’s Conference on Fire Prevention Action Program. 
52 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Fire Administration National Fire Data Center, 
“School Fires.” 
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4. Project Justification 
In recognition of evolving threats, such as Active Shooters in U.S. IHEs and 
HOFs, the President of the United States, Barack Obama is recorded in the U.S. National 
Security Strategy as stating, 
At home, the United States is pursuing a strategy capable of meeting the 
full range of threats and hazards to our communities.” “We are investing 
in operational capabilities and equipment, and improving the reliability 
and interoperability of communications systems for first responders.” 
“That is why we are pursuing initiatives to protect and reduce 
vulnerabilities in critical infrastructure, at our borders, ports, and airports, 
and to enhance overall air, maritime, transportation, and space and cyber 
security.53  
Secretary of Defense Robert Gates also presented his initial guidance for meeting 
the challenges of difficult problems to national security, such as the Active Shooter threat 
in the National Defense Strategy stating, 
However, as the spreading web of globalization presents new 
opportunities and challenges, the importance of planning to protect the 
homeland against previously unexpected threats increases. Meeting these 
challenges also creates a tension between the need for security and the 
requirements of openness in commerce and civil liberties. On the one 
hand, the flow of goods, services, people, technology and information 
grows every year, and with it the openness of American society. On the 
other hand, terrorists and others wishing us harm seek to exploit that 
openness.54 
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Major General Mullen confirmed these concerns 
articulated by the President and Secretary of Defense and addressed them in the National 
Military Strategy by stating, “there are no more vital interests than the security of the 
American people, our territory, and our way of life.”55 
                                                 
53 President of the United States, Barack Obama, National Security Strategy, May 2010, 17. 
54 Secretary of Defense, Robert Gates, National Defense Strategy, June 2008, 6. 
55 Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, M. G. Mullen, The National Military Strategy of the United States 
of America, Redefining America’s Military Leadership, February 2011, 5. 
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In recognition of these threats, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates delineated his 
guidance for military preparedness in order to protect the U.S. national security against 
threats, such as Active Shooters in the Quadrennial Defense Review as he stated, 
The experiences of the past several years have deepened the realization 
that state- and non-state adversaries alike may seek to attack military and 
civilian targets within the United States. Protecting the nation and its 
people from such threats requires close synchronization between civilian 
and military efforts.56  
In an effort to further define the Department of Defense’s strategy for mitigating 
the threat of domestic terrorism and Active Shooter incidents, U.S. Northern Command 
and North American Aerospace Defense Commander Admiral James Winnefeld stated in 
the NORTHCOM Posture Statement that,  
To help prevent acts of terrorism, we are working to improve information 
sharing to better position ourselves to preemptively detect and protect 
against these threats, particularly in regard to our military bases and other 
infrastructure. We are fully implementing the relevant recommendations 
of the Department of Defense Independent Review Related to Fort Hood, 
and have made progress over the last year in our ability to rapidly 
disseminate threat information to DOD installations when required. In the 
wake of a terrorist event, we are prepared to support civil authorities, as 
directed, to assist in mitigating the consequences.57 
Although we agree with the general intent of these statements and believe that 
strategic emphasis is well placed on evolving and dynamic threats of domestic terrorism 
and Active Shooters in U.S. IHEs and HOFs, we also have found no clear plan articulated 
in any of the five primary U.S. national security documents which prescribes an 
operational standard with capacity to accomplish the desired level of security and 
readiness. It is our hope that the recommendations included in this thesis which are based 
on our case study analysis of the most lethal Active Shooter incidents which have taken 
place on U.S. IHEs will present a clear plan capable of mitigating the effects of Active 
Shooters in support of U.S. national security priorities.  
                                                 
56 Secretary of Defense, Robert Gates, Quadrennial Defense Review Report, February 2010, 18. 
57 Admiral James A. Winnefeld, Jr., U.S. Navy , Commander, U.S. Northern Command and North 
American Aerospace Defense Command, Testimony Before the House Armed Services Committee, March 
30, 2011, 4. 
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III. HYPOTHESES 
In order to answer the research question, we have explored and tested the 
following hypotheses. 
A. HYPOTHESIS 1: PREVENTION/PREEMPTION OF THE ACTIVE 
SHOOTER ALONE IS INSUFFICIENT TO REDUCE THE RATE OF KILL 
The Department of Education, Department of Justice, the U.S. Secret Service and 
the Federal Bureau of Investigation posit that a prevention/preemption strategy is the 
most effective means of reducing the Rate of Kill of an Active Shooter incident. 
However, a pure prevention/preemption strategy consisting of mental health screening 
and care coupled with increased efforts to identify and mitigate an Active Shooter prior to 
the incident is subject to a multitude of factors and considerations that preclude it from 
being an effective means of mitigation. A prevention and preemption strategy capable of 
effectively accomplishing these tasks is impractical for an already overburdened and 
underfunded aspect of student health. Although homicide is the second leading cause of 
death for U.S. college students and campus-counseling centers report sharp increases in 
serious psychological needs, most of the mental health services required to address these 
needs are referred to off-campus care providers and are limited to the extent of student 
insurance coverage.58 Additionally, most university counseling centers do not have a full-
time crisis management response system in place or qualified psychiatric coverage 
capable of implementing an effective prevention program for campus violence.59 As a 
result, in order to effectively mitigate potential effects of Active Shooters in U.S. IHEs 
through a mental health focused prevention/preemption strategy, the necessary 
enhancements to existing capabilities would require an unrealistic commitment of time 
and money.  
                                                 
58 Suicide Prevention Resource Center, Promoting Mental Health and Preventing Suicide in College 
and University Settings, Newton, MA: Education Development Center, Inc., 2004, 14. 
59 Suicide Prevention Resource Center, Promoting Mental Health and Preventing Suicide in College 
and University Settings, 20. 
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In addition to the exorbitant costs and extreme resourcing an effective mental 
health focused prevention/preemption strategy would require, mental health professionals 
and organizations are also not predisposed to prevent acts of mass violence, such as 
Active Shooter incidents. Instead, the primary focus for mental health organizations is on 
repairing psychological trauma in a post-incident environment. According to the National 
Institute for Mental Health, “early intervention is defined as any form of psychological 
intervention delivered within the first four weeks following incidents of mass violence or 
disasters.”60 Although optimal early mental health assessments and interventions are 
conducted within a hierarchy of needs, these provisions are provided in a post-incident 
environment. Accordingly, the hierarchal requirements of survival, safety, security, and 
physical health would only be afforded to survivors and would have no preventative 
value for Potential Victims in a pre-incident environment.61 As per the Guidance for 
Timing of Early Intervention for incidents of Mass Violence, the pre-incident phase 
published by the National Institute for Mental Health includes no mental health screening 
or active control measures capable of effectively mitigating the potential effects of an 
Active Shooter. In fact, the only mental health screening mentioned by the U.S. 
Department of Health and Human Services, U.S. Department of Defense, U.S. 
Department of Veterans Affairs, U.S. Department of Justice, and the American Red Cross 
in their report on Evidence-Based Early Psychological Intervention for Victims/Survivors 
of Mass Violence is for survivors in a post-incident environment. 62 According to the 
literature review of this report and only examining the 47 cases receiving an “A” grade 
according to the Agency of Health Care Policy and Research’s (AHCPR) Levels of 
Evidence and excluding the 16 cases in which the mental health response exceeded one 
year, the average response time to the incidents of acute stress included in this study was 
                                                 
60 National Institute of Mental Health, Mental Health and Mass Violence: Evidence-Based Early 
Psychological Intervention for Victims/Survivors of Mass Violence. A Workshop to Reach Consensus on 
Best Practices, (NIH Publication No. 02-5138), Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2002, 
1. 
61 National Institute of Mental Health, Mental Health and Mass Violence: Evidence-Based Early 
Psychological Intervention for Victims/Survivors of Mass Violence. A Workshop to Reach Consensus on 
Best Practices, 2. 
62 National Institute of Mental Health, Mental Health and Mass Violence: Evidence-Based Early 
Psychological Intervention for Victims/Survivors of Mass Violence. A Workshop to Reach Consensus on 
Best Practices, 8.  
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63 days post trauma.63 Although the psychological assistance rendered in each of these 
instances is invaluable to those who receive it, it is imprudent to expect these capabilities 
to protect potential victims in a pre-incident environment.  
The U.S. Department of Education designed their Emergency Action Plan in 
accordance with FEMA’s four phases of emergency management: Prevention-Mitigation, 
Preparedness, Response, and Recovery.64 Within the Prevention-Mitigation phase of the 
Department of Education’s Emergency Management Plan, counseling and mental health 
services are prescribed only for identification and training of appropriate staff to provide 
developmentally and culturally appropriate mental health services to the university 
population. Additionally, training for mental health staff members on specific 
interventions and basic training of university professors and staff members on available 
resources, common reactions to trauma, and early warning signs of potentially dangerous 
individuals are key components of this plan. Although the Department of Education also 
places particular emphasis on development of support structure and partnership 
agreements, as well as template letters for alerting students, parents, families, staff, and 
the community to emergencies; none of these capabilities offer a practical or standardized 
capacity for effectively preventing Active Shooter incidents in U.S. IHEs.65 
In a collaborative effort to establish a practical approach to mitigating the effects 
of Active Shooters in U.S. IHEs, the U.S. Department of Education and the U.S. Secret 
Service produced the Safe Schools Initiative. This initiative made recommendations 
based on a comprehensive examination of the thinking, planning, and other behaviors of 
students who had committed school shootings.66 These prevention and preemption efforts 
focused on disrupting the Individual Violence Process. This process consists of an 
                                                 
63 National Institute of Mental Health, Mental Health and Mass Violence: Evidence-Based Early 
Psychological Intervention for Victims/Survivors of Mass Violence. A Workshop to Reach Consensus on 
Best Practices, Table 1. 
64 FEMA’s State and Local Guide SLG 101: Guide for All-Hazards Emergency Operations Planning, 
September 1996. 
65 U.S. Department of Education, Office of Safe and Drug-Free Schools, Action Guide for Emergency 
Management at Institutions of Higher Education, Washington, DC, 2009, Table 2. 
66 United States Secret Service, United States Department of Education, The Final Report and 
Findings of the Safe School Initiative: Implications for the Prevention of School Attacks in the United 
States, ii.  
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individual’s progression from a negative situation to intense feelings including anger, 
hostility, retaliation and vengeance. If not identified and mitigated at the level of intense 
feelings, the individual violence process will continue to escalate to ideas of justified 
violence and the impossibility of a peaceful resolution and will lead to planning of an 
attack and finally culminate with violent action.67 This progression of the Individual 
Violence Process is common among workplace and school shooters, as well as criminal 
and ideological terrorists. The Department of Education and the Secret Service sought to 
disrupt this process for potential Active Shooters in U.S. IHEs by identifying pre-attack 
behaviors and communications that could be detectable for future attacks. 
Three assessment approaches emerged from the Secret Service perspective as 
potential methods of disrupting the Individual Violence Process and identifying potential 
Active Shooters prior to the incident. These assessment approaches consist of profiling, 
guided professional judgment, and automated decision making. First, profiling is defined 
by the Secret Service to include, “a range of identification techniques or assessment 
strategies that are used in both law enforcement and non-law enforcement settings.”68 
The Secret Service’s use of prospective profiling begins with a specific person and 
utilizes compiled characteristics of previous school shooters in order to predict future 
likelihood that the person in question will become an Active Shooter. Two principle 
sources were utilized by the Secret Service to construct the prospective profile template 
of an Active Shooter: The School Shooter Profile developed by the FBI and the 
Classroom Avenger developed by McGee and DeBernardo. Through a combination of 
commonalities in both of these profiles, the Secret Service developed their own Profile of 
an Active Shooter and is able to compare potential perpetrators to the profile in order to 
identify those who exceed the threshold for concern.69 
                                                 
67 Samuel Mayhugh, “Active Shooters: Behavior, Conditions, and Situations,” Active Shooter 
Awareness Virtual Roundtable, Washington, DC, September 27, 2011. 
68 Marisa Reddy, “Evaluating Risk for Targeted Violence in Schools: Comparing Risk Assessment, 
Threat Assessment, and Other Approaches,” Psychology in the Schools 38, no. 2 (2001): 161. 
69 Reddy, “Evaluating Risk for Targeted Violence in Schools: Comparing Risk Assessment, Threat 
Assessment, and Other Approaches,” 162. 
 23 
However, prospective profiling for potential Active Shooters is not yet specific 
enough to identify a student who is at risk for becoming an Active Shooter. Additionally, 
profiling of this nature carries a significant risk of false positives and the potential 
negative effects of falsely identifying students as potential Active Shooters is an 
intolerable risk for most IHEs. Additionally, both the U.S. Department of Education and 
the U.S. Department of Justice, in conjunction with many other nationally accredited 
education and mental health organizations, denounced practices of stereotyping students 
in their published action guide entitled Early Warning, Timely Response: A Guide to Safe 
Schools.70 Furthermore, the accuracy of a school shooter profile is questionable and, as a 
result, will inevitably exclude students who do not fit the profile but still pose a 
significant risk of becoming an Active Shooter. Likewise, an inaccurate profile will also 
falsely identify students as potential Active Shooters who, in reality, pose no significant 
threat.71 The challenges of creating an accurate profile are immense with 30% of 
offenders listed as unaffiliated or indirectly affiliated with the IHE, an accurate profile 
would also have to transcend the IHE boundaries and include threats from beyond the 
student and employee population.72 For these reasons, the use of prospective profiling in 
schools has received harsh criticism from parents, students, school administrators and 
even the Secretary of Education. These criticisms are centered largely around fears that 
profiling students in this manner has the potential to limit civil liberties and increase bias 
against minority groups based on criteria of race, appearance, religion, sexual orientation, 
and other contributing demographic factors.73 As a result, many IHEs will be extremely 
reluctant to adopt practices of prospective profiling on their campuses and the probability 
of these practices being standardized among all U.S. IHEs is extremely low.  
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The second assessment approach presented by the Secret Service as a potential 
means of disrupting the Individual Violence Process for potential Active Shooters is 
labeled Guided Professional Judgment. The practice of guided professional judgment 
begins when a trained and licensed mental health professional interviews a client. During 
the course of this interview, the counselor is able to evaluate their client’s potential for 
violent behavior through a comparison of base rates of violence within the individual’s 
population and relevant risk factors presented by the client. This process is aided through 
the use of checklists which assist the counselor in the collection and analysis of 
appropriate information. This approach is also known as structured clinical assessment.74 
Although these procedures are effective mental health practices, two obvious obstacles 
preclude guided professional judgment from effectively mitigating the effects of potential 
Active Shooters in U.S. IHEs. First, in order for this practice to be an effective means of 
Active Shooter prevention/preemption, these interviews would have to screen every 
member of the IHE population. As U.S. colleges and Universities are already struggling 
to meet current demand for routine student mental health, it is improbable that any IHE 
would devote the necessary staff, facilities and resources required to accomplish this 
task.75 Second, according to the Family Policy Compliance Office, a sub-committee of 
the Department of Education, mandating all students to capitulate to interviews of this 
nature would not only violate their civil liberties, it would also not be conducive to 
preserving a learning environment.76 These obstacles, combined with the limited 
availability of empirical research related to risk factors regarding targeted school violence 
make it highly improbable that the practice of guided professional judgment will emerge 
as an effective means of Active Shooter prevention.77  
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The third assessment approach presented by the Secret Service as a potential 
means of disrupting the Individual Violence Process for potential Active Shooters is 
known as Automated Decision Making. This process involves computer systems 
consisting of artificial intelligence informed by expert knowledge on a particular situation 
in order to render a solution or decision. As applied to the Active Shooter problem, the 
automated decision making process utilizes various methods and structures to compare 
compiled knowledge of targeted violence in U.S. IHEs against facts presented by the case 
at hand.78 However, as with the other possible forms of mental health focused 
prevention/preemption strategies, this too has significant obstacles to overcome if it is to 
become an effective means of Active Shooter prevention. First, like guided professional 
judgment, the practice of automated decision making would also have to be applied to the 
entirety of the IHE population as a screening mechanism if it were to be considered an 
effective means of Active Shooter prevention. Accordingly, this too would require an 
exorbitant amount of time, resources, and staff in order to compile relevant facts on every 
member of the IHE population. Furthermore, neither appropriate actuarial equations, nor 
agreement on the risk factors for evaluating risk regarding targeted violence have been 
finalized.79 For these reasons automated decision making, while it may prove to be a 
valuable resource for future prevention of Active Shooters in U.S. IHEs, offers no value 
to the current threat.  
In recognition of the fact that none of the preceding methods offered by the Secret 
Service and the Department of Education represent a plausible Active Shooter prevention 
strategy, the Secret Service offers the Threat Assessment Approach as their most effective 
preventative measure. The Threat Assessment Approach is comprised of operational 
activities that combine an investigative process and information-gathering strategies with 
target-violence relevant questions that are designed to identify, assess, and manage 
individuals with potential for becoming an Active Shooter. These questions seek to 
ascertain motivation, communication, unusual interests, attack-related behaviors, mental 
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condition, level of cognitive sophistication, recent losses, consistency, potential for harm, 
and contributing environmental problems.80 The threat assessment process involves three 
principle steps: identifying individuals with intent to attack, assessing an individual’s 
potential for violent action, and management of communicated threats. In the Safe 
Schools Initiative, the Secret Service suggested two principle areas in which to focus 
threat assessment efforts: developing detection and evaluation capabilities for 
information related to targeted school violence, and incorporating threat assessment 
findings when formulating strategies to prevent Active Shooters in IHEs.81 As identified 
in the Safe Schools Initiative, the Threat Assessment Approach has many valuable aspects 
for prevention of Active Shooters in IHEs. However, this method still possesses little 
potential for reducing the Rate of Kill for Active Shooter incidents.  
Conceding that profiling is ineffective, guided professional judgment is currently 
inappropriate, and automated decision making is not yet supported by the necessary 
empirical research; the Secret Service offers the Threat Assessment Approach as a good 
initial step toward preempting Active Shooters in U.S. IHEs.82 However, this approach 
also has significant obstacles and limitations. First, in order for a threat to be assessed, 
one has to be rendered and indentified. Therefore, this method ignores all Active 
Shooters who do not first communicate a threat in some form. Second, this method 
requires that a threat be properly identified and reported to the appropriate authorities. In 
order to be accomplished in U.S. IHEs, this method of Active Shooter prevention would 
operate on the premise that every student, faculty, and staff member is a sensor for 
detecting credible threats. The U.S. Department of Defense recently adopted a similar 
strategy claiming that, “every soldier was a sensor,” and, as a result, experienced an 
influx of inaccurate and useless information that only further obligated limited resources 
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and yielded negative returns.83 The principle problem experienced by the Department of 
Defense in adopting this policy was the inability to standardize or effectively qualify 
incoming information. Similarly, U.S. IHEs should expect the same difficulties when 
attempting to implement the Threat Assessment Approach for Active Shooter prevention. 
Additionally, as identified with every other form of mental health focused Active Shooter 
prevention/preemption measures, staffing, resourcing and time requirements for effective 
implementation of these strategies are unrealistic for IHEs.84  
The U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ), Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), 
Critical Incident Response Group (CIRG), and the National Center for the Analysis of 
Violent Crime (NCAVC) also presented a threat assessment model in their collaborative 
publication entitled The School Shooter: A Threat Assessment Perspective. In this report, 
Attorney General Janet Reno identified youth violence as the greatest single criminal 
problem in the U.S. and declared that the threat assessment and intervention 
recommendations included in the findings of this report represented a vital foundation for 
preemptive measures against the Active Shooter problem. FBI director Louis Freeh 
explained that the Threat Assessment Perspective provided a practical resource for 
prevention of targeted violence in U.S. IHEs. This study was based on findings of the 
NCAVC’s 1998 review of school shootings from a behavioral perspective in order to 
identify influential dynamics. Conceding that prediction of school shootings is almost 
impossible, the DOJ and FBI pursued the threat assessment approach, which informs 
judgment based on threat credibility and available resources, intent, and motivation of the 
threatener. Operating on the common agreement that most people do not switch instantly 
from non-violent to violent behavior, the DOJ and FBI identified signposts along the 
evolutionary path of violence as part of their Threat Assessment Perspective.85  
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One of the most significant signposts along this path to violence is a threat. As 
such, the Threat Assessment Perspective delineates the types of threats as direct threats, 
indirect threats, veiled threats, and conditional threats. The Threat Assessment 
Perspective also recommends considering specific and plausible details, emotional 
content, and precipitating stressors in order to effectively assess the threat as either a low, 
medium or high-level threat. In response to these threats, the DOJ and FBI recommend 
that a qualified school psychologist or counselor utilize a Four-Pronged Assessment 
Model consisting of: personality of the student, family dynamics, school dynamics, and 
social dynamics in order to properly assess threat level and credibility. Additionally, the 
DOJ and FBI recommend informing students and parents of school policies, designation 
of a threat assessment coordinator, and formation of a multidisciplinary team as 
guidelines for establishing and implementing an effective threat management system. 
However, all of these recommendations are contingent on the presence of a threat that 
precedes the incident of targeted violence. According to the DOE, DHS, FBI, and Secret 
Service collaborative review entitled Campus Attacks; of the 272 incidents of targeted 
violence occurring on U.S. IHEs from 1900 to 2008, threats, such as this only occurred in 
13% of the total incidents. Additionally, the Four Pronged Assessment can only be 
utilized if the identity of the threatener is known prior to the incident and affords no 
measure of mitigation to the anonymous threat. This is a troubling reality considering the 
NCAVC’s assessment that most threats are made anonymously. Furthermore, most of 
these recommendations, as well as the entire Four Pronged Assessment are based on the 
assumption that the perpetrator will be a student.86 However, contemporary examples and 
case studies included in this report confirm that the student population is only one portion 
of the total IHE population and attacks of targeted violence are only carried out by 
students 60% of the time.87 Lastly, as with all of the preceding mental health focused 
methods of Active Shooter prevention/preemption, shortages of qualified school 
psychologists and counselors make many of these recommendations impractical. 
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Although the DOJ and FBI articulate valuable contributions to the effort of Active 
Shooter prevention in IHEs, these recommendations are incomplete and, if utilized 
autonomously, would do very little to mitigate the effects of Active Shooters in IHEs.88  
With these considerations in mind, while observing the principle mission of IHEs 
as places of learning, any effective form of Active Shooter Mitigation must also preserve 
the educational environment and facilitate safe learning. The preceding arguments have 
effectively summarized the official recommendations put forth by the Department of 
Education, Department of Justice, U.S. Secret Service, Federal Bureau of Investigation, 
Critical Incident Response Group, and the National Center for the Analysis of Violent 
Crime. However, none of these organizations can guarantee with any considerable 
fidelity that their recommendations will be able to effetely prevent or preempt an Active 
Shooter attack. This unfortunate conclusion has been confirmed throughout the United 
States on countless IHE campuses. However, perhaps no example illustrates the realities 
of our first hypothesis better than the Virginia Tech shooting. Despite a considerable 
mental health history, repeated incidents of threatening behavior which were known to 
both VT campus police and faculty, as well as involuntary committal to a mental health 
hospital; no form or combination of the fore mentioned prevention and preemption 
methods were effective in preventing the VT shooter from caring out the deadliest mass 
shooting in U.S. history.    
Therefore, if prevention is not absolute, then any form of Active Shooter 
mitigation that is not capable of effectively implementing or supporting a tactical 
response is therefore irresponsible. Prevention/preemption measures will remain 
incapable of reducing the Rate of Kill for Active Shooter incidents because they lack the 
capability to meet effective crisis response criteria. These methods do not contain, 
control, or alert SWAT and nearby law enforcement personnel in response to an attack. 
Furthermore, they provide little capability to communicate with an Active Shooter and 
foster little innovation or adjustment to current SOPs and interagency cooperation. 
Although the U.S. Secret Service experiences great success with prevention and 
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preemption tactics utilized to protect dignitaries, these methods are much too resource 
intensive to be a realistic solution to every IHE or HOF; and therefore, additional 
resources and emphasis must be placed on responsive methods of mitigation for Active 
Shooter incidents. 
B. HYPOTHESIS 2: LAW ENFORCEMENT INTERDICTION OF THE 
ACTIVE SHOOTER IS INSUFFICIENT TO REDUCE THE RK 
Local and Federal Law Enforcement agencies, as well as police tactical 
organizations, such as the National Tactical Officer’s Association (NTOA) and the North 
American S.W.A.T. Training Association (NASTA) maintain that a tactical response is 
the most effective means of Active Shooter mitigation. Additionally, Active Shooter 
response training organizations, such as Advanced Law Enforcement Rapid Response 
Training (ALERRT) present a two-pronged approach to Active Shooter response 
advocating victim initiative and defensive actions coupled with aggressive Law 
Enforcement response. Since the University of Texas Tower shooting in 1966, Law 
Enforcement agencies have evolved and improved tactics and police organization to meet 
the emerging Active Shooter threat. While Law Enforcement and campus police officers 
are clearly better trained, equipped, and organized to meet this threat on today’s IHE 
campuses, certain operational realities preclude this form of Active Shooter response 
from mitigating the effects or reducing the Rate of Kill for these incidents with any 
degree of acceptable reliability. The first operational reality of Active Shooter scenarios 
is that when seconds count, the police are only minutes away. Law Enforcement 
capability to reduce the Rate of Kill in Active Shooter scenarios is limited by the 
separation of time and space between threat and First Responders at the outset of the 
incident. In every Active Shooter incident, each step of tactical response (alert, dispatch, 
response, neutralization) requires time. However, the unfortunate reality of Active 
Shooter scenarios is that increased Response Time and Incident Duration yields an 
increased Rate of Kill. Law enforcement response is delayed by the time required for 
Potential Victims to recognize the threat and call 911 and further delayed by time 
required for 911 dispatches to alert responding units. Although police response in most  
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locations is very quick, it is not immediate in any location and, as long as the average 
Response Time to an Active Shooter scenario is greater than the average Incident 
Duration, this solution will remain as ineffective as it is impractical. 
The second operational reality that precludes Law Enforcement tactical response 
from mitigating the effects of Active Shooters in IHEs is complacency. Complacency 
among federal departments, IHE administrators, and police agencies results in weak 
policies, as well as ill trained and equipped First Responders. Most IHEs are not willing 
to devote the necessary resources toward preventing a perceived low percentage threat, 
such as Active Shooter scenarios. However, according to the U.S. Secret Service, in 1998 
alone, 35 students were murdered and a quarter of a million more were seriously injured 
in acts of school violence.89 Meanwhile, not a single U.S. student has died in a school 
fire since the 1958 fire which consumed Our Lady of the Angels grade school on the 
West Side of Chicago, killing 92 children and three nuns.90 However, in response to the 
threat of fire in U.S. schools, well-crafted policies, alerting procedures, active control 
measures, and response standards have effectively mitigated this threat. On the other 
hand, although the International Association of Chiefs of Police and the Bureau of Justice 
Assistance confirm that Law Enforcement reaction is a critical component of a well-
coordinated response to crisis situations, such as Active Shooter incidents, no clear 
policy, alerting procedure, or active control measure has been able to assist Law 
Enforcement in the mitigation of this threat. Accordingly, Law Enforcement tactical 
response and integration with campus police or SROs was not mentioned at all in the 
DOE publication entitled Creating Safe and Drug-Free Schools: An Action Guide and no 
clear or concise plan capable of achieving the “5 C’s” (Contain, Control, Communicate, 
Call S.W.A.T., Create immediate action plan) is articulated in the Guide for Preventing 
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and Responding to School Violence.91 Additionally, no current national standard exists 
for the hiring criteria or training requirements for campus law enforcement officers.92 
While Law Enforcement response is indeed a critical component to an effective Active 
Shooter mitigation strategy, these discrepancies highlight that any response plan that 
relies solely on a tactical response is insufficient to reduce the Rate of Kill in Active 
Shooter scenarios.  
Law Enforcement Responsibilities: 
Guide for Preventing and Responding to School Violence: 
1. Respond to all reports of criminal activities in the school. Rapid response teams 
should be formed to help insure immediate intervention in all emergency 
situations.  
2.  Exercise appropriate rules of engagement when immediate intervention is needed, 
keeping in mind the safety of victims, bystanders, and first responders. 
3.  Establish and adhere to direction from the Incident Command System. 
4.  Establish appropriate security and response perimeters. Provide traffic control 
assistance to enable emergency services to get through to the school. 
5.  Develop lines of communication with affected schools’ administrations and 
district emergency operation centers or command posts. 
6.  Protect relevant evidence from contamination. Follow approved collection 
procedures to facilitate effective prosecution of perpetrators. 
7.  Help parents and/or guardians find their children. 
8.  Be prepared to assist with many unforeseeable duties. 
Table 3.   Law Enforcement Responsibilities for Response to Crisis Situations As 
Described by the “Guide for Preventing and Responding to School Violence,” 
Written by the International Association of Chiefs of Police and the Bureau of 
Justice Assistance.93 
Law Enforcement and Campus Police are the only agencies capable of imposing 
security in an Active Shooter Scenario and; therefore, no Active Shooter scene should be 
considered secure until one of these organizations has declared it as such. However, in a 
pure Law Enforcement interdiction strategy, containment of the environment (e.g., TA, 
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TZ, and AA) takes too long, and in some cases, could take hours. This reality was 
confirmed in the summer of 1999 at Columbine High School and, as a result, police 
tactics began to evolve. Previous practices of containing the scene, alerting S.W.A.T. and 
waiting for a properly trained and equipped Emergency Response Team are no longer 
hailed as valid tactics. Current policies regarding First Responder and Law Enforcement 
response to Active Shooter incidents advocate immediate response through formation of 
small contact teams and “direct-to-threat” movement techniques.94 Accordingly, 
containment of the incident becomes a secondary priority to threat mitigation and the 
initial First Responders to the incident will focus their efforts on responding to the threat. 
However, as additional Law Enforcement and campus police personnel arrive, 
containment can be achieved through the establishment of an inner and outer security 
perimeter and will deny avenues of escape and access to other possible victims, hostages, 
weapons, or resources for the shooter. These perimeters should also be established in 
such a manner as to limit information regarding the actions of first responders within the 
inner perimeter to bystanders located outside of the outer perimeter. Although 
containment is an integral component of Active Shooter response, it does not have to be 
achieved prior to threat mitigation. For this reason, current Law Enforcement and campus 
police policies emphasize threat mitigation as a higher priority to incident containment.95 
However, containment as described here, would require large numbers of Law 
Enforcement and campus security personnel, as well as synchronized modes of 
communication in order to effectively contain an Active Shooter scenario on most IHEs. 
Unfortunately, the time, resources, and manpower required to accomplish this task on 
most IHEs makes this aspect of Active Shooter tactical response unattainable in many 
instances.  
In response to Active Shooter scenarios, Law Enforcement and campus police 
tactics require that First Responders control both themselves and the situation. This level 
of control is accomplished through the evacuation of innocent personnel from both the 
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inner perimeter and outer perimeter when possible. Additionally, evacuation of injured 
personnel to medical treatment facilities and potential witnesses to qualified interrogators 
also assists in establishing situational control. Again, post-Columbine Law Enforcement 
Active Shooter response tactics regard threat mitigation as the paramount tactical 
objective and control can thereby be affected through threat mitigation as well.96 While 
this is true, average Law Enforcement and campus police response times to Active 
Shooter incidents afford a significant delta of uncontrolled time and space; and, until the 
incident is properly contained, the Active Shooter will maintain control of the 
environment.  
The ability to communicate at a tactical level through organically assigned 
communications assets represents a considerable advantage afforded to Law Enforcement 
personnel with regards to Active Shooter response. Effective communication is indeed 
the key to any successful tactical operation. However, in complex crisis environments, 
such as Active Shooter incidents, effective communication involves much more that 
merely inter-departmental communication. Instead, effective communication should be 
established with all First Responders, witnesses, and suspects in order to improve 
situational awareness and coordinate tactical maneuvers.97 Unfortunately, non-
standardized communication protocols limit interagency coordination at the tactical level 
and adversely affect Law Enforcement response.98 Furthermore, Law Enforcement 
agencies have no standardized means of initiating or maintaining communication with the 
shooter or suspects. Additionally, when First Responders are able to initiate 
communication with the shooter or suspects, many are not properly trained for the 
situation, as field negotiation is not a standardized module of instruction in most basic 
police academies. Effective communication is without question an integral component to  
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any Law Enforcement response capable of mitigating the effects of an Active Shooter. 
However, many limiting factors and environmental constraints negate the effectiveness of 
Law Enforcement and campus police capability to communicate.  
One such environmental constraint on communication is manifested in the 
alerting procedures pertaining to Active Shooter scenarios. Activation of the emergency 
response is incumbent on the Potential Victims and is dependent on non-standardized 
communication. This initial and crucial step of the tactical response to Active Shooters is 
facilitated through the 911-dispatch center with calls from landline and cellular phones. 
Although dispatching procedures are standardized after the emergency call is received by 
the 911-dispatch center, non-standardization of how these calls are initiated has the 
potential to delay response. For instance, if an emergency call is received from a cell 
phone, that call is automatically routed to the 911-dispatch center which is closest to the 
cell phone tower from where the call was received. However, as was the case during the 
Virginia Tech response, this is not always the closest 911-dispatch center to the crime 
and, as a result; these emergency calls can easily be routed to the incorrect police 
department. This discrepancy can have serious implications when it results in a delayed 
Law Enforcement response to the incident. 
Once First Responders have been dispatched to the emergency, further 
notifications and reports are the responsibility of the first responder and can be 
accomplished through organically assigned communication assets. In response to 
barricade or Hostage Rescue situations, First Responders also utilize these assets to call 
S.W.A.T. Although current police tactics no longer require First Responders to wait for a 
qualified S.W.A.T. team to respond to Active Shooter incidents, in Hostage Rescue or 
barricade situations these specialized teams of tactical police officers and negotiators are 
much more qualified to respond to these dynamic situations. For these reasons, S.W.A.T 
teams are dispatched to Active Shooter incidents, however; First Responders must remain 
prepared to take action if the situation deteriorates prior to the arrival of S.W.A.T.99 
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An effective tactical response to an Active Shooter incident is also dependent on 
the ability for Law Enforcement personnel and First Responders to create an Immediate 
Action Plan. Immediate action plans are typically implemented in Hostage Rescue and 
barricade situations and should be formulated as soon as practically possible. These plans 
should consider provisions for an Arrest Team, Recovery and Security Team, less than 
lethal options, sexual assault and countdown scenarios, as well as Active Shooter 
situations.100 However, immediate action plans are also an integral component to First 
Responder and initial Law Enforcement response to all Active Shooter scenarios, not just 
Hostage Rescue and barricade situations. While, these plans are not formalized, good 
tactical plans that are communicated among the responding officers will greatly increase 
the effectiveness of the response and help to reduce the Rate of Kill. However, the ability 
for responding officers to formulate and communicate these plans is limited by time 
constraints and availability of information. As with every component of a tactical 
response to an Active Shooter incident, environmental factors and situational limitations 
make Active Shooter response one of the most difficult and disadvantageous situations 
Law Enforcement and campus police officers can encounter. This reality has been 
evidenced in all 14 of the included case studies and was extremely evident during our 
analysis of the University of Texas Tower shooting.   
While containment SOPs give Law Enforcement officers, campus police and First 
Responders some advantage, the time elapsed from incident initiation to first response 
greatly reduces tactical surprise and thus, the disadvantages of this form of mitigation far 
outweigh any organizational advantage. The unfortunate realities presented by the 
dynamic and disadvantageous environment of an Active Shooter scenario also limit Law 
Enforcement capabilities to control the scene, communicate effectively, or create an 
immediate action plan. This assertion was demonstrated extensively during the 
University of Texas Tower shooting as ill-equipped and unprepared Law Enforcement 
and First Responders responded to a barricaded shooter who tormented a helpless crowd 
of UT students, staff, and faculty, as well as Guadalupe St. patrons from atop the UT 
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Tower for a terrifying 1 ½ hours. The UT Tower shooting was the first incident that 
alerted the country to the fact that Law Enforcement personnel and campus police are 
expected to respond to situations that many are not trained, equipped, or prepared for. 
Unfortunately, this lack of preparation and assets results in loss of life. In response to the 
UT Tower shooting, Law Enforcement agencies throughout the U.S. amended their 
tactics, improved training and established specially trained response units, which later 
became known as S.W.A.T., in order to better mitigate the effects of attacks like the one 
experienced on the UT campus. Although S.W.A.T is an extremely valuable and 
necessary asset to any police department, this capability still does not return any 
immediate advantages to victims or potential victims in these scenarios.  
As the Active Shooter threat evolved from UT to Columbine, and Virginia Tech; 
Law Enforcement agencies recognized an emerging need to change tactics from 
S.W.A.T. centric methods of interdiction to response methods that were more capable of 
providing timely interdiction through the use of small contact teams of responding police 
officers. Although many quality-training facilities,, such as ALERRT are available to 
teach these Active Shooter response tactics to Law Enforcement and campus police 
organizations, not every department has received this training or maintains proficiency in 
it. Additionally, current alerting procedures and dispatch policies allow for a considerable 
Incident Duration. The Incident Duration must be interrupted in some way at the outset 
of the shooting in order to allow First Responders the time required to react effectively to 
the Target Areas and Threat Zones. A comprehensive literature review of current policies 
and relevant cases reveals that current IHE alerting systems reliant upon a 911 
notification are not adequate to reduce Response Time or to impose any of the “5 C’s” in 
order to mitigate the effects of an Active Shooter or to decrease the Incident Duration. 
C. HYPOTHESIS 3: A VICTIM INITIATED MITIGATION SYSTEM WILL 
SUFFICIENTLY SYNCHRONIZE IMMEDIATE CONTROL MEASURES 
WITH A PRESCRIBED SET OF AUTOMATED AND STANDARDIZED 
RESPONSES IN ORDER TO REDUCE THE RK 
Although many federal security, education, and mental health departments have 
contributed recommendations for Active Shooter mitigation in IHEs, the U.S. 
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Department of Homeland Security emerges as the largest proponent for victim actions. In 
a collaborative effort entitled Active Shooter: How to Respond; DHS, along with NTOA 
and the Fairfax County Police Department, identified preparedness and response of 
Potential Victims as the most effective means to reduce the Rate of Kill in Active Shooter 
scenarios.101 In similar fashion, the threat of fire in IHEs and HOFs, has been effectively 
mitigated through the utilization of a victim initiated system commonly referred to as the 
fire alarm. In response to an increasing threat of fire losses in the U.S. resulting in over 
10,000 annual deaths by 1946, President Harry S. Truman convened The President’s 
Conference on Fire Prevention Action Program in 1947. As a result, fire alarms 
accompanied with complementary response policies and procedures required to 
effectively support a victim-initiated alert were introduced.102 This fundamental change 
of victim responsibility and action has drastically reduced Response Time and Incident 
Duration of fires in IHEs and, as a result, has reduced current fire casualties in these 
facilities to Zero103. Likewise, a Victim Initiated Mitigation (VIM) system utilized in 
IHEs and HOFs incorporating automated control measures and complementary response 
protocols also represents the only realistic means of reducing Response Time and Incident 
Duration for Active Shooter scenarios. 
A Victim Initiated Mitigation system capable of mitigating the effects of an 
Active Shooter in IHEs would have to impose the 5C’s in an immediate or timely 
manner. Similar to fire response active control measures initiated by the fire alarm, such 
as sprinkler systems, fire extinguishers and fire evacuation plans; effective Active 
Shooter mitigation in IHEs also requires a victim initiated response coupled with active 
control measures. This methodology represents a fundamental shift in current Active 
Shooter response and victim responsibilities; however, a victim initiated response is the 
only means of imposing the 5C’s in a practical manner. First, a VIM system can 
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immediately notify Law Enforcement while simultaneously containing the threat utilizing 
facility lockdown and mass alert protocols. The Active Shooter threat can be contained 
immediately with an automated lock down of the Threat Zone and can be further 
contained through the selective lock down of other adjacent IHE facilities. Second, the 
Victim Initiated Response and Automated Lockdown (VIRAL) will also limit the Active 
Shooter’s control by denying his freedom of movement and limiting all movement within 
the IHE facility to egress only. A VIRAL activation will also increase Law Enforcement 
and First Responder control during Active Shooter scenarios by permitting complete 
access to all areas of the facility through special access protocols. Third, communication 
is greatly increased with establishment of an immediate dialogue between the Incident 
Command Center and the Target Area. Additionally, all students and faculty can also be 
alerted and given initial guidance via prepared messages delivered through numerous 
networked and personally owned communication devices. Furthermore, campus police, 
local Law Enforcement, Fire, Rescue and S.W.A.T. resources can be simultaneously 
called by the ICC. Additionally, improved situational awareness provided by a VIM 
system supporting two-way communication between the ICC and the Threat Area, as 
well as real time video of the Threat Room will greatly assist in the creation of an 
Immediate Action Plan. In an unpredictable and disadvantageous environment, such as an 
Active Shooter scenario, these automated actions will improve situational awareness and 
impose control within IHE facilities, and afford First Responders the capability to 
significantly reduce the Rate of Kill. Furthermore, by coupling victim actions with 
automated control measures and Law Enforcement response, the facade of current IHE 
safety can be replaced with Victim Initiated Mitigation.  
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IV. CASE STUDIES  
A. VIRGINIA TECH (BLACKSBURG, VA)  
On April 16, 2007, Seung Hui Cho committed the deadliest mass shooting in 
American history as he murdered 32 and injured 17 students and faculty in two related 
incidents on the Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University (Virginia Tech) 
campus.104 This case study will examine Cho’s mental health history, the contributing 
factors leading up to this tragedy and the security control measures in place at Virginia 
Tech prior to the shooting. Additionally, this case study will analyze both the West 
Ambler Johnston residence hall double homicide and the Norris lecture hall mass murder 
including a detailed timeline of events and Emergency Rescue Team (ERT) response. 
Finally, security and control measure upgrades made on the Virginia Tech campus since 
the attack will be described and analyzed for their capacity to prevent or mitigate this 
type of event in the future.  
1. Virginia Tech Prior to the Incident 
In order to place the events of April 16, 2007 in the proper context, the setting and 
security posture of the university must first be accurately depicted. Although the fact 
remains that Virginia Tech was the scene of the worst school shooting in U.S. history, the 
organic control measures and security posture were not substandard or dissimilar to the 
majority of U.S. colleges and universities nationwide. Therefore, by describing the 
physical security, emergency alerting system, emergency response plan and emergency 
assets available at the time of the incident, conclusions can be drawn to assist in 
mitigating the effects of future Active Shooter attacks.  
Virginia Tech is a beautiful campus consisting of 131 major buildings dispersed 
over 2,600 acres, positioned at the foothills of the Blue Ridge Mountains in Blacksburg, 
VA.105 The university is an open campus with 16 roadways permitting unrestricted 
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ingress and egress of students, staff, faculty and guests. Persistent construction required 
to support the university’s projected growth is accompanied by the unfortunate side effect 
of associated consistent construction noise. On April 16, 2007 Virginia Tech hosted a 
total estimated campus population of 34,503 consisting of 26,370 students (9,000 of 




Figure 3.   Aerial View #1 of the Virginia Tech Campus highlighting Harper Hall 
(Cho’s Dormitory), Norris Hall (Scene of the Mass Shooting) and West 
Ambler Johnston Hall (Scene of the Double Homicide). 
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Figure 4.   Aerial View #2 of the Virginia Tech Campus highlighting Harper Hall 
(Cho’s Dormitory), Norris Hall (Scene of the Mass Shooting) and West 
Ambler Johnston Hall (Scene of the Double Homicide). 
The Virginia Tech Police Department (VTPD) is an accredited Police Force. The 
officers assigned to the VTPD meet all Virginia state requirements and are credentialed 
as accredited Peace Officers. The VTPD also maintains an Emergency Rescue Team 
(ERT) capability.107 The mission of the VTPD is:  
The Virginia Tech Police Department strives to enhance the safety and quality of 
life for students, faculty, staff and visitors through effective law enforcement and 
proactive crime prevention in partnership with the university community. The VTPD 
Chief on April 16 was Chief Wendell Flinchum, a native of Blacksburg who spent his 
entire career with the VTPD beginning in 1983. Chief Flinchum was selected as the 
VTPD Chief of Police over 90 candidates in December of 2006.108 Chief Flinchum 
commanded a well-respected Police Department consisting of a Patrol Division, 
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Investigative Unit, Emergency Response Team (ERT), K-9 program, administrative 
Division, and Communications unit. Additionally, the VTPD fosters positive 
relationships with the student population through the implementation of programs, such 
as the Adopt-A-Hall Program which links VTPD to students and RAs in Residence Halls, 
and the Student Police Academy offered twice per year which provides with an inside 
look of the VTPD and their Standard Operating Procedures.109  
On April 16, 2007, the VTPD consisted of 35 officers. Normal operating 
procedures included a day shift that began at 0700 and consisted of five officers on patrol 
with an additional nine officers who work office hours of 0800–1700 totaling 14 officers 
on duty during a typical weekday. Even though the VTPD is an accredited police 
department, it is still understaffed and incapable of responding to major events in an 
autonomous manner. For this reason, the VTPD entered into a mutual aid agreement with 
the Blacksburg Police Department (BPD). This partnership requires joint training and 
coordination for immediate emergency response assistance. This training and 
coordination provides the additional support required for the VTPD to fulfill its purpose 
as stated in the university’s Emergency Response Plan.110 
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Figure 5.   Virginia Tech Emergency Reporting Guidance as of 2007 
In addition to the VTPD, organic university security control measures include 
controlled access to residence halls that require a student or staff keycard for entrance 
between 2200 and 1000 hours. Furthermore, these keycards only grant individual access 
for assigned dormitories and mailbox areas. With the exception of staff offices, many 
buildings on campus are considered public spaces and open 24 hours daily along with 
most classrooms on campus that have no locks. Additionally, there are no guards or 
cameras over-watching the entrances or hallways of most Virginia Tech campus 
buildings. Although loudspeaker systems are present in some buildings, they were not 
centrally networked and required someone to speak into an intercom in each building. In 
light of the horrific events that occurred on this campus on April 16, 2007, the preceding 
security posture seems extremely lackadaisical and insufficient. However, this level of 
security is not uncommon and, is in fact, quite typical of most university campuses that 




appropriate when compared to the basic mission of Institutions of Higher Education that 
is to provide a peaceful and open campus setting that encourages freedom of movement 
and expression.111  
Virginia Tech’s existing emergency alerting system was in the process of being 
updated in the spring of 2007. At that time, the university’s system had the capability to 
send emergency messages to all students, staff and faculty via a broadcast email system. 
Virginia Tech also utilizes the university’s home webpage for posting emergency 
messages. This site has a high volume capacity and even as the events of April 16, 2007 
unfolded, the site was able to sustain over 148,000 hits per hour. Emergency messages, 
usually weather related, are posted on this webpage in a box directly on the primary 
screen so that users will see the message as soon as they are on the site.112 Virginia Tech 
also maintains contact with local radio and television stations in the surrounding area and 
has the capability to send emergency messages to these stations that can be played 
immediately. This capability affords the Virginia Tech administration the ability to send 
an emergency message via multiple media platforms and inform not only the university 
population, but the local area population as well. In the spring of 2007, Virginia Tech was 
also in the process of installing a Unified Campus Alerting System. This multimedia 
messaging system is capable of sending parallel emergency messages to registered 
computers, cell phones, PDAs, and telephones.113 Registered users of this system can 
include students, staff, faculty, and parents. All students are strongly encouraged to 
register with this system, but are not required to do so. Transmission of emergency 
messages utilizing this system to the entire university population on all multimedia 
devices can be completed in less than one minute. Drawbacks to this system are cost and 
available bandwidth to accommodate the surge of messages.114 Equally important as 
having an efficient and expeditious means to deliver emergency messages is the plan for  
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message delivery, content, and timing. In the case of Virginia Tech on April 16, the 
Virginia Tech Policy Group and the Virginia Tech Police Chief had the authority to send 
an emergency message to the university population.115  
2. The Events of April 16, 2007 
a. West Ambler Johnston Hall 
In the early hours of April 16, Seung Hui Cho departed his dormitory 
(Harper Hall) and walked to West Ambler Johnston (WAJ) Hall. After gaining access to 
the dormitory, Cho made his way to room 4040, which was Emily Hilscher’s room. Miss 
Hilscher had just returned with her boyfriend who was a student at Radford University. 
Although Cho had a previous history of stalking other female students on the Virginia 
Tech campus, there was no previous recorded connection between Cho and Emily 
Hilscher prior to her murder.116  
At approximately 0715, Cho shoots Emily Hilscher. In response to the loud 
noises, Resident Advisor, Ryan Clark, who lived in the adjacent room, went to Emily 
Hilscher’s room in order to investigate. Police reports filed as part of the crime scene 
investigation indicate that Ryan Clark confronted Cho and was shot as well. The loud 
noises resulting from Cho’s fatal gun shots, killing Emily Hilscher and Ryan Clark and 
the sounds of their bodies falling to the floor, were initially misinterpreted by other 
students in the dormitory as someone falling out of a loft bed. As a result, a student 
residing in a nearby room called the VTPD and a police officer and EMS team was 
dispatched to the dormitory. Upon arriving to room 4040 at 0742, the police officer 
identified the wounds sustained by Emily Hilscher and Ryan Clark as gunshot wounds 
and immediately called for additional police assistance and the EMS team began to 
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Montgomery Regional Hospital and then to Carilion Roanoke Memorial Hospital where 
she died. Ryan Clark was transported to Montgomery Regional Hospital where he was 





Figure 6.   Front Entrance of West Ambler Johnston 
Meanwhile, Cho exited the building unnoticed and arrived at his dormitory 
(Harper Hall) at 0717 where he changed clothes and checked his email at 0725. He then 
proceeded to delete all of his emails, wipe out his university account, as well as remove 
and dispose of his cell phone and computer hard drive. Between 0725 and 0900, an 
individual fitting Cho’s description was seen by the duck pond.118 At 0901, Cho mailed a 
package containing his seven page written manifesto along with a video recording of 
himself interpreting the manifesto and photos of himself with an assortment of guns to 
NBC News in New York. Cho also mailed a letter to the English Department at this 
time.119 After Cho mailed his items, his exact course to Norris Hall is unknown.120 
Upon notification of the double homicide, VTPD Chief Wendell Flinchum called 
for additional resources from the Blacksburg Police Department (BPD) and crime scene 
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investigators were sent to WAJ Hall. After investigators arrived, students were 
interviewed and the dormitory was locked down.121 As a result of the initial crime scene 
investigation, Emily Hilscher’s boyfriend was quickly identified as a “person of interest” 
by the VTPD and BPD. At the conclusion of the crime scene investigation, no other 
pieces of evidence or leads identified Cho as the shooter. Acting on their initial lead, law 
enforcement officers reached a premature conclusion and focused their efforts on the 
boyfriend.122 Although this conclusion was false and diverted investigative efforts, an 
unanticipated but beneficial result was the alert and posture of the VTPD and BPD ERTs 
in order to make anticipated arrests.123  
Once informed of the double homicide in WAJ Hall by Chief Flinchum, President 
Steger immediately convened the Emergency Policy Group in order to decide on 
appropriate content and timing of a notification to the university community. The Policy 
Group delivered a carefully worded alert notification message more than two hours after 
the WAJ double homicide.124 Just before 0930, the Virginia Tech University population 
received the following emergency notification: 
A shooting incident occurred at West Ambler Johnston earlier this 
morning. Police are on the scene and are investigating. The university 
community is urged to be cautious and are asked to contact Virginia Tech 
Police if you observe anything suspicious or with information on the case. 
Contact Virginia Tech Police at 231–6411. Stay tuned to the www.vt.edu. 
We will post as soon as we have more information.125 
b. Norris Hall 
In response to the double homicide at WAJ Hall, many more police 
officers than normal were on the Virginia Tech Campus. Additionally, both the VTPD 
and the BPD ERTs were assembled, pre-positioned at the BPD headquarters and postured 
to make arrests resulting from the initial crime scene investigation currently underway at 
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WAJ Hall. Meanwhile, Cho left the post office at approximately 0901 and proceeded to 
Norris Hall wearing a backpack which he used to conceal his two pistols, nearly 400 
rounds of ammunition (most of which was preloaded into magazines), a knife, heavy 
chains, and a hammer. Cho also wore a lightweight coat this morning in order to conceal 
his tactical shooting vest. Once at Norris Hall, Cho chained all three main exterior doors 
in order to delay response and to trap potential victims.126  
 
 
Figure 7.   One of the Main Entrances of Norris Hall 
The chains were noticed by some students prior to the shooting, but were 
not reported. In one instance, a female student on her way into Norris Hall noticed the 
entrance doors chained shut and crawled through a window in order to get to her 
destination inside the building. Another group of students attempting to leave the 
building also noticed the chains but did not report them to any staff or faculty members. 
The complacent nature of the student populace and frequent construction on campus 
explains why, in both instances, the students dismissed the chains as part of a campus 
construction project and carried on with their daily activities.127 After Cho chained the 
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exterior doors, he roamed the halls of the second floor peering into classrooms. Without 
saying a word, Cho entered the Advanced Hydrology engineering class of Professor G. 
V. Loganathan, located in room 206, where he killed the instructor and continued 
shooting at the 13 students present for class in room 206 that fateful morning. Of the 13 
students, nine were killed, two were injured, and two were unharmed. Cho carried out his 
actions in complete silence without saying a word. He gave no indication of rationale or 
motive during the entire incident that lasted 11 minutes from approximately 0940 to 
0951. As Cho began his massacre, in room 206, Jocelyne Couture-Nowak who was the 
French teacher in the adjacent room (room 211) asked student, Colin Goddard, to call 9-
1-1. Goddard’s call was initially routed to the BPD and was received at 0941 and was 
then rerouted to the VTPD and received at 0942. Students throughout Norris hall, most of 
which are unfamiliar with the sound of live gunfire, were initially confused by the loud 
noises. Some professors even demanded that class continue as planned until fleeing 
students followed by Cho revealed the true seriousness of the situation.128  
After leaving room 206 Cho walked across the hall to room 207, a German 
class taught by Christopher Bishop. Cho shot professor Bishop and several students has 
he entered the room. Once inside, he moved up and down the aisles of the classroom 
shooting other students as he came to them. Before Cho left room 207, he had killed 
Professor Bishop and four additional students, as well as wounded another six. Cho then 
moved to Professor Nowak’s class in room 211. Despite efforts to barricade the door with 
furniture, Cho pushed his way into the classroom and, without saying a word, proceeded 
to open fire on the classroom. Goddard, the student who had called 9-1-1, was among the 
first to be shot. As he fell to the floor, another student named Emily Hass retrieved his 
cell phone and, although she was slightly wounded twice in the head by bullets, remained 
on the line with the 9-1-1 dispatch for the remainder of the shooting.129  
Students in room 205 barricaded the door with their bodies and feet. 
Despite Cho’s efforts to force his way into the room, he was unsuccessful and his 
haphazard shots fired through the door into the classroom did not result in any injuries. 
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As Cho returned to the German class in room 207, the remaining able-bodied students, 
some uninjured and some injured, barricaded the door with their bodies as well. Although 
Cho was able to open the door slightly and fire shots into the classroom, the shots fired 
were not effective and Cho eventually ceased at his attempt to re-enter and no further 
injuries were sustained in room 207. After being denied entry into room 207, he moved 
back to room 211 where he walked up and down each aisle shooting students again. 
Although Goddard was shot two more times by Cho, he continued to play dead. 
Ultimately, Cho killed the professor and eleven students and injured another six in room 
211.130  
While on his way to room 204, an engineering class taught by Professor 
Liviu Librescu, a janitor saw Cho reloading his pistols in the hallway and fled. Cho then 
continued his movement to room 204. As Cho arrived to the classroom, Professor 
Lebrescu braced his body against the door and told the students to exit through the 
window. Ten of the 16 students present in the class were able to escape by leaping the 19 
feet from the second floor class window to the ground below. Professor Librescu was 
fatally shot through the door by Cho, and once in the classroom, Cho proceeded to kill 
one student and seriously injured three others.131 
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Figure 8.   Norris Hall Classroom Windows on the Side of Professor Librescu’s 
Classroom 
The classrooms in Norris hall are mostly square and furnished with 
lightweight furniture. None of the classroom doors were lockable from the inside and 
there was no available messaging system by which professors could initiate or receive an 
alert. This design afforded the students and faculty in Norris Hall no reliable ability to 
effectively barricade classrooms or call for help. Ten minutes passed from the receipt of 
the first 9-1-1 call to the end of the incident when Cho finally committed suicide. Within 
that timeframe, Cho fired 174 rounds from two semiautomatic pistols (9mm Glock and 
.22 cal Walther) for which he had 19 total high capacity magazines. He fired most of his 
shots from point blank range and killed 30 students and faculty members and injured 
another 17 before finally shooting himself in the head at approximately 0951.132  
3. Analysis 
Virginia Tech’s existing emergency alerting system was in the process of being 
updated in the spring of 2007. At that time, the university’s system had the capability to 
send emergency messages to all students, staff and faculty via a broadcast email system. 
While this feature greatly expedites the flow of information in an emergency situation, 
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there are significant, inherent shortfalls with this aspect of the emergency alerting system. 
First, unless you are actively monitoring your email account at the time the alert is sent, 
then there will be a significant delay between message sent and message received. 
Second, the authority and capability to send such a message rested with the University 
Associate Vice President for University Relations. Although this individual has the 
capability to send this message from anywhere via internet connectivity, the emergency 
must first be verified before an alert can be sent. Additionally, the Virginia Tech email 
system had 36,000 registered email addresses as of April 16, 2007. With a message 
distribution rate of 10,000 messages per minute, the process of sending an emergency 
message alone takes 3.6 minutes.133 Considering the steps required in order to send an 
emergency message and the constraints of the available network for broadcast email 
alerts; even by assigning a minimal and unrealistic time of one minute to each of the steps 
required in the emergency messaging process, the total time from incident occurrence to 
emergency message receipt would be 12.6 minutes.134 As the average Active Shooter 
Incident is 12.5 minutes, on average, a system, such as this would not be able to even 
alert the university population prior to the culmination of the incident.135  
 
Figure 9.   Virginia Tech Abbreviated Emergency Alerting Procedure 
Virginia Tech also utilizes the university’s home webpage for posting emergency 
messages. This site has a high volume capacity and even as the events of April 16, 2007 
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unfolded, the site was able to sustain over 148,000 hits per hour. Emergency messages, 
usually weather related, are posted on this webpage in a box directly on the primary 
screen so that users will see the message as soon as they are on the site.136 While this 
asset provides many great features and capabilities for delivering emergency messages, it 
too has significant shortfalls. First, as with the broadcast email, users must be either 
actively monitoring the web page or navigate to it in order to receive the emergency 
message. Second, this web page is typically used for less time sensitive emergencies, 
such as weather alerts, as well as standard student and staff notices. As a result, a high 
level of information saturation encourages webpage users to ignore alerts.  
Virginia Tech also maintains contact with local radio and television stations in the 
surrounding area and has the capability to send emergency messages to these stations that 
can be played immediately. This capability affords the Virginia Tech administration the 
ability to send an emergency message via multiple media platforms and inform not only 
the university population, but the local area population as well. However, as with the 
previous two capabilities, this one too has significant shortfalls. First, this process 
requires university officials to present validation codes for each radio or television station 
in order to prevent false reports. As a result, the process for transmitting an emergency 
message in this manner takes approximately 20 minutes.137 This time added to the 
existing time required to validate an emergency through the university’s own abbreviated 
validation process would take a minimum of 29 minutes. This too is well in excess of the 
12.5 minutes of duration for the average Active Shooter scenario. Additionally, 
emergency messages delivered in this manner have the potential to attract more curious 
bystanders or concerned citizens to the situation and further complicate the problem. 
Although text messages delivered via cell phones would probably provide a more 
expedient means by which to alert the university population, this feature was not yet 
installed as part of the Virginia Tech emergency alerting system on April 16, 2007. 
Instead, the university had a broadcast phone-mail system in place that is capable of 
sending a phone message to all registered phone numbers. However, this system required 
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voluntary registration so messages are only sent to those phones that are registered. An 
emergency message was delivered to registered users on April 16. As the Associate Vice 
President for University Relations stated in the Report to the Review Panel presented to 
Governor Kaine, this method of emergency notification requires 11 separate actions and 
is not a useful approach to time critical alerts. In addition to the previously listed 
emergency notification capabilities, additional sporadic assets, such as loudspeaker 
systems, bullhorns and human relay utilizing Resident Advisors and floor wardens round 
out the Virginia Tech capabilities that were in place at the time of the Active Shooter 
incident on April 16.138  
Equally important as having an efficient and expeditious means to deliver 
emergency messages is the plan for message delivery, content, and timing. In the case of 
Virginia Tech on April 16, the Virginia Tech Policy Group and the Virginia Tech Police 
Chief had the authority to send an emergency message to the university population. 
Virginia Tech policy at the time of the incident directed the Police Chief to consult with 
the Virginia Tech Policy Group, consisting of the university president and senior 
university officials, prior to sending any messages. Although the chief had the authority 
to send a message, he did not possess the means to do so. In fact, only two individuals on 
the university staff possessed the authority and the means to send an emergency message 
to the university population: the Associate Vice President for University Relations and 
the Director of News and Information. Furthermore, Virginia Tech had no preset 
messages for different types of emergencies prepared in advance. Each message sent 
through the Virginia Tech emergency alert system was individually crafted at the time of 
the incident.139 The university Policy Group also issued five additional messages to the 
community that, while they assisted in informing the university population after the 
incident was over, had no effect on reducing the rate of kill. The five messages are 
outlined in Table 6. 
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Messages issued by the Virginia Tech University Policy Group to the Community in 
Response to the Norris Hall Shooting 
Time Message 
0950 “A gunman is loose on campus. Stay in buildings until further notice. Stay away from all windows.” 
1015 
“Virginia Tech has cancelled all classes. Those on campus are asked to remain where they are, 
lock their doors, and stay away from windows. Persons off campus are asked not to come to 
campus.” 
1050 
“In addition to an earlier shooting today in West Ambler Johnston, there has been a multiple 
shooting with multiple victims in Norris Hall. Police and EMS are on the scene. Police have one 
shooter in custody and as part of routine police procedure; they continue to search for a second 
shooter. “All people in university buildings are required to stay inside until further notice. All 
entrances to campus are closed.” 
1130 
“Faculty and staff located on the Burruss Hall side of the drill field are asked to leave their 
office and go home immediately. Faculty and staff located on the War Memorial/Eggleston Hall 
side of the drill field are asked to leave their offices and go home at 12:30 p.m.” 
1215 
“Virginia Tech has closed today Monday, April 16, 2007. On Tuesday, April 17, classes will be 
cancelled. The university will remain open for administrative operations. There will be an 
additional university statement presented today at noon.  
“All students, faculty and staff are required to stay where they are until police execute a planned 
evacuation. A phased closing will be in effect today; further information will be forthcoming as 
soon as police secure the campus. 
“Tomorrow there will be a university convocation/ ceremony at noon at Cassell Coliseum. The 
Inn at Virginia Tech has been designated as the site for parents to gather and obtain 
information.” 
Table 4.   These Messages Were Issued to the Virginia Tech Community in Response to 
the Norris Hall Shooting by the Virginia Tech University Policy Group  
(From 140) 
These messages were all issued too late to be of any security value and, as a 
result, did not affect the Rate of Kill for this instance at all. While these messages 
arguably had a moderate value for facilitating the exit plan for personnel currently on the 
campus, the university has received harsh criticism for the untimely nature and the vague 
content of these messages.140 
According to university records, 148 students were registered for class convening 
at 0905 in Norris Hall on April 16. At least 31 students did not go to class that day which 
means that at least 100 or possibly as many as 120 students (counting those who 
happened to be in the building but were not registered for 0905 classes) were in Norris 
Hall at the time of the shooting. Additionally, other university administrative staff 
members were present in Norris Hall at this time as well, but none of them were injured 
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or killed. Of the students and faculty present, 30 were killed, 17 were injured by gunfire, 
6 were injured by jumping from windows, and 4 sustained injuries from other causes. 
Room 211 suffered the highest casualty count at 12 followed by room 206 with 10, 207 
with 5, 204 with 2, and 225 with 1. These casualties are further depicted in Tables 4 and 
5.141 When analyzing these totals, the most significant conclusion relative to Active 
Shooter mitigation is generated when these casualties are compared in the order in which 
they occurred. Cho began killing victims in room 206, he then moved to 207, then 211, 
then 205, then back to 207 and back to 211 before killing himself. Room 206 had a 77% 
kill ratio of persons present versus persons killed. Room 207 had a 38% kill ratio, room 
211 had a 67% kill ratio, and room 205 had zero persons killed. As Cho returned to room 
207, he found the door barricaded and was unable to re-enter or to inflict further injuries. 
Throughout this incident, in every instance where potential victims took action, whether 
it was jumping out of windows, barricading doors, calling police, or playing dead, the 
Rate of Kill was decreased.142 Although this example provides strong evidence in support 
of victim response in incidents, such as this, lack of a standardized response and 
immediate control measures still affords victims and potential victims little advantage 
during Active Shooter scenarios. The Virginia Tech shooting demonstrated that victims 
and potential victims are the only immediate responders to an Active Shooter and lends 
great support to our third hypothesis which maintains that a Victim Initiated Mitigation 
system that is able to sufficiently synchronize immediate control measures with a 
prescribed set of automated responses would have been capable of reducing the Rate of 
Kill in this instance.  
Due to the delayed release of the initial message issued by the Policy Group, 
some students and faculty were already in their 0905 class. If the Policy Group could 
have released the message earlier, more members of the university population could have 
been alerted prior to class.143 In addition to the untimely emergency notification, the 
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Virginia Tech university administration received harsh criticism for not locking down the 
campus in response to the murders at WAJ Hall. However, upon further analysis of the 
feasibility of locking down a campus as large as Virginia Tech with a total population of 
35,000 people, this task proves not only to be unfeasible, but impossible with the current 
university infrastructure and security.144 With a population of 35,000 people and a 
university composition of 131 major buildings, the process of locking this institution 
down could be likened to locking down a small city. In defense of the university 
administration’s decision not to lock the campus down in response to the WAJ double 
homicide, if a murder were to occur in a small city of similar dimensions, the entire city 
is not typically locked down.145 However, in response to this argument, it can easily be 
argued that universities have more control over their population and facilities than 
municipal leadership and law enforcement have over the population and facilities in their 
city. Additionally, parental expectations of university security are higher than reasonable 
expectations of security within a given city.146 As the findings of the Report of the 
Review Panel presented to Governor Kaine indicate, parents, students, staff, and faculty 
all have an expectation that the university will be locked down in some manner in 
response to an incident, such as the one that occurred on April 16.  
The preceding list of poorly managed and inadequate alert systems coupled with 
an extremely cumbersome and inefficient chain of command is indicative of a poor 
Emergency Response Plan. The plan in place on April 16, 2007 was two years old and 
included no specific instructions for a school shooting incident.147 Instead, the plan 
broadly divides all emergencies into categories (0, I, II, or III). The events of April 16 
constitute the highest level of emergency as outlined in this plan. A level III emergency 
requires the designation of an Emergency Response Coordinator (ECR), and 
establishment of an Emergency Operations Center (EOC), as well as Satellite Operations 
Centers to assist the ERC. Virginia Tech’s Emergency Response plan also goes on to 
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identify two key decision groups: the Policy Group and the Emergency Response 
Resources Group.148 While this plan goes into great detail with regards to the 
establishment of positions and descriptions of the authorities and responsibilities of those 
positions, it does not provide a clear tactical response to an emergency situation, such as 
the one experienced on April 16. 
 
Norris Hall Student Census for April 16, 2007 0905 Classes 
 
Table 5.   Results from a Norris Hall Student Census for April 16, 2007 0905 Classes 
From 147) 
 
Norris Hall Faculty Census for April 16, 2007 
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Key Security Recommendations as Prescribed by the Virginia Tech Review Panel 
Recommendation Number Virginia Tech Review Panel Recommendation 
VIII-1 Campus police everywhere should train with local police departments 
on response to active shooters and other emergencies. 
VIII-2 Dispatchers should be cautious when giving advice or instructions by 
phone to people in a shooting or facing other threats without knowing 
the situation. 
VIII-3 Police should escort survivors out of buildings, where circumstances 
and manpower permit. 
VIII-4 Schools should check the hardware on exterior doors to ensure that 
they are not subject to being chained shut 
VIII-5 Take bomb threats seriously. Students and staff should report them 
immediately, even if most do turn out to be false alarms. 
Table 7.   Key Security Recommendations as Prescribed by the Virginia Tech Review 
Panel in Regards to the Mass Shooting at Norris Hall 
In the Report to the Virginia Tech Review Panel ordered by Governor Kaine, 
several key findings were identified as a result of an in depth review of the Virginia Tech 
emergency response to the mass shooting carried out by Seung Hui Cho on April 16. The 
first of which was that there was no provision for a school shooting anywhere in the 
entire plan.149 This oversight was the largest contributing factor to the disjointed and 
ineffective emergency response experienced on April 16. This also accounts for the lack 
of student awareness, and training for staff, and faculty regarding Active Shooter 
scenarios. Additionally, the VTPD was not placed high enough in the decision making 
hierarchy.150 This greatly contributed to the delay in alerting the university population to 
the emergency situation. Also contributing to this delay, was the cumbersome emergency 
response policy that requires that a Policy Group be convened in order to decide whether 
to send a message to the university population and to compose its contents. Furthermore, 
lack of basic security control measures on all buildings and an efficient means of 
emergency notification also greatly compounded the events of April 16.151 While it may 
seem obvious in the wake of Cho’s massacre at Virginia Tech, the Virginia Tech Review 
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Panel felt obligated to state in their report to the Governor that, “Parents and students can 
and do consider security a factor in making a choice of where to go to school.”152  
Key Security Recommendations as Prescribed by the Virginia Tech Review Panel 
Recommendation Number Virginia Tech Review Panel Recommendation 
II-1 Universities should do a risk analysis (threat assessment) and then choose 
a level of security appropriate for their campus. 
II-2 Virginia Tech should update and enhance its Emergency Response Plan 
and bring it into compliance with federal and state guidelines. 
II-3 Virginia Tech and other institutions of higher learning should have a 
threat assessment team that includes representatives from law 
enforcement, human resources, student and academic affairs, legal 
counsel, and mental health functions. 
II-4 Students, faculty, and staff should be trained annually about responding to 
various emergencies and about the notification systems that will be used. 
II-5 Universities and colleges must comply with the Clery Act, which requires 
timely public warnings of imminent danger. 
II-6 Campus emergency communications systems must have multiple means of 
sharing information. 
II-7 In an emergency, immediate messages must be sent to the campus 
community that provide clear information on the nature of the emergency 
and actions to be taken. 
II-8 Campus police, as well as administration officials should have the 
authority and capability to send an emergency message. 
II-9 The head of campus police should be a member of a threat assessment 
team, as well as the emergency response team for the university. 
II-10 Campus police must report directly to the senior operations officer 
responsible for emergency decision making. 
II-11 Campus police must train for active shooters 
Table 8.   Key Recommendations Describing Security Enhancement Suggestions As 
Prescribed by the Virginia Tech Review Panel Report to Governor Kaine153 
Police response to the Norris Hall shooting was an insignificant factor in reducing 
the Rate of Kill of the incident. Within 3 minutes of the 9-1-1 call being received by the 
dispatch the first two officers were on scene followed immediately by three other 
officers. This incredible response time was a result of the increased security posture and 
pre-positioning of many officers at WAJ in conjunction with the earlier double homicide. 
Although in this instance, these circumstances provided for a prompt response; had the 
WAJ double homicide not occurred, the response time and composition of the responding 
officers would have been significantly different. After experiencing extreme difficulty 
bypassing the chained doors, two teams composed of a mixture of patrol and SWAT 
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officers proceeded to the sounds of gunfire. As they arrived to the second floor, the 
shooting stopped as Cho committed suicide.154 Despite the responding officer’s best 
efforts, they were not able to reduce the Rate of Kill in Norris Hall during the eleven 
minute Incident Duration because they were not equipped with the necessary tools 
required to defeat the chained doors, nor did they have an expedient access to building 
floor plans required to identify an alternate entry point. Furthermore, the events of April 
16 unfolded so rapidly that police were not able to designate an Incident Commander or 
establish an Emergency Operations Center in order to coordinate the tactical response.155 
The feasibility of a complete campus lock down of the Virginia Tech campus is 
questionable at best. When escaped convict William Morva escaped from a nearby 
detention facility in August of 2006, and was believed to be on the Virginia Tech 
campus, the university administration decided to close the university. This resulted in 
numerous large scale problems. First, a massive traffic jam ensued and university and 
surrounding roadways were congested for over an hour and a half. Additionally, many 
people stood for long periods of time at bus stops. In an Active Shooter scenario, this 
situation makes the university population very vulnerable while in their cars on congested 
and gridlocked roadways or congregated at bus stops for long periods of time. Second, 
the process of locking a building down involves locking exterior and interior doors. 
However, Virginia Tech classrooms are not equipped with interior door locks for 
classroom doors. Therefore, at the time of the incident, if the university administration 
had decided to lock the campus down, only the exterior doors leading into each building 
would have been able to be locked. In the particular instance of the April 16 shooting, 
this solution would have proven to be inconsequential unless the lockdown was initiated 
immediately after the WAJ double homicide. Furthermore, no efficient means of 
communicating between buildings existed on the Virginia Tech campus at the time of the 
shooting providing no way to coordinate a timely lock down of the campus. In fact, the 
only reasonable asset available to the campus at the time capable of locking all buildings 
down was the VTPD. However, the 14 of 41 total VTPD officers which are on duty at 
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any given time would not likely have the entire campus locked down in less than two 
hours after initiation of an Active Shooter scenario.156 Additionally, Virginia Tech is 
constructed, much like most universities, as a porous campus. Even if every building on 
the campus were to be locked, it is completely infeasible to expect that the entirety of 
Virginia Tech’s 2,600 acres could be locked down. A more feasible option would have 
been to quickly disseminate a message canceling classes in response to the WAJ double 
homicide. This action would have greatly reduced the number of students on campus at 
the time of the second shooting. Even given the limitations of the messaging system in 
place at Virginia Tech on April 16, if an alert was sent out canceling classes in a timely 
manner after the WAJ shooting, a large portion of the university population would have 
received the message prior to departing for class.  
As a result, it was the finding of the Report of the Review Panel presented to 
Governor Kaine that, had a timely alert been issued canceling classes after the WAJ 
shooting or a campus lock down been initiated, that the number of casualties resulting 
from the incident could have been reduced. However, the panel also concluded that none 
of these measures taken in response to the WAJ double homicide would have likely 
averted the subsequent mass shooting altogether.157  
Key Security Recommendations as Prescribed by the Virginia Tech Review Panel 
Recommendation Number Virginia Tech Review Panel Recommendation 
VII-1 In the preliminary stages of an investigation, the police should resist 
focusing on a single theory and communicating that to decision 
makers. 
VII-2 All key facts should be included in an alerting message, and it 
should be disseminated as quickly as possible, with explicit 
information. 
VII-3 Recipients of emergency messages should be urged to inform others. 
VII-4 Universities should have multiple communication systems, including 
some not dependent on high technology. 
VII-5 Plans for canceling classes or closing the campus should be 
included in the university’s emergency operations plan. 
Table 9.   Key Recommendations Describing Security Enhancement Suggestions As 
Prescribed by the Virginia Tech Review Panel Report to Governor Kaine158 
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After review of the incident details of the Virginia Tech massacre, it is apparent 
that student and faculty survivability was enhanced solely by their own actions. While it 
can be argued that the law enforcement response contributed to Cho’s decision to end the 
massacre at 11 minutes vice a longer duration, the evidence and firsthand accounts are 
irrefutable in portraying that the only factor that reduced the Rate of Kill during the 
Norris Hall mass shooting were actions taken by potential victims. All students who 
jumped out of windows in order to avoid the shooter survived. Barricading classroom 
doors clearly saved lives and reduced the rate of kill. Unfortunately, this action did not 
always deny the shooter entry into the classroom, but on average, Cho’s freedom of 
movement was greatly reduced and lives were saved through the brave actions of some 
victims. Several students also pretended to be dead as Cho passed by them and survived 
as a result.159  
4. Conclusion 
In the wake of the horrible events that unfolded on the Virginia Tech campus on 
the morning of April 16, we are left with more questions than answers. The motivating 
factors which encouraged a disturbed student to indiscriminately kill 32 and injure 17 of 
his classmates and faculty members died with Cho. Although the VTPD and BPD 
responded quickly to Norris Hall, 11 minutes still remained from Cho’s first shot to his 
last. Unfortunately, these 11 minutes and the carnage that ensued during this timeframe 
validate our second hypothesis by demonstrating that Law Enforcement response to the 
Active Shooter is insufficient to reduce the Rate of Kill. Law Enforcement capability to 
reduce the Rate of Kill in Active Shooter scenarios will always be limited by the 
separation of time and space between the threat and First Responders at the outset of the 
incident. Cho’s attack on the Virginia Tech campus illustrates this claim. 
With certainty, the increased presence of police at WAJ Hall, in response to the 
previous double homicide, contributed to a more timely response to the Norris Hall mass 
shooting. However, what is not certain is how the police response would have been 
affected if large numbers of officers were not already on campus. Given the initial 
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response time of 27 minutes to WAJ Hall, it is reasonable to assume that a significantly 
longer response time would have been experienced had the Norris Hall massacre been 
Cho’s initial attack. Additionally, the events of April 16 occurred so rapidly that the 
VTPD was unable to establish an EOC. As a result, the confusing scenario was further 
complicated with difficulties of communication. While establishment of an EOC would 
have improved communications, it remains unknown if the resulting improved 
communications could have reduced the Rate of Kill by communicating accurate 
information to hospitals and local treatment facilities. Additionally, although Virginia 
Tech had alerting procedures and resources in place, the fact remains that 2 hours and 11 
minutes passed from when the WAJ Hall double homicide occurred to when the Virginia 
Tech administration issued its first message informing the students, staff, and faculty of 
the events. Had this first warning been published prior to the beginning of 0905 classes 
and contained clearer guidance for either closing the campus or operating under 
heightened alert; perhaps Cho could have been interdicted prior to the shooting or less 
students would have been present in Norris Hall at the time of the shooting. Indeed, the 
answers to all of these questions will remain speculative in nature. However, what is 
known as a result of the Virginia Tech mass shooting is that although the control 
measures and alerting procedures Virginia Tech had in place prior to the shooting 
sounded very impressive; in reality, none of them did anything to mitigate Cho’s attack. 
Instead, vigilance toward a solution capable of reducing the Rate of Kill of actions, such 
as the ones that occurred on April 16 is required.  
As stated earlier, DHS reports that the average Active Shooter incident duration is 
12.5 minutes, while the average First Responder response time is 18 minutes. Cho’s 
rampage in Norris Hall lasted 11 minutes; in that time he managed to fire 174 rounds, kill 
30 and injure 17 people before finally killing himself. This means that on average 16 
shots were fired, three people were killed and two people were injured every minute. 
Although the average duration of an Active Shooter incident is 12.5 minutes, a sub-12.5 
minute response standard to this type of emergency cannot be the vanguard of any 
reasonable response. Every minute counts. In the two minutes that it took for Colin 
Goddard’s phone call to be transferred to the correct dispatch center, 32 shots were fired, 
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six people died, and four people were injured. In the five minutes it took for first 
responders to arrive to Norris Hall, 80 shots were fired, 15 people were killed and 10 
people were injured. Every minute truly counts. 
Of course, the most preferred method of mitigating attacks, such as this is to 
prevent them from happening at all. However, Cho’s extensive and troubling mental 
health history prior to his attack validates our first hypothesis demonstrating that 
prevention and preemption of the Active Shooter alone is insufficient to reduce the rate 
of kill. The Virginia Tech mass shooting incident was conducted by a disturbed young 
man who, by all rights, did not receive adequate mental health care despite the efforts of 
his family and the Virginia Tech faculty members who made a concerted effort to ensure 
that he was cared for. Unfortunately, a mental health focused prevention and preemption 
strategy capable of effectively mitigating the Active Shooter threat is impractical for an 
already overburdened and underfunded aspect of student health. Instead, these aspects of 
mental health seem to be more applicable in a post-traumatic incident role. The events of 
April 16 forever changed the Cho family along with the families of the 32 victims killed 
that day. Deep emotional scares are felt not only by the additional 17 victims who were 
injured by Cho, but by the Virginia Tech community and the local Blacksburg 
community as well. Life will truly never be the same for the Virginia Tech and 
Blacksburg community. While this case study admittedly includes questions without 
answers, it is done with great solidarity and respect to the victims. Our hope is that 
through the process of examining the horrific events, such as the one that occurred on the 
Virginia Tech campus on April 16, 2007, we will be able to offer suggestions for how to 
effectively mitigate these events in the future.  
B. UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS (AUSTIN, TX)  
On August 1, 1966, a 25 year old architectural engineering student and former 
Marine named Charles Joseph Whitman opened fire from atop the University of Texas 
tower. Whitman’s attack resulted in the death of 13 people and wounding of 31 others 
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and ended when a responding police officer shot and killed Whitman.160 Whitman, 
frustrated and agitated by a deteriorating personal life, pending courts martial, addiction 
to amphetamines, and a struggling academic career, began his massacre in the early 
morning hours of August 1 as he stabbed his own mother in the heart and shot her in the 
head in her apartment at 1212 Guadalupe St. Whitman then returned to his home at 906 
Jewell Street where he stabbed his wife Kathy to death as she slept.161 After stopping at a 
rental company to rent a dolly, a bank to cash some checks, and a few stores to purchase 
additional firearms and ammunition, Whitman arrived to the University of Texas campus 
armed with a Remington Model 700 bolt action riffle with a Leupold M8-4X scope, a 
modified Sears 12 gauge semi-automatic shotgun, a Remington 35 caliber model 141 
pump rifle, a U.S. Carbine 30 caliber M-1 rifle, a Smith and Wesson 357 Magnum 4.5 
inch barrel revolver, a 9MM Luger semi-automatic pistol, and a 6.35 MM caliber semi-
automatic pistol, and appropriate accompanying ammunition.162 When Whitman arrived 
to the UT main administrative building shortly after 11:30 a.m., he met security guard 
Jack Rodman and presented an identification card that identified him as a research 
assistant for the school and explained that he had a delivery to make. Officer Rodman 
issued Whitman a parking pass and granted him access to the building. Whitman rode the 
elevator to the 27th floor of the tower that is located one floor beneath the clock face.163 
After Whitman traversed the long flight of stairs leading to the rooms within the 
observation deck area, he was confronted by Edna Townsley who was the receptionist on 
duty and had observed the large trunk with which Whitman was struggling. Ms. 
Townsley asked for Whitman’s University work identification. Unable to provide the 
appropriate identification, Whitman knocked her unconscious with the butt of his rifle 
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and dragged her body behind a couch; she later died from her injuries.164 Shortly after 
Whitman had concealed the body of Ms. Townsley, a young couple who had been 
sightseeing on the deck (Cheryl Botts and Don Walden) returned to the receptionist area 
and encountered Whitman, who was holding a rifle in each hand and was standing behind 
a puddle of Ms. Townsley’s blood. Botts later stated that she believed the large red stain 
on the floor to be varnish, and that she thought Whitman was preparing to shoot pigeons 
from the observation deck. Whitman and the young couple exchanged greetings and 
pleasantries as Botts and Walden passed the reception area and entered the elevators. 
Once they were gone, Whitman barricaded the stairway.165 
Shortly after Whitman had barricaded the stairway, two families (the Gabours and 
Lamports) who were ascending the staircase encountered the barricade. Michael Gabour 
was looking through the barricade when Whitman shot him with his sawed-off shotgun, 
hitting him in the left neck and shoulder region. Whitman then fired the shotgun two 
more times through grates on the stairway into both families as they attempted to retreat 
down the stairs.166 Whitman fired his first shots from the tower’s outer deck at 
approximately 11:48 a.m. After a brief period of disorientation and confusion, the first 
emergency call to the Austin Police Department was made by a history professor after he 
saw several students shot in the South Mall gathering center. Prior to this call, many 
others had dismissed the multiple reports of Whitman’s rifle because they were 
unfamiliar with the sound of gunfire. However, panic ensued and the situation was fully 
understood shortly thereafter.167 All active police officers in Austin were ordered to the 
campus. Other off-duty officers, Travis County Sheriff’s deputies, and Texas Department 
of Public Safety troopers also converged on the area to assist.168 
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Authorities, assisted by armed civilians, were able to return fire on Whitman’s 
position approximately 20 minutes after he began his indiscriminant killing from the 
tower. Whitman used the waterspouts on each side of the tower as gun ports, affording 
him covered firing positions.169 Police lieutenant Marion Lee circled the tower from a 
small airplane and radioed a confirmation that there was only a single sniper on the 
observation deck. Lt Lee also attempted to shoot Whitman from the circling plane, but 
turbulence disrupted opportunities for a clear shot. After receiving effective fire from 
Whitman, pilot Jim Boutwell continued to circle the tower from a safe distance until the 
end of the incident.170 
Whitman’s choice of victims was indiscriminate but mostly concentrated on 
Guadalupe Street which is a major commercial district bordering the western campus 
boundary. In an effort to evacuate casualties amid Whitman’s rampage, an armored 
vehicle and ambulances from local funeral homes were utilized. As a result of the large 
number of casualties and the uncertainty surrounding the amount of potential casualties, 
the Brackenridge Hospital administrator declared an emergency, and all available 
medical staff reported to the hospital in order to reinforce personnel currently on-duty.171  
Austin Police Department (APD) Officers Ramiro Martinez, Houston McCoy and 
Jerry Day, assisted by an armed civilian named Allen Crum, were the first to reach the 
tower’s observation deck. These first responders breeched the south door an entered the 
observation deck at 1:24 p.m. Martinez and McCoy proceeded in a northerly direction 
along the east deck while Day and Crum proceeded in a westerly direction along the 
south deck. Several feet before reaching the southwest corner, Crum accidentally 
discharged a shot from his borrowed rifle. Simultaneously, Martinez moved from behind 
the corner into the northeast area and fired all six rounds from his .38 police revolver at 
Whitman. While Martinez was firing, McCoy fired two fatal shots of 00-buckshot from 
his 12-gauge shotgun into the head, neck, and left side of Whitman, who was sitting in 
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the northwest corner approximately 50 feet away. Houston McCoy appeared before the 
Travis County Grand Jury on August 5, 1966 and received a justifiable homicide verdict 
for the death of Whitman.172  
On August 1, 1966, the University of Texas at Austin endured a horrifying 
shooting spree which lasted approximately 1 hour and 34 minutes and was carried out by 
a deranged student who, through his actions, transformed a historical Texas landmark 
into a sniper’s vantage point. Unfortunately, Whitman’s troubled personal life consisting 
of a pending courts martial, addiction to amphetamines, and poor academic performance 
was not addressed by mental health professionals and these stressors finally culminated 
with violent action. Whitman’s attack provides another validating example for our first 
hypothesis that states that prevention and preemption measures alone are insufficient to 
reduce the Rate of Kill for Active Shooter incidents. This attack differed from the 
Virginia Tech attack in that although Whitman was experiencing difficulties with many 
aspects of his personal and professional life, he had not been identified as a risk to 
himself or others prior to the attack as Cho was. Furthermore, no evidence was given in 
any police report or other review of the UT Tower shooting that indicated Whitman had 
received any form of mental health care or screening prior to the attack. If he had, it 
would have occurred as part of his entry requirements into the Marine Corps and these 
reports were not shared with the University. As a result, the UT Tower shooting 
demonstrates that a mental health focused prevention and preemption focused strategy is 
not capable of effectively mitigating Active Shooter attacks.  
Ultimately, Whitman’s rampage was ended through the brave actions of three 
police officers and one armed civilian. However, although the courage and resolve of 
these three individuals cannot be questioned, the fact remains that this was not a 
standardized response. As such, had these three individuals not been present that fateful 
day, it is illogical to assume that other individuals would react in the same manner. 
Furthermore, this unorganized and disadvantageous response to Whitman’s attack 
required a lot of time to organize and execute. In the 1 hour and 34 minutes that elapsed 
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from Whitman’s first shot to his demise atop the UT tower, many lives were lost or 
changed forever. This unfortunate aspect of the UT Tower shooting provides a validating 
example of our second hypothesis as it demonstrates that Law Enforcement interdiction 
of the Active Shooter was insufficient to reduce the Rate of Kill during this incident. 
Similar to the Virginia Tech shooting, law enforcement capability to reduce the Rate of 
Kill during the UT Tower shooting was limited by the separation of time and space 
between the threat and First Responders. In the case of the UT Tower shooting, 
overcoming these limitations took 1 hour and 34 minutes. The administrators and 
authorities of the UT campus and surrounding business district of Austin found 
themselves unprepared, ill-equipped, and inadequately trained to respond to an event, 
such as this. They were not alone. In fact, as a result of the UT tower shooting, coupled 
with a nationwide escalation of violence, police departments around the country began a 
critical introspective review of their training and capabilities. In fact, it is largely argued 
among the Law Enforcement community that the UT tower shooting provided the 
catalyst for the formation of SWAT teams.173  
As demonstrated by the UT tower shooting, Whitman had full access and freedom 
of movement while victims below remained helpless with no viable means of mitigation. 
No alert or security measures were in place that were capable of providing notifications 
of the event or protection to the UT students, staff and faculty or Guadalupe St patrons. 
Whitman’s rampage was only halted through the brave, but unorganized and ill-
advantaged assault of three police officers and one armed civilian. Similar to the Virginia 
Tech shooting, actions taken by potential victims clearly saved lives and reduced the Rate 
of Kill during the UT Tower shooting. However, with no advantages afforded to them, 
this response was haphazard and delayed. In the absence of an adequate plan, equipment, 
or control measures; the first responders to the UT tower shooting were afforded no 
advantages and were forced to rely only on creativity and courage in order to stop the 
killing. As Law Enforcement and civil authorities in 1966 recognized the need to adapt 
tactics and equipment in response to this tragedy, authorities of our present time are 
                                                 
173 Robert Snow, Swat Teams: Explosive Face-offs with America (Cambridge, MA: Perseus Books, 
November 1999), 6.  
 73 
charged with the responsibility to take a critical look at available assets and determine if 
the current security needs are meet in High Occupancy Facilities in light of Active 
Shooter incidents since the UT tower shooting. This case study provides a good 
validating example of our third hypothesis confirming that a victim initiated response 
capable of sufficiently synchronizing immediate control measures with a prescribed set of 
automated and standardized responses is an effectively way to reduce the Rate of Kill for 
incidents, such as this. The UT Tower shooting demonstrates that a Victim Initiated 
Mitigation system incorporating automated control measures and complementary 
response protocols represents the only realistic means of reducing Response Time and 


















Charles J. Whitman’s Possessions at time of Death 
Trunk Contents 
Channel Master 14 Transistor AM-FM Radio 
(portable) brown case  
Robinson Reminder (note book, no writing) 
White 3.5 gallon plastic water jug (full water) 
Red 3.5 gallon plastic gas jug (full gas) 
Sales slip from Davis Hardware for August 1, 1966 
4 "C" cell flashlight battery 
Several lengths of cotton and nylon ropes (different 
lengths) 
One plastic compass ("Wonda-scope") 
One paper mate ball point (black) 
Hatchet 
(Nesco) Machete with green scabbard 
(Hercules) hammer 
Green ammunition box with gun cleaning 
equipment 
Alarm Clock , "Gene" brand 
Cigarette lighter 
Canteen with water 
Rifle Scabbard, green, "Sears" 
Hunting knife (Camallus) with brown scabbard and 
whit stone 
Large pocket knife (Wooden handle) lock blade 
Pipe wrench (10") 
Pair eye glasses, brown frame and brown case 
Box of kitchen matches 
12 Assorted cans of food and two cans Sego, jar 
honey 
One can charcoal starter 
White and green 6-volt flashlight 
One set ear plugs 
Two rolls tape (white adhesive) 
Approximately one foot long solid steel bar 
Army green rubber duffle bag 
Green extension cord 
Lengths of clothes line wire and yellow electrical 
wire 
Bread- sweet rolls 
Gray gloves 
Deer bag (same bag) 
6MM Remington, (full 20 box) shells – ammunition 
Large knife (Randall) with bone handle name of 
“CHARLES J. WHITMAN” on blade with brown 
scabbard with whit stone 
Printed on 
Trunk 
L/CPL. CHARLES J. WHITMAN 
USMC - 1871634 
Marine Bks. 
Navy 115, Box 32-A 
FPO, NY, N.Y. 
To: Mrs C.A. WHITMAN, Jr.  
P.O. Box 1065 
Lake Worth, FLA. USA 
(Insured Tag #10372 - May 17, 1961 - N.Y. N.Y.) 
Ammunition 
35 Remington (full box) shells 
35 Remington (full box) shells-"Peters" 
35 Remington (full box) shells 
357 Mag (Peters 50 rounds) full box 
357 Mag Western (full box) 
357 Mag Western (7 shells) 
30 Caliber "Peters" (2 full boxes) 
Box Western 25 caliber auto. (approx. 40) 
Box Remington 9mm Luger (full box) 
Box 35 Western two shells 
Weapons Found 
Around the 
Body of Charles 
Whitman 
Remington Model 700 - 6MM, Bolt action #149037, with Leupold four power - M8-4X scope, cheek stock 
(serial #61384) and leather strap. 
Sears 12 gauge 2.75 chamber automatic shotgun, barrel and stock, both sawed off 
Remington 35 caliber model 141 pump #1859 rifle 
U.S. Carbine 30 caliber M-1 Universal #69799 with Webb sling. 
357 Mag Smith and Weston 4.5 barrel, chrome, Model 19 #K391583 
9MM Luger #2010 




Placed in CID. 
1-15 round clip 30 cal carbine loaded with hollow points 
1-30 round clip, 30 cal carbine loaded with hollow points 
1-30 round cilp 30 cal carbine loaded with lead nose bullets 
2- clips 9mm Luger loaded, one clip had X cut on bullet 
1-clip 25 cal. loaded 
1- pair light brown leather gloves 
1-Cartridge belt with 22 round of 6 mm ammunition 
1- Shoulder holster for 357 Magnum with ammunition holder with 11 rounds of ammunition 
1- pair Kirby 7x35 Field Glasses 
1- knapsack and web belt and canteen holder, also one US compas with canvas case and B-D snake bite kit 
in canvas cask on belt 
Items Found in 
Knapsack 
4- 30 rd clips for 30 cal carbine 
1- Small package of toilet paper 
1- Mirach can opener 
1- Soap dish with some pills and other items 
1- Queen #19 pocket knife 
1- Pair of sunglasses 
1- Foot powder 
Gillette razor 
18-round 12 ga Winchester #4 buckshot shells 
4-35 Remington shells 
44 rounds 6mm shells 
6 rounds 357 Magnum 
7 round 30 cal carbine ammunition 
5 hulls 6 mm 
Table 10.   Contents and Possessions of Charles J. Whitman as reported by Officer Ligon 
at time of Death 
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C. CALIFORNIA STATE UNIVERSITY (FULLERTON, CA) 
On July 12, 1976, a 37-year-old man named Edward Charles Allaway entered the 
basement of the Cal State Fullerton library where he was employed as a custodian and 
opened fire, killing seven people and wounding two others.174 Allaway pulled into the 
parking lot adjacent to the west side of the library shortly after 8:00 am an walked 
casually towards the library entrance with a .22 caliber rifle in one hand and a box of .22 
caliber ammunition in the other. Although Allaway was motivated by his psychotic 
dilutions that some of his co-workers were forcing his estranged wife to participate in 
pornographic films and were plotting to kill both of them, he had received no mental 
health care, nor had he been subjected to any psychological screening prior to the 
shooting which could have prevented or preempted this attack. Similar to the UT Tower 
shooting where no prior mental health history existed with Whitman prior to the attack, 
this example also validates our first hypothesis that maintains that prevention and 
preemption of the Active Shooter alone is insufficient to reduce the Rate of Kill for these 
incidents. Instead, Allaway entered a stairwell in the library and proceeded to the 
basement where, at approximately 8:30 am, he entered secretary Karen Dwinell’s office 
and shot Paul Herzberg who was a photographer. A fleeing media center assistant, Bruce 
Jacobsen, was shot in the chest as he was attempting to escape in the adjacent 150-foot 
long hallway. Allaway then fired on the Graphics department killing Frank Teplansky 
and Professor Seth Fesseden.175  
From the Graphics department, Allaway chased down and killed custodians Debra 
Paulsen and Donald Karges. After reloading his rifle in the stairwell, Allaway continued 
up the stairs towards the elevators in the library lobby. Janitorial supervisor Maynard 
Hoffman was shot in the elevator and as Allaway stood over his body to watch him bleed 
to death, library technician Steven Becker hit him in the back of the head with a plate and 
attempted to wrestle the rifle from Allaway. Becker was soon assisted by Library 
Supervisor Don Keran who wrapped Allaway in a bear hug. After an intense struggle, 
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Allaway regained the advantage and shot Keran. A wounded Becker pursued Allaway out 
of the library until he turned and killed Becker near the southeast side of the building. 
Although Allaway was not subdued, the actions taken by Keran and Becker discouraged 
him enough to cease his assault. Allaway then re-entered the library through the east 
entrance and proceeded through the library to his car which remained in the parking lot 
adjacent to the west side of the building.176 As with Virginia Tech and the UT Tower 
shooting, actions taken by potential victims clearly reduced the Rate of Kill for this 
incident as well. However, because these potential victims were afforded no advantages, 
this response was not standardized and was insufficient to contain or control the threat. 
After killing seven people and wounding another two in less than five minutes, Allaway 
decided to end his rampage and eluded University and local Police in route to the 
Anaheim Hilton Inn, where his estranged wife was on duty.177 After arriving at the hotel, 
Allaway asked his estranged wife for a glass of water and a dime so he could make a 
phone call. He then placed a call to Police confessing to the shooting and providing his 
current location. Subsequently, local Police Officers arrested an unarmed Allaway who 
was waiting for them in the banquet hall of the hotel.178  
This tragic event which took place in the California State Fullerton University 
Library demonstrates that even in an Active Shooter instance of short duration where 
there is no feasible response opportunity for Law Enforcement, the shooter was afforded 
freedom of movement throughout the duration of the event and victims and potential 
victims were afforded no advantages capable of increasing their survivability. However, 
even with no advantages afforded to them, potential victims did choose to act and, as was 
the case in the Virginia Tech and University of Texas case studies, victim actions 
arguably reduced the Rate of Kill in this case as well. Although, the brave actions of 
potential victims discouraged Allaway’s activities they did not mitigate the effects of the 
shooter, or conclude the incident. In fact, this incident was only concluded when the 
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shooter decided to cease his activities. During the five minutes that elapsed in the Cal 
State Fullerton Library during Allaway’s rampage, casualties were sustained at a rate of 
one death per minute and one injury per 2.5 minutes. At this Rate of Kill it is very 
plausible to postulate that had Allaway desired to continue his activities, he could have 
inflicted many more casualties. These unfortunate circumstances are not dissimilar to the 
incidents that transpired at Virginia Tech or the University of Texas in that although the 
actions of potential victims clearly reduced Active Shooter effectiveness. However, 
because these actions were not standardized or assisted with immediate control measures, 
the effects of this attack were not able to be mitigated. This lends great support for our 
third hypothesis that maintains that a Victim Initiated Mitigation system utilized in IHEs, 
which is capable of incorporating automated control measures and complementary 
response protocols represent the only feasible means of reducing Response Time and 
Incident Duration for Active Shooter scenarios.  
D. UNIVERSITY OF IOWA (IOWA CITY, IA) 
On November 1, 1991 at 3:42 p.m., a 28-year-old Chinese graduate student 
named Gang Lu opened fire on the University of Iowa campus, killing five people and 
wounding one other.179 Angered by an unenthusiastic reception of his doctoral 
dissertation coupled with the University’s failure to award him with the highly 
prestigious Spriesterbach Dissertation Prize, Lu constructed a list of targets and 
formulated detailed plans for how to exact his revenge. Armed with a .38 caliber snub 
nosed revolver and a .22 caliber revolver, Lu attended a physics and astronomy 
department meeting in room 208 of Van Allen Hall and shortly after the meeting began 
killed his professor, Christoph Goertz; fellow doctoral student Linhua Shan, and 
wounded associate professor Robert A. Smith.180 Lu exited the seminar room and killed 
department chair Dwight Nicholson in his office. After killing Nicholson, Lu returned to 
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room 208 and shot all of his initial victims again, killing the wounded Robert Smith.181 
Lu then left Van Allen Hall and walked three blocks across the snow covered campus to 
Jessup Hall which houses the University’s administration offices.182 After arriving at 
Jessup Hall, Lu entered the Office of Academic Affairs in room 111 and asked for T. 
Anne Cleary, who was the associate vice president of academic affairs. After a brief 
conversation with Cleary, Lu shot her in the face. He then wounded Ms. Cleary’s 23-
year-old receptionist before going upstairs to room 203 and fatally shooting himself in 
the head at 3:50 p.m.183 
In the eight minutes that elapsed during his premeditated mass murder which 
spanned two buildings, four rooms and three city blocks across the university campus, 
Gang Lu fired 16 shots and succeeded in killing everyone he held responsible for his 
failure to be nominated for his department’s most prestigious physics award.184 Christoph 
K. Goertz was one of America’s leading space plasma physicists, a professor of physics 
and astronomy at the University of Iowa and was Lu’s dissertation chairperson. Dwight 
R. Nicholson was the chairman of the University’s physics and astronomy department 
and was one of Lu’s dissertation committee members. Robert A. Smith, who was an 
associate professor of physics and astronomy, was also on Lu’s dissertation committee. 
Linhua Shan, was a research investigator for the physics and astronomy department and 
was Lu’s fellow doctoral student who ultimately won the Spriestersbach prize over Lu. 
Ms. T. Anne Cleary was the associate vice president for academic affairs and the 
grievance officer at the university whom Lu had made several complaints to regarding 
nomination for the Spriestersbach prize. Miya Rodolfo-Sioson was a temporary student 
employee working in the grievance office and was shot by Lu for undetermined 
reasons.185  
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Due to the current security posture and preparedness of the University of Iowa 
campus in November of 1991, Lu was afforded access and freedom of movement 
throughout the entire shooting incident that affected multiple rooms and buildings. 
Despite a timely response by then chief of the Iowa City Police Department, R.J. 
Winkelhake, the incident had already culminated with Lu’s suicide. In the eight minutes 
that elapsed from Lu’s first shot to his last, the Rate of Kill for this incident was one 
casualty per every 1.6 minutes that does not account for the critical wounding of Miya 
Rodolfo-Sioson who, although she survived, was paralyzed from the neck down as a 
result of her injuries. This case clearly supports the assertion that although qualified and 
competent Law Enforcement personnel are capable to respond to Active Shooter 
incidents, the assumption that this response will be able to mitigate the effects of an 
Active Shooter is a false one. This is in keeping with our second hypothesis and similar 
to all three preceding case studies, Law Enforcement response was limited by time and 
space in this case as well and although qualified responders were available, they were not 
able to respond in time to mitigate the effects of this incident. There is simply no 
reasonable method in which qualified first responders can respond quickly enough to 
disrupt the Rate of Kill in Active Shooter incidents. The University of Iowa case study 
only highlights the fact that the shooter is the one who determines the length and severity 
of the majority of Active Shooter incidents and that until a standardized system of active 
control measures capable of being initiated by Potential Victims can be implemented, this 
unfortunate reality will remain true. As with the Cal State Fullerton shooting, Lu had no 
previous mental health history and short of performing a mental health screening of every 
incoming student, the University of Iowa possessed no means by which to identify Lu 
prior to the attack or to otherwise prevent the attack. These assertions are in keeping with 
our first hypothesis which maintains that a mental health focused prevention and 
preemption strategy that is capable of effectively preventing an Active Shooter incident is 
impractical for an already overburdened and underfunded aspect of student health. 
However, as with each of the preceding case studies, had the University of Iowa 
facilities been equipped with a Victim Initiated Mitigation system that is capable of 
synchronizing immediate control measures with a prescribed set of automated and 
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standardized responses, students, staff and faculty could have initiated this system and 
limited Lu’s freedom of movement. A system, such as this would not have allowed Lu’s 
rampage to continue through two buildings, four rooms and three city blocks. Instead, a 
Victim Initiated Mitigation system would have incorporated automated control measures 
with complementary response protocols, decreased Response Time and Incident 
Duration, as well as accomplish the Five C’s in a timely manner.  
E. SIMON’S ROCK COLLEGE OF BARD (GREAT BARRINGTON, MA) 
On December 14, 1992, an 18-year-old undergraduate student named Wayne Lo 
opened fire on the Simon’s Rock College of Bard campus at 10:20 p.m., killing two 
people and wounding four others.186 Prior to the attack, on December 14, a United Parcel 
Service package addressed for Lo arrived to the campus mail room. The receptionist, who 
accepted the package, noticed that it came from a North Carolina based company called 
Classic Arms. Suspecting that the package may contain weapons, she notified the 
appropriate college officials. Mr. Rodgers, Dean of the college, determined that although 
he was notified that Lo had received a package from an ammunition company, the school 
had no authority to interfere with the delivery of the package. However, the Dean did 
request that Lo’s dormitory advisors inspect the contents of the package and conduct an 
inspection of his room. Lo’s dormitory advisors, Trinka and Floyd Robinson, went to 
Lo’s room and asked to see the contents of the package. After initially refusing, Lo 
finally consented to show the advisors what was in the package. The contents consisted 
of ammunition magazines, a plastic rifle stock and an empty cartridge box. Lo gave 
plausible explanations for having a package with these contents shipped to him at school 
stating that the cartridge box was a Christmas present for his father and that the other 
items were to be used by him when he returned home. The Robinsons also conducted an 
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to discuss the contents of his package and to reiterate the college’s policy regarding 
weapons on campus. Lo was calm and rational throughout the meeting and assured the 
Dean that he did not possess any weapons on campus.187  
Immediately following his meeting with Dean Rogers, Lo got into a taxi for the 
20-mile ride north to Pittsfield, Massachusetts where he bought an SKS semi-automatic 
assault rifle. At 10:20 p.m. Lo began his rampage on the Simon’s Rock College of Bard 
campus by shooting Teresa Beavers, a security officer, twice in the abdomen. Teresa’s 
husband was on the phone with his wife at the time of the shooting and called 911 
immediately to report the incident. After seriously wounding Teresa Beavers, Lo 
indiscriminately killed Nacunan Saez who was a professor of Spanish as she drove her 
car onto campus. Lo then proceeded to Simon’s Rock library where he fatally shot Galen 
Gibsonand and wounded Thomas McElderry. Not yet satisfied, Lo continued to a nearby 
dormitory where he seriously wounded Joshua A. Faber before his rifle malfunctioned 
forcing him to end his 20 minute rampage. Lo then called police and submitted to his 
arrest without further incident.188  
In this case study, the Rate of Kill is one casualty per 10 minutes and the rate at 
which people were wounded was one person wounded every five minutes. Although staff 
members and administrators had strong suspicions that Lo was in violation of the 
college’s weapons policy, after conducting the inspection of his dorm room and 
reviewing the school’s weapons policy with him, he was no longer viewed as a violent 
threat. Similar to the University of Texas, Cal State Fullerton, and the University of Iowa, 
Lo had no previous mental health history and although his actions raised suspicions, they 
did not warrant further action at the time. These events are in keeping with our first 
hypothesis as they demonstrate yet again that preventative and preemptive measures 
remain insufficient to reduce the Rate of Kill for Active Shooter incidents. Additionally, 
throughout Lo’s attack, he was afforded complete freedom of movement across the 
Simons Rock College campus, and although competent Law Enforcement authorities 
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were available and were alerted to the incident immediately after it began, this incident 
was not able to be contained or otherwise controlled for 20 minutes. Unfortunately, these 
circumstances are not unique and this case is not an outlier. Rather, in keeping with our 
second hypothesis, the response characteristics and resulting casualties of this shooting 
highlight a common inability of IHEs to reduce response time or effectively mitigate the 
effects of an Active Shooter. Additionally, as with every one of the preceding case 
studies, a Victim Initiated Mitigation system could have restricted Lo’s movement and 
isolated potential victims through automated control measures and complementary 
response protocols. If the Simons Rock College of Bard had a system, such as this in 
place at the time of this incident, a drastic reduction in response time, incident duration 
and Rate of Kill would have been the result.  
F. SAN DIEGO STATE UNIVERSITY (SAN DIEGO, CA) 
On August 15, 1996, a disgruntled graduate student named Frederick Martin 
Davidson entered the Engineering Building on the San Diego State University campus 
and killed three professors. Davidson, who believed the three professors and the entire 
engineering department were involved in a conspiracy against him, had his thesis rejected 
once and was fearful that the faculty would reject it again.189 Davidson along with 
Professors Liang, Lowrey and Lyrintzis, as well as three other engineering students 
gathered in a classroom in the Engineering Building shortly before 2:00 p.m. After being 
formally introduced by Professor Liang, Davidson handed Liang a printed copy of an e-
mail, he had received from a prospective employer who was interested in hiring 
Davidson. The email stated that Davidson’s future employment with the company hinged 
on a successful Master’s thesis defense. Without allowing Liang time for comment, and 
without saying anything himself, Davidson removed the 9mm semiautomatic Taurus 
handgun and five spare magazines he had stored in the first aid box on the wall prior to 
the meeting and immediately started firing. Liang was the first casualty as Davidson shot 
him while he was still seated at the faculty table. Lowrey and Lyrintzis were also 
wounded initially. As Lowrey tried to escape throughthe only main access door, 
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Davidson shot Lowrey several more times, and he died on the floor in front of the main 
doorway. Lyrintzis fled into an adjoining classroom, and hid under a table. After killing 
Lowrey, Davidson reloaded another clip into the handgun, and pursued Lyrintzis into the 
other room and killed Lyrintzis while he hid under the desk.190  
Davidson did not harm the three other Graduate students who were in the 
classroom. Davidson later stated that his anger was not directed at the students and that 
he never had any intentions of harming them.191 Before Davidson decided to end his 
rampage which lasted only four minutes and call 9-1-1 himself, he had fired 23 rounds 
hitting the three professors 16 times. Police arrived to find Davidson in the 3rd floor 
hallway still holding the handgun and pleading for the officers to kill him. 192 Although, 
he ultimately surrendered to police without further incident, Davidson had intended to 
kill himself after the shootings, but was unable to do so. 193 Davidson had left a murder 
suicide note in the hallway for the police to find, detailing the location of evidence and 
computer files in his house.194 
In this case, Davidson’s actions and the Law Enforcement response only serve to 
further substantiate the emerging reality that there is currently no viable security measure 
in place that is capable of effectively mitigating the effects of an Active Shooter. 
Although Davidson’s rampage lasted only four minutes, he was able to kill three people 
and had the capacity to kill many others but chose not to. The Rate of Kill for this 
incident was one casualty per every 1.33 minutes. However, more disturbing than the rate 
at which casualties were inflicted in this case, is the trending affirmation of our second 
hypothesis and the realization that the only person who is capable of mitigating the 
effects of an Active Shooter is the shooter himself. Here, the killing only ceased as a 
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result of Davidson’s choice to discontinue his rampage. Neither potential victims, nor 
Law Enforcement personnel were afforded any viable means to interdict the shooter or to 
mitigate the effects of his actions. In fact, in this particular case, the campus was not even 
alerted to the incident until 2:40 p.m., over 40 minutes after the shooting began.195 
Additionally, as with the University of Texas, Cal State Fullerton, University of Iowa, 
and Simons Rock College of Bard; in support of our first hypothesis, San Diego State 
University had no viable or effective means of prevention or preemption capable of 
mitigating the effects of this incident. Again, the only feasible means by which this 
Active Shooter incident could have been mitigated was through the implementation of a 
Victim Initiated Mitigation system. In this case, automated control measures initiated by 
a VIM system could have restricted Davidson’s freedom of movement that would not 
have allowed him to enter subsequent rooms and inflict further casualties. Likewise, 
through the complementary response protocols offered by a VIM system, authorities 
would have been dispatched more rapidly thereby reducing the Response Time, Incident 
Duration and ultimately the Rate of Kill.  
G. APPALACHIAN SCHOOL OF LAW (GRUNDY, VA) 
On January 16, 2002 just past 1:00 p.m., a 42-year-old former student named 
Peter Odighizuwa who was angered about his recent academic dismissal from the school, 
opened fire with a .380 caliber semi-automatic handgun on the campus of the 
Appalachian School of Law, killing three people and wounding an additional three.196 
Among the dead were Dean L. Anthony Sutin, Professor Thomas Blackwell, and student 
Angela Denise Dales. At approximately 1:00 p.m. Odighizuwa, discussed his academic 
problems with Professor Dale Rubin. At the end of this discussion, Odighizuwa 
reportedly told Rubin to pray for him and walked to the office of Dean Anthony Sutin 
and killed him. From the Dean’s office, Odighizuwa proceeded to Professor Thomas  
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Blackwell’s office and killed him. When Odighizuwa exited the building, he was 
confronted by two students with personal firearms and one unarmed student who subdued 
him.197  
In this case, the actions of Potential Victims clearly prevented further casualties 
and ended Odighizuwa’s rampage on the Appalachian School of Law campus. However, 
all of the students that assisted in subduing the shooter were off-duty Law Enforcement 
officers and two of them responded with their own personally owned firearms. This 
unique response is atypical to say the least. However, even with such a well-trained and 
timely response, three people were still killed and three additional people were seriously 
injured. Again, no feasible advantages were afforded the first responders in this case 
either. As a result, it was only by virtue of the heroic actions of Potential Victims that this 
incident was ended. Unfortunately, this response cannot be standardized, nor is it prudent 
to anticipate that these actions alone will mitigate future incidents.  
Similar to the University of Texas, Cal State Fullerton, University of Iowa, 
Simon’s Rock College of Bard, and San Diego State University; Odighizuwa had no prior 
mental health history and the Appalachian School of Law had no feasible means of 
prevention or preemption in place that was capable of mitigating the effects of this 
incident. Although, this case presents a unique composition of potential victims who 
became first responders, the fact remains that uniformed Law Enforcement had no 
opportunity to respond to this incident. However, in this case, as well as all of the 
preceding case studies included in this research, a Victim Initiated Mitigation system 
could have mitigated the effects of this incident as well. In this case, Odighizuwa’s 
freedom of movement would have been limited by a VIM system and, as a result, he 
would not have been able to inflict subsequent casualties.  
H. UNIVERSITY OF ARIZONA (TUCSON, AZ) 
On October 29, 2002, Robert Flores opened fire in an instructor’s office at the 
University of Arizona Nursing College, killing three instructors. The shooter, a 41-year-
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old male burst into a nursing class building shortly after the building opened.198 He first 
killed Professor Rogers in her office, then moved to an adjacent classroom and killed two 
additional professors before killing himself. The victims included Barbara Monroe, 45, 
Cheryl McGaffic, 44, and Robin Rogers, 50, all nursing professors. The incident was 
motivated by an administrative block initiated by the three professors that prohibited 
Flores from taking a mid-term in a critical care nursing class that he was failing. Flores’ 
weapons of choice included 4 handguns (.45-caliber semi-automatic, .40-caliber semi-
automatic, .357-caliber revolver, and 9-millimeter revolver).199  
As with many other Active Shooter incidents, a retrospective review reveals 
favorable conditions for a retaliation shooting.200 Earlier in the school year, Flores 
bragged about his obtainment of a concealed handgun license. Additionally, students and 
teachers recalled that the shooter talked about “taking care” of the school of medicine at 
the University if the administration did not assist him with his studies. This threat 
prompted a fellow nursing student, Lori Schenkel, to alert the authorities in late 2001, 
almost one year prior to the incident. The police report states that authorities attempted to 
contact the shooter but were unable to and that there were no follow on attempts to 
investigate Schenkel’s report.201 In addition to the report filed in 2001, Flores often 
mentioned that he suffered from Gulf War Syndrome, having served in an Army 
engineering unit deployed to Iraq and Kuwait in 1990 and 1991. Flores claimed that 
exposure to chemical weapons caches that were destroyed by his unit were the cause of 
his mental anxiety and that he had previous bouts of depression as well. However, these 
warning signs were never brought to the attention of authorities and Flores received no 
mental health treatment for his self-proclaimed mental illness.202 This lack of mental  
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health intervention coupled with the lack of follow-up on Schenkel’s report confirms our 
first hypothesis that prevention and preemption measures remain inadequate to reduce the 
Rate of Kill in Active Shooter incidents.  
Flores’ attack lasted ten minutes and Law Enforcement officials were alerted 
through 911 calls made by potential victims. Although Flores selected only three targets, 
the facility floor plan and lack of control measures afforded hi freedom of movement and 
access to many other rooms throughout the building to include a full classroom. 
Throughout the duration of this incident, Law Enforcement officers had no capability to 
respond in a timely manner and, as with every other preceding case study validating our 
second hypothesis, Law Enforcement interdiction of the Active Shooter remains 
insufficient to reduce the Rate of Kill in this incident as well. Here, as with every other 
example provided thus far, the only factor that limited the duration of this incident was 
the desire of the shooter. In this case, Flores ended his attack by committing suicide. 
However, if Flores had decided to continue with his attack, there were no obstacles and 
the Rate of Kill for this incident could have been much higher considering the number of 
available targets. Additionally, this case highlights the lack of utility in the current 
profiling and reporting process to prevent these attacks. Department of Education 
profiling and prevention methodology were not enough to highlight the potential effects 
of the shooter nor was the local report filed by fellow students prior to the incident. 
I. DUQUESNE UNIVERSITY (PITTSBURGH, PA) 
At 2:00 am on the morning of September 17, 2006, gun shots erupted outside of a 
school dance resulting in three critically wounded and two moderately wounded 
Duquesne University basketball players. Law Enforcement officers responded quickly 
and began their investigation of the scene searching for signs of the shooter and 
questioning witnesses. The shooter, William Holmes, 18, was arrested almost three days 





immediately following the shooting, after Holmes’ arrest all charges against other 
suspects were dropped and the prime suspect, Brandon Baynes, 19, was released after 
evidence exonerated him.203 
On the night of the incident, a young transfer student named Brittany Jones, 19, 
allowed for several friends to pass through the security checkpoint at the dance with 
concealed weapons. Jones, who sponsored the event for the Black Student Union, was 
carrying a concealed handgun as well. Shortly before 0200 hours, it is believed an 
argument broke out at the dance over a jealous relationship between the Holmes and one 
of the five basketball players. After the dance, the argument spilled into a cross street 
approximately a half-block away, yet still within the campus grounds. Witnesses describe 
seeing the wounded boys on the ground shortly after hearing gunfire. Police officials 
asked local authorities to help physically secure the campus and check buildings. 
Although casings from two different guns were found but authorities were only able to 
positively identify one shooter in the incident.204 
This case demonstrates that an active shooter event can be spontaneous and not 
necessarily preplanned. In this case, similar to the University of Texas, Cal State 
Fullerton, University of Iowa, Simons Rock College of Bard, San Diego State University, 
and Appalachian School of Law, no feasible preventative or preemptive measures could 
have reasonably prevented this shooting. Likewise, although the response by authorities 
seems to be well coordinated and timely, responding Law Enforcement officers had no 
opportunity to interdict the Active Shooter or to reduce the Rate of Kill. Additionally, all 
adjacent buildings and other structures remained unsecured throughout the shooting 
incident. If the shooting had continued or spilled into other areas of campus, it is likely 
that other casualties would have occurred. Although a Victim Initiated Mitigation system 
would most likely not have been effective against this attack, if this incident had 
escalated into adjacent buildings or into other portions of the dance hall, a VIM system 
would have been the only viable means by which the Rate of Kill could have been 
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reduced. This incident also demonstrates the lack of security protocols for high 
occupancy facilities on campus since several concealed weapons were allowed inside the 
dance. This lack of standardization or appropriate mitigation measures only foster an 
environment in which an active shooter incident can occur. As a result of this shooting, 
Duquesne University raised the security budget on campus two months later in order to 
provide for more campus police and security personnel in an effort to better secure 
campus events.205 However, unless these improvements incorporate a Victim Initiated 
Mitigation system, this university will remain vulnerable to future Active Shooter attacks.  
J. LOUISIANA TECHNICAL COLLEGE (BATON ROUGE, LA) 
On February 8, 2008, Latina Williams, 23, opened fire in a classroom in 
Louisiana Technical College with a handgun, killing two students before turning the gun 
on herself and committing suicide. The two victims, Karsheika Graves, 21, and 
Tanieshia-Deanna Butler, 26, were only known to be classmates to the shooter and the 
motive for the incident remains unknown.206 The mother of the shooter later issued a 
statement of regret for the two victims and denounced her daughters’ actions.207 
Prior to the incident, warning signs had emerged regarding Williams’ behavior 
that went unanswered. Williams was estranged from her family for nearly two years and 
students noticed signs of paranoia and anxiety in the classroom and outside of the 
classroom. She was unemployed and living out of her car while attending school. Shortly 
before the shooting, authorities believe that Williams made a call to a crisis counselor 
indicating that she was going to commit suicide. The counselor immediately notified 
authorities but before they could react to the call the incident had already taken place. 
These events again confirm our first hypothesis in that despite many indicators and even 
a direct warning issued to a crisis counselor, prevention and preemption measures 
remained insufficient to reduce the Rate of Kill for this incident. The shooter was quoted 
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by an eyewitness in the classroom before she turned the gun on herself saying, “Don’t 
worry, I’m not mad at ya’ll.”208 Emergency calls were first received by the 911-dispatch 
center at 8:36 am and Law Enforcement officers responded to the classroom at 8:40 am, 
four minutes after the shooting began. Police immediately locked down the school with 
additional police forces and cancelled the remainder of classes for the day.209 However, 
even with this extremely short police response time, this incident had still culminated 
prior to arrival of first responders and, as a result and similar to each of the preceding 
case studies, responding Law Enforcement had no ability to interdict the Active Shooter 
or to reduce the Rate of Kill in this case either.  
Although Williams had no apparent motivation for murdering two students, she 
certainly exhibited warning signs prior to the incident and made attempts to call for help. 
Unfortunately, an effective mental health focused prevention and preemption strategy 
was not feasible in this instance as well. This is yet another example confirming that 
profiling and mental health examinations cannot be relied upon solely to mitigate active 
shooters. Louisiana Technical College is simply not fiscally able to fund the robust 
mental health resources required to implement such a program. The short duration of this 
incident prevented Law Enforcement officers from being able to interdict the shooter. 
Once again, the factor that limited the Rate of Kill in this instance was the desire of the 
Shooter to continue or discontinue their attack. The shooter used a .357 revolver and 
reportedly fired all rounds, reloaded the gun in the classroom, and continued shooting. 
This indicates that the victims still remained in a state of shock and were not capable of 
actively taking down the shooter during the reload. Although a Victim Initiated 
Mitigation system would most likely not have been effective in reducing the Rate of Kill 
in this instance, this example provided evidence confirming that actions taken in stressful 
situations by potential victims are difficult to standardize. Therefore, in keeping with our  
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third hypothesis, additional control measures, such as a VIM system must be 
implemented in order to assist potential victims by standardizing their response and 
reducing the response time and incident duration by improving response protocols. . 
K. NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY (DEKALB, IL) 
On Valentine’s Day, February 14, 2008, Steven Kazmierczak entered Cole Hall 
and opened fire with a shotgun and three handguns.210 The auditorium held 123 students 
and the resulting casualties were six dead and 21 wounded. Similar to Virginia Tech, 
Kazmierczak had a history of mental illness prior to the attack. However, this history was 
not divulged to the University due to mental health privacy acts. In the Northern Illinois 
University final report on this incident, speculation that Kazmierczak had stopped taking 
his mental health medications was listed as a contributing factor leading to his attack.211 
Similar to each of the preceding case studies, Northern Illinois University also did not 
have an effective prevention or preemptive program in place that was capable of 
mitigating the effects of this attack.  
On February 14, the Kazmierczak entered the side entrance of the auditorium and 
was dressed in all black with a T-shirt that said “Terrorist” superimposed over a picture 
of an automatic rifle. He wore a duty rig with two magazines and a pistol and had another 
set of pistols in a bag over his shoulder with additional ammunition. He first opened fire 
with the shotgun into a grouping of students located in the center of the class and then 
fired his remaining rounds at the instructor located at the far end of the lecture stage. The 
instructor attempted to escape from a side door but found it locked and was forced to 
move back into the open to escape.212 When his shotgun rounds were complete, 
Kazmierczak began moving down the aisles with a Glock 9mm, shooting at moving and 
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stationary targets as he went. At one point, witnesses recall yelling to each other while he 
reloaded but there are no indications that any student attempted to subdue the shooter.213 
According to the NIU final report, university police responded to the incident 
within 26 seconds of the first round being fired and were the first to enter Cole Hall. The 
police officers established a perimeter around building prior to entering to interdict the 
shooter. By the time police entered the auditorium, the shooter had already taken his own 
life.214 Unfortunately, even with such an impressive response time, this incident still had 
a Rate of Kill of one person per every four seconds and people were wounded at a rate of 
one person per every second. Additionally, despite their best efforts, this incident had 
culminated prior to the arrival of Law Enforcement officers and similar to each of the 
preceding case studies, Law Enforcement reaction was insufficient to reduce the Rate of 
Kill for this incident as well.  
In the ensuing chaos that followed for police, authorities believed that there may 
be other areas on campus where shootings had taken place. This speculation and lack of 
situational awareness for the University caused first responders to fan out away from 
Cole Hall to clear and secure other buildings. Although it is not noted as a negative 
aspect of the tactical response, the first responding units were unable to attend to 
wounded individuals or develop accountability based on these additional perceived 
threats.215 Additionally, outside agencies were not requested or alerted to the attack by 
University authorities until 40 minutes after the incident began.216 
In response to these capability gaps, NIU implemented a text message system and 
introduced additional patrol units to the campus since this attack. The university also 
developed a new operating procedure to integrate the outside law enforcement and 
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fire/emergency units to assist in a timelier manner to Active Shooters.217 However, these 
improvements still fall short of the facility upgrades required to better protect potential 
victims from such an event provide additional escape routes for potential victims, or to 
provide first responders with fast and accurate situational awareness of the remainder of 
the campus.  
L. UNIVERSITY OF CENTRAL ARKANSAS (CONWAY, AR) 
At 9:22 pm on October 26, 2008, four men, Kawin Brockman, 19, of Conway; 
Kelcey Perry, 19, of Morrilton; Mario Toney, 20, of Little Rock; and Brandon Wade, 20, 
of Lake Village, opened fire on a group students near their dorms on the University of 
Central Arkansas campus in Conway, Arkansas. This shooting resulted in the death of 
two students, Ryan Henderson, 18, of Little Rock and Chavares Block, 19, of Dermott 
and a minor leg wound to student Martrevis Norman of Blytheville.218 The shooters used 
handguns and fired from a moving vehicle. 
Although the men all were charged with two counts of capital murder, police 
never found a motive. It is believed that the shooters were targeting certain individuals 
but that the actual victims were not the intended targets. Police were able to apprehend 
three of the shooters later in the night and the fourth man turned himself in two days 
later.219 
This incident spawned an investigation that led police to begin to develop 
techniques to respond to drive by shootings on campuses. Although no techniques exist to 
mitigate these types of incidents, facility management and upgrades that separate students 
from roadways and other potential firing points could greatly increase the survivability of 
victims. Although this attack is indicated within the DHS listing of university shootings, 
the drive-by shooting style of this attack offers very unique characteristics. As a result, it 
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would be unfair to compare this incident against prevention and preemption measures, or 
to expect that Law Enforcement officers could have mitigated the effects. Furthermore, a 
Victim Initiated Mitigation system is not relevant for this attack either.  
M. THE UNIVERSITY OF ALABAMA (HUNTSVILLE, AL)  
Amy Bishop, 42, opened fire in a faculty meeting at the University of, Alabama, 
Huntsville on February 12, 2010.220 Her shooting killed three professors, Gopi K. Podila, 
the chairman of the Department of Biological Sciences, and two other faculty members, 
Maria Ragland Davis and Adriel Johnson. The attack also wounded three others, Joseph 
G. Leahy, listed in critical condition after the shooting; professor’s assistant Stephanie 
Monticello, also in critical condition; and Professor Luis Rogelio Cruz-Vera, listed in 
stable condition.221 
At approximately 4:00 pm, Bishop entered the biology building on campus, and 
proceeded to the meeting room and opened fire with a 9mm pistol. The campus police 
were alerted and a campus wide text message went out roughly three minutes after the 
shooting. Police apprehended the shooter after she walked out of the front door of the 
building and appeared to be in a daze. The shooting was motivated by a recent decision to 
not give tenure to the shooter and not renew her teaching contract at the University.222 
Despite the fact that there were several dozen other students in the building at the time, 
no one else was injured. The targets were preplanned and meditated by Bishop. 
Bishop’s history is unique in the fact that in 1986 she killed her brother with a 
shotgun in the family’s Massachusetts kitchen. The story given to police was that she was 
learning how to operate the firearm from a relative when the gun went off and fatally 
wounded her brother. Since that time, Bishop has displayed a multitude of psychological 
dysfunction and is described by students as both a brilliant teacher and a 
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schizophrenic.223 However, despite these obvious warning signs, the University of 
Alabama, Huntsville was still unable to effectively prevent or preempt this attack. Unique 
to this case as well was the inability of the University message system to properly inform 
the student body and the families of the incident. Several students complained that they 
did not receive notification of the lockdown until two hours after the incident and some 
did not receive it at all. Most of the information was obtained from local television 
broadcasts after the incident was already contained.224  
While this case clearly undermines the mental health and behavioral health 
approach to preventing or preempting mitigation of active shooters. The pre-planned 
targets and motivation of the shooter again become the only limiting factor affecting the 
Rate of Kill for this incident. Because prevention and preemption measures, as well as 
Law Enforcement reaction were of no consequence to mitigating the effects of this attack, 
victim response emerges as the only feasible means of mitigation. If the University of 
Alabama, Huntsville campus had a Victim Initiated Mitigation system in place at the time 
of this attack, other potential victims would not have remained vulnerable throughout the 
attack. Furthermore, failures experienced by campus police and emergency incident alert 
systems as well and inabilities to properly lockdown the university in the event that there 
were multiple shooters or if the shooter herself had decided to select additional targets 
would not have occurred.  
N. OHIO STATE UNIVERSITY (COLUMBUS, OH)  
At approximately 3:30 am, March 9, 2010, 51-year-old Nathaniel Brown showed 
up for his early morning maintenance shift at Ohio State University. Shortly after arriving 
he opened fire with two small caliber handguns killing one employee, Larry Wallington, 
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the shooter’s immediate supervisor, Brown turned the weapon on himself and committed 
suicide.225 Witnesses and the 911 call that accompanied the attack state the shootings 
lasted less than two minutes.226 
Prior to the incident the shooter had received a few bad reports about his lack of 
work ethic, sleeping on the job and overall laziness at the workplace. These reports 
prompted university maintenance supervisors to recommend Brown for termination of 
employment. Brown placed complaints to the local Union chapter and stated that the 
university was treating him unfairly. Ohio State’s hiring policy placed Brown on 
probation for the first few months of employment which meant he would be scrutinized 
harder during that period. Police officials believe that Browns attack was set in motion on 
March 2 when he received official word from the university that he would be terminated 
from his position.227 In addition to his employment difficulties, Brown’s criminal record 
revealed that he lied on his application to the University. He had been charged with 
receipt of stolen property in 1979 and served five years in prison before being released in 
1984. He lied about this on his application and it contributed to his employer’s decision 
to terminate him.228 
Similar to every other case study included in this research, prevention and 
preemption measures failed to prevent this attack. In this case, the university failed to 
conduct a thorough background check on the shooter and also failed to see the warning 
signs that resulted from Brown’s termination. His Rate of Kill was low because he had 
already pre-planned his shooting spree and decided on his targets. However, despite 
being in a terminated status, Brown still maintained access to the grounds and the specific 
building in which he used to work. Facility security measures and an active plan for 
termination of employees is an area that Ohio State University has sought to fix since the 
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incident. However, although Law Enforcement officers had no opportunity to mitigate 
the effects of this incident, no new security measures have been emplaced that would 
enable a victim-initiated response.  
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V.  ANALYSIS 
A.  CASE STUDY COMPARISON 
1.  Ordinal Value Explanation 
After selecting our case studies and defining the lethality of each case utilizing 
Utility Theory by assigning ordinal values to variables that contribute to the lethality of 
Active Shooter incidents, we applied the same principles when comparing these case 
studies in order to determine relative vulnerability of each university to Active Shooter 
violence. Vulnerability is defined as being susceptible to physical or emotional injury or 
susceptible to attack.229 The Universities included in this research as case studies, all 
exhibit vulnerabilities that made them susceptible to attack. Determining these points of 
vulnerability and rating them according to their propensity to contribute to an IHE’s 
susceptibility to acts of extreme violence is a crucial aspect in determining which 
variables can be manipulated in order to mitigate the effects of Active Shooters. The 
following analysis of 14 most lethal Active Shooter incidents occurring in U.S. IHEs will 
demonstrate that there are three main factors contributing to higher Rates of Kill. These 
factors include university demographics and population, local area demographics and 
university facility composition.  
Before the analysis of this research can be discussed, it is necessary to explain the 
weighting of ordinal values assigned to factors that either promote or reduce vulnerability 
of IHEs to Active Shooter violence. The following tables depict the variables chosen and 
the assigned weight of each variable. The ordinal values assigned to these variables were 
initially selected based on the authors’ professional experiences gained through a 
combined 31 years of military service, 14 years of Army Special Forces tactical 
experience, and conduct of numerous Threat Vulnerability Assessments on Forward 
Operating Bases, foreign military installations, and U.S. embassies. These variables were 
then validated by expert Law Enforcement representatives at the 2011 ALERRT Active 
Shooter Conference in San Marcos, Texas, as well as proponents of Law Enforcement 
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training and Active Shooter response, such as the National Tactical Officers Association, 
ALERRT, DHS, as well as various state police agencies throughout Texas, Iowa, New 
York, California, Washington, D.C., and numerous other municipal departments 
represented at the 2011 ALERRT Active Shooter Conference. Although the variables 
selected may not encompass all factors contributing to IHE vulnerability, they should 
provide an accurate estimate of a university’s susceptibility to Active Shooter violence. 
However, as with any other review of law enforcement or military tactics, these results 
are only representative of current threats and in order to remain relevant must be 
consistently updated in order to accurately represent an evolutionary threat.  
The variables selected to determine IHE vulnerability to Active Shooter violence 
are separated into two main headings: Pre-Event Contributing Factors and Event 
Contributing Factors. Pre-Event Contributing Factors represent factors prior to the 
occurrence of Active Shooter violence that contribute to the likelihood of an individual 
becoming an Active Shooter, and either promote or preclude potential victim 
survivability. The first sub-heading of Pre-Event Contributing Factors is Shooter Profile. 
Factors within this category are taken from the shooter summary of each of our selected 
case studies and each relevant characteristic was weighted with an ordinal value. It is 
important to regard this comparative analysis as a tactically oriented perspective with 
corresponding weighted values based on each variable’s propensity to contribute to 
Active Shooter violence. This research does not contend that values are not subject to 
change as tactics in Active Shooter response evolve and, more importantly, as Active 
Shooters themselves evolve. For example, the ordinal value of 13 is given to the variable 
“Verbal/Written Warning Given Prior to the Event.” Within this category, this factor has 
the highest ordinal value. When comparing this variable to “Prior Disciplinary 
Action/Incarceration,” which has an ordinal value of 4, the inference can be made that a 
university is more vulnerable to a person who makes a threat to conduct an act of extreme 
violence as opposed to someone who has been incarcerated. Incarceration, although 




indicator of Active Shooter violence as the actual verbal or written threat to conduct the 
act is. The remaining variables listed in this category are assigned ordinal values in the 
same manner.  
 
Pre-Event Contributing Factors 
Shooter Profile 
Characteristic Ordinal Value 
Verbal/Written Threat Prior 13 
Time Elapsed from Threat to Incident 
(Days) 12 
Physically Aggressive Acts Prior 10 
Time Elapsed from Physically 
Aggressive Acts to Incident (Days) 9 
Stalk / Harass Acts Prior 8 
Alarming Behavior Observed Prior 11 
Mental Illness History 7 
Medication Prescribed 3 
Prior Disciplinary Action / Incarceration 4 
DSM Diagnosis 6 
Time Elapsed from DSM Diagnosis to 
Incident 5 
Drug Abuse Yes: 1 No: 0 
Health Issues Yes: 1 No: 0 
Table 11.   Pre-Event Contributing Factors Depicting Assigned Ordinal Values Which 
Represent Each Variable’s Contribution to IHE Vulnerability to Active 
Shooter Violence Based on Behavioral and Mental Health Histories of Each 
Active Shooter Represented in the Included Case Studies 
The second sub-heading of Pre-Event Contributing Factors is Emergency 
Response Capability. This sub-heading is further separating into two sub-headings of 
Campus Police Response and Local Law Enforcement Response. Ordinal values for each 
contributing variable is assigned in the same manner as the preceding category and 
assessed based on propensity to contribute to IHE vulnerability to Active Shooter 






Pre-Event Contributing Factors 
Emergency Response Capability 
Campus Police Response 
Characteristic Ordinal Value 
Police Force Accreditation -15 
ERT/SWAT Capability -17 
Number of Officers at Time of Incident -18 
Number of Officers on Duty at Time of 
Incident -19 
Number of Adjacent Law Enforcement 
Agencies -16 
Established Active Shooter Plan of 
Action In Place 21 
Active Shooter Training Conducted Yes: -20 No: 20 
Local Law Enforcement Response 
Characteristic Ordinal Value 
Police Force Accreditation -8 
ERT / SWAT Capability -9 
Number of Officers at Time of Incident -12 
Number of Officers on Duty at Time of 
Incident -11 
Number of Adjacent Law Enforcement 
Agencies -10 
Distance from Police Station to Campus 
Center (Mi.) -7 
Active Shooter Plan of Action in Place Yes: -14 No: 14 
Active Shooter Training Conducted Yes: -13 No: 13 
Table 12.   Pre-Event Contributing Factors Depicting Assigned Ordinal Values Which 
Represent Each Variable’s Contribution to IHE Vulnerability to Active 
Shooter Violence Based on Emergency Response Capability of Each 
University Represented in the included case studies 
In the instances where an ordinal value does not fit into an incremental rating 
system, some answers to the criteria were simply “yes” or “no.” In these instances, the 
ordinal value assigned was either a 1 or 0 where 1 demonstrates a contribution to IHE 
vulnerability and 0 represents no contribution to IHE vulnerability. Additionally, in order 
to accurately depict IHE vulnerability to Active Shooter violence, certain variables also 
had to be assessed based on their ability to either contribute to vulnerability or reduce 
IHE vulnerability. For example, the variable of “Active Shooter Plan of Action in Place” 
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has a weight of either -14 or 14. This contrast in weighting demonstrates that Law 
Enforcement agencies that have an Active Shooter plan of action in place prior to an 
Active Shooter incident are clearly more prepared and better equipped to respond to 
emergencies of this nature. Therefore, if a plan was in place prior to the Active Shooter 
incident, the ordinal value is a negative number, in this case -14, and works in the 
university’s favor to reduce its vulnerability. Likewise, a university that does not have an 
Active Shooter plan in place prior to the Active Shooter incident is clearly less prepared 
and equipped to meet the challenges of emergencies, such as this. Therefore, these 
universities receive a positive number, in this case 14, as this lack of preparedness 
increases a universities vulnerability to Active Shooter violence. Assigning ordinal values 
in this manner creates a more accurate representation of IHE vulnerability to Active 
Shooter violence as some historical factors are assessed favorably for IHEs and others are 
assessed as the security shortfalls they are. However, in every instance and in the interest 
of fairness and academic honesty, where an advantage could be given to a university, no 
matter how small, it was always granted. For example, no negative values were assessed 
to the “Police Ability to Communicate with Student Population” variable for any 
university. Even if the university only possessed rudimentary phone lines in each 
building at the time of the incident, such as the case of the UT Tower Shooting, credit 
was given in the form of reduction of the university’s vulnerability. Further concessions 
were afforded when considering the factors of Law Enforcement response, both from 
adjacent agencies and university police. These factors were very well received by law 
enforcement personnel as valid variables and accurate representations of IHE 
vulnerability. 
The third sub-heading of Pre-Event Contributing Factors is University 
Environmental Factors. This sub-heading is further separating into three additional sub-
headings of Violent Crime, Other Crime, and University Demographics and Population. 
Ordinal values for each contributing variable is assigned in the same manner as the 
preceding category and assessed based on propensity to contribute to IHE vulnerability to 
Active Shooter violence. 
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Pre-Event Contributing Factors 
University Environmental Factors (Year of Attack) 
Violent Crime 




Armed Robbery 24 
Other Crime 
Characteristic Ordinal Value 
Gang Related Arrests 23 
Drug Arrests 21 
Illegal Weapons Arrests 22 
University Demographics and Population 
Characteristic Ordinal Value 
% Male 1 





American Indian 1 
Other 1 
Total University Population 1 
Police Ability to Contain and Control 
Student Population 
Yes: -1 No: 1 
Police Ability to Communicate with 
Student Population 
Yes: -1 No: 1 
Table 13.   Pre-Event Contributing Factors Depicting Assigned Ordinal Values Which 
Represent Each Variable’s Contribution to IHE Vulnerability to Active 
Shooter Violence Based on University Environmental Factors During the 
Year of Attack of Each University Represented in the Included Case Studies 
The fourth sub-heading of Pre-Event Contributing Factors is Local Environment 
Factors. This sub-heading is further separating into three additional sub-headings of 
Violent Crime, Other Crime, and Local Area Demographics and Population. Ordinal 
values for each contributing variable is assigned in the same manner as the preceding 




Pre-Event Contributing Factors 
Local Environmental Factors (Year of Attack) 
Violent Crime 




Armed Robbery 17 
Other Crime 
Characteristic Ordinal Value 
Gang Related Arrests 16 
Drug Arrests 14 
Illegal Weapons Arrests 15 
University Demographics and Population 
Characteristic Ordinal Value 
Unemployment Rate 1 
Poverty Rate 1 
% Male 1 
% Female 1 
Median Age Male 1 





American Indian 1 
Other 1 
Total University Population 1 
Police Ability to Control Access of Local 
Population to University Facilities 
Yes: -1 No: 1 
Police Ability to Communicate with Local 
Population 
Yes: -1 No: 1 
Table 14.   Pre-Event Contributing Factors Depicting Assigned Ordinal Values Which 
Represent Each Variable’s Contribution to IHE Vulnerability to Active 
Shooter Violence Based on University Environmental Factors During the 
Year of Attack of Each University Represented in the Included Case Studies 
Factors of University Crime and Local area crime statistics, as well as the 
demographics of both variables, were utilized to weight factors that demonstrate the 
vulnerability of an IHE. The demographics and student population are key factors and 
have profound influence on weighted vulnerability of IHEs. Again, a tactically focused 
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application of Utility Theory reveals that larger university populations result in higher 
risk Active Shooter violence. This logic takes into account that as student population 
increases, university police departments and local Law Enforcement does not always 
expand proportionally. This logic is also validated within our selected case studies by the 
majority of Active Shooter incidents that occurred in large universities and the severity of 
these attacks that were, on average, much more severe among larger universities as well. 
Larger university campuses and student populations make it much more difficult to 
contain and control a sprawling campus of hundreds of acres and potentially hundreds of 
buildings. Additionally, the perception of academic openness that every IHE wishes to 
portray on their campus also grants the local population with the freedom to freely walk 
through the grounds and enjoy the history and atmosphere of the institution. As a result, 
this also presents much additional vulnerability to Active Shooter violence. 
The fifth sub-heading of Pre-Event Contributing Factors is University Facility 
Composition. Ordinal values for each contributing variable is assigned in the same 
manner as the preceding category and assessed based on propensity to contribute to IHE 
vulnerability to Active Shooter violence and potential to either promote or preclude 













Pre-Event Contributing Factors 
University Facility Composition 
Characteristic Ordinal Value 
Guards Present at Buildings Yes: -6 No: 6 
Total Number of Buildings 28 
Total Campus Acreage 1 
Guarded Roads or Gateways Yes: -5 No: 5 
Campus Entranceways 1 
Total Campus Population at Time of 
Incident 1 
Student Population at Time of Incident 1 
Campus Daily Visitor Population at Time 
of Incident 1 
Faculty Population at Time of Incident 1 
Door Locks on Buildings Yes: -4 No: 4 
Buildings with Security Cameras Yes: -2 No: 2 
Ability to Contain Threat to Student 
Population Yes: -1 No: 1 
Ability to Contain Student Population Yes: -1 No: 1 
Alert System in Place at Time of Incident Yes: -1 No: 1 
Table 15.   Pre-Event Contributing Factors Depicting Assigned Ordinal Values Which 
Represent Each Variable’s Contribution to IHE Vulnerability to Active 
Shooter Violence Based on University Facility Composition of Each 
University Represented in the Included Case Studies 
The factors of facility composition also had profound effects on IHE vulnerability 
to Active Shooter violence. Many of the ordinal values within this category are listed as a 
yes or no based on evidence that university facilities either have some type of security 
provision or they do not. Similar to University and Local Area Demographics and 
Population, University Facility Composition became the other largest contributor to 
vulnerability in IHE’s as the data compiled and compared utilizing Utility Theory 
demonstrated. Data showed that the ability to simply lock a door, to communicate 
directly to a threat building or to have security cameras were crucial aspects to 
significantly reducing the vulnerability of IHE’s to Active Shooter violence and for 
increasing potential victim survivability during these events. Although the data collected 
and analyzed in this category does not reflect preventative attributes of Facility 
Composition, the deterrent value of these capabilities is easily inferred and expounded on 
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later in this thesis. This data revealed that the potential ability to contain, control and 
communicate with students, law enforcement and the shooter in a timely manner 
significantly reduced response time and Rate of Kill in every case study. Although 
significant advances have been made on campuses since tragedies, such as Virginia Tech, 
the majority of IHE’s included as case studies in this research still fell short of physical 
security considerations comparable with those recommended in this thesis. While text 
message and mass alert systems afford IHEs the ability to communicate a threat to 
students, staff, and faculty, they fail to contain or control the IHE population or the 
shooter during acts of extreme violence. Additionally, these text and mass alert services 
are still generated from a 911 call and subject to delays and confusion resulting from 
dispatch services.  
The sixth sub-heading of Event Contributing Factors is divided into three sub-
headings of Victim Lethality, Ballistic Lethality, and Incident Lethality. Ordinal values for 
each contributing variable is assigned in the same manner as the preceding category and 
assessed based on propensity to contribute to IHE vulnerability to Active Shooter 













Event Contributing Factors 
Victim Lethality 
Characteristic Ordinal Value 
Number of Rooms Affected 33 
Number of Buildings Affected 37 
Ballistic Lethality 
Characteristic Ordinal Value 
Number of Weapons 32 
Number of Shots Fired 40 
Incident Lethality 
Characteristic Ordinal Value 
Number of Shooters 36 
Total Incident Duration 41 
Active Shooting Duration 34 
Shooter Suicide -31 
Shooter Submission -30 
Shooter Interdiction -29 
Alert Time -39 
Incident Lethality 
Characteristic Ordinal Value 
ERT Notification -38 
Response Time  -35 
Persons Wounded 42 
Persons Killed 43 
Other 1 
Total University Population 1 
Police Ability to Control Access of Local 
Population to University Facilities 
Yes: -1 No: 1 
Police Ability to Communicate with 
Local Population 
Yes: -1 No: 1 
Table 16.   Event Contributing Factors Depicting Assigned Ordinal Values Which 
Represent Each Variable’s Contribution to IHE Vulnerability to Active 
Shooter Violence Based on Victim Lethality, Ballistic Lethality, and Incident 
Lethality of Each University Represented in the Included Case Studies 
2.  Vulnerability Ratings 
In order to identify the relative vulnerability of each university, after a 
comprehensive list of contributing variables was developed, weighted and assessed 
through the application of Utility Theory; an accurate threat perspective was gained and 
an Initial Vulnerability Rating of each IHE was assigned. These values are assigned 
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through the application of Utility Theory to actual data mined from police reports, press 
releases, as well as university, state and federal records of the incident and represent each 
IHE’s relative vulnerability to Active Shooter violence prior to the incident. Once the 
Initial Vulnerability Rating (IVR) was assessed for each IHE, these variables were again 
assessed in each case study through the application of Utility Theory to predicted values 
in order to reflect potential vulnerability. This process allowed us to incorporate the 
proposed facility upgrades and automated responses included in the recommended Victim 
Initiated Mitigation system and assign a Predicted Vulnerability Rating (PVR).  
This comparative analysis of the included case studies allowed us to identify 
variables that directly affect the Rate of Kill of Active Shooter incidents in IHEs and 
highlighted a feasible solution capable of enhancing or reducing appropriate variables 
resulting in a reduction in the rate of kill. In order to accomplish this, ordinal values were 
entered into two separate spreadsheets and Utility Theory was applied to values for each 
IHE. The first spreadsheet titled Initial Vulnerability Rating represents capabilities that 
were available to the university at the time of the Active Shooter incident to mitigate the 
effects of the shooting. The second spreadsheet titled Predicted Vulnerability Rating, 
represents the adjusted vulnerability after a Victim Initiated Mitigation system is 
implemented. In the Initial Vulnerability Rating spreadsheet, the column labeled 
Emergency Response Capability presents all negative values after being applied to the 
associated ordinal values. This represents the only factor in the Initial Vulnerability 
Rating assessment that reduced IHE vulnerability to Active Shooter violence. This means 
that everything else, to varying degrees, is contributing to university vulnerability. 
University Demographics, Local Demographics and Facility Composition represent the 
highest totals, or the most influential factors contributing to vulnerability and higher 










University Initial Vulnerability Rating 
  Emergency Response Capability University Environmental Factors  Local Environmental Factors       






Dem. Violent Crime 
Other 









Total Initial Vulnerability 
Rating 
Virginia Tech 18115.32 -944 -1037.9 277 399 200 5473 0 3985.3 49179 272 7024 960 83902.724 
Northern Illinois 




20 -578 -1318 123 168 200 47587 2308 293.51 2105 70 152 150 51280.51 
Cal State 
Fullerton 17 -851 -4174 824 405 200 7682 288 10217 35312 136 832 447 51335 
University of 
Iowa 63 -451 -3051.3 1327 4347 200 5490 846 10160.93 47011 206 704 491 67343.63 
Simon’s Rock 
College of Bard 11 -340 -367 0 147 200 125 353 10201.97 2340 210 1232 966 15078.97 
San Diego State 
University 0 -814 -30737 1254 6645 187 180192 12025 10209.6 36157 103 952 191 216364.6 
Appalachian 
School of Law 3317.083 -237 -144.434 0 0 199 0 0 10186.99 563 136 672 372 15064.6388 
University of 
Arizona 7706 -809 -593 176 1890 200 168005 80619 10226 50569 103 448 263 318803 
Duquesne 
University 0 -885 -14776.9 101 105 200 49346 40212 10182.67 12084.5 0 424 222 97215.27 
University of 




3321 -520 -6231.5 180 338 200 87223 590 10189.94 6058 70 512 104 102034.44 
Ohio State 
University 3306 -1262 -9599 728 1094 200 228 0 10193.6 127144 70 464 -65 132501.6 
University of 
Texas 75 -997 -5296.4 50 63 200 71326 17675 10792.21 60766 70 2080 8049 164852.81 
Table 17.   University Initial Vulnerability Rating Depicting Assigned Vulnerability Ratings to Selected Case Study 
Universities Prior to the Active Shooter Incident 
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The second spreadsheet titled Predicted Vulnerability Rating depicts resulting 
values of Utility Theory application incorporating implementation of the VIM system. 
The most notable observation made during this comparison was that upgrading facility 
composition to VIM system compliance became the largest factor in reducing IHE 
vulnerability. The remaining two largest contributors to IHE vulnerability were 
unchanged from the Initial Vulnerability Rating: demographics and population. This 
indicates that university populations and surrounding populations are going to be 
comprised of all different ethnicities, genders, religions, political affiliations, and the 
threats associated with each demographic composition will remain constant. Assuming 
that universities will not change admission demographics and will continue to admit new 
students on the basis of academic merit, it is safe to say the only variables contributing to 
IHE vulnerability that can be manipulated are those associated with the physical 
composition of the university’s facilities and terrain. In doing so, First Responders to acts 
of extreme violence have an advantage that actually begins to work for the Law 
Enforcement personnel in an Active Shooter scenarios. Further explanation of the VIM 
















University Predicted Vulnerability Rating with VIMS 
  Emergency Response Capability University Environmental Factors  Local Environmental Factors       









Total Vuln. with 
VIMS 
Virginia Tech 18115.32 -944 -1037.9 277 399 200 5473 0 3985.3 -20869 272 7024 960 13854.724 
Northern Illinois 
University 14668 
-883 -483.2 641 948 198 1598 1075 266.12 -19821 70 2400 1461 2137.92 
Louisiana Technical 
College 20 
-578 -1318 123 168 200 47587 2308 293.51 -987 70 152 255 48293.51 
Cal State Fullerton 17 -851 -4174 824 405 200 7682 288 10217 -24920 136 832 622 -8722 
University of Iowa 63 -451 -3051.3 1327 4347 200 5490 846 10160.93 -9949 206 704 771 10663.63 
Simon’s Rock College 
of Bard 11 
-340 -367 0 147 200 125 353 10201.97 1172 210 1232 1666 14610.97 
San Diego State 
University 0 
-814 -30737 1254 6645 187 180192 12025 10209.6 
-24803 103 952 331 155544.6 
Appalachian School of 
Law 3317.083 
-237 -144.434 0 0 199 0 0 10186.99 31 136 672 1112 15272.6388 
University of Arizona 7706 -809 -593 176 1890 200 168005 80619 10226 
-15839 103 448 438 252570 
Duquesne University 0 -885 -14776.9 101 105 200 49346 40212 10182.67 -6275.5 0 424 292 78925.27 
University of Central 
Arkansas 0 
-706 -740.5 156 1939 200 3346 0 10168.76 -5546 37 776 145 9775.26 
University of Alabama, 
Huntsville 3321 
-520 -6231.5 180 338 200 87223 590 10189.94 -1182 70 512 314 95004.44 
Ohio State University 3306 -1262 -9599 728 1094 200 228 0 10193.6 35944 70 464 180 41546.6 
University of Texas 75 -997 -5296.4 50 63 200 71326 17675 10792.21 -2534 70 2080 8714 102217.81 
Table 18.   University Predicted Vulnerability Rating Depicting Assigned Vulnerability Ratings to Selected Case Study 
Universities with Victim Initiated Mitigation System 
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3.  Case Study Comparative Analysis 
A comparative analysis of each case study depicts the percent change in 
vulnerability from the initial vulnerability of each IHE to the lowered vulnerability with 
the VIMs implementation. The percent difference represents the decrease in vulnerability 
to active shooter incidents, thereby increasing the ability to lower the Rate of Kill. There 
are so many factors that cause a university to be more or less vulnerable to higher Rates 
of Kill that it is necessary to explain each case study comparison, starting with the highest 
percent change and then in descending order. The final two that will be discussed will be 
the outliers: Cal State Fullerton and Appalachian School of Law. These two instances 
represent very unique circumstances and variables that cause the data to fall outside of 






























University of Iowa 67343.63 10663.63 85% 
Simon’s Rock 
College of Bard 
15078.97 14610.97 
3% 

































** Outlying data is explained in Chapter 4, Case Study Comparison 
Table 19.   Vulnerability Comparison Depicting Vulnerability Contrast Between Initial 
Vulnerability Ratings (IVRs) Of Case Study Universities and Predicated 
Vulnerability Ratings (PVRs) 
The largest percent change in vulnerability, 97%, is Northern Illinois University. 
NIU was more prepared for an active shooter incident than most universities at the time. 
As outlined in the case study, First Responders were on scene very quickly and moved 
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tactically to interdict the shooter. In this instance, the shooter committed suicide before 
the First Responders could end the situation but not before the shooter was able to kill six 
and wound twenty-one students. Even with an extremely low response time, the shooter 
was able to affect a high Rate of Kill and a very high casualty rate. Factors that lead to 
NIU’s vulnerability include the high number of students on campus, over 26,000 at the 
time of incident. Despite the fast response of the police, they still did not possess a means 
to contain or control the student population if the shooter had decided to continue his 
rampage. The data suggests that if a VIM system were installed at NIU, coupled with its 
existing active shooter countermeasures, the campus would be 97% less vulnerable to 
Active Shooter Violence. Please refer to Appendix B for a comparative vulnerability 
assessment and Victim Initiated Mitigation system estimate.     
The University of Iowa presented unique characteristics for reducing the Rate of 
Kill in an active shooter scenario. The percent change in vulnerability after VIMs 
implementation is 85%. The university police were not as well equipped or trained as the 
NIU departments but a significant amount of effort was placed on communications 
processes for students in the event of an emergency. The shooter in this instance was able 
to inflict casualties in two rooms within the first affected building, then walked three 
blocks on campus to continue his shooting spree, and ultimately shot himself. The 
incident lasted approximately eight minutes, but law enforcement was unable to respond 
until nine minutes after the first shot. The shooter was able to freely move from building 
to building in order to carry out his plan without any disruption. The data suggests that if 
a VIM system existed, the targets would be behind several layers of locked doors. The 
VIM system would have eliminated the shooter’s ability to return to the first room and 
execute an already wounded victim and would have blocked his entry into the second 
building where he killed his fifth victim and wounded another. With a population of over 
28,000 on campus at the time of incident, the percent change between Initial and 
Predicted Vulnerability Ratings is partially explained by the large number of unprotected 




the University of Iowa, it is probable that the university would be 85% less vulnerable to 
Active Shooter violence. Please refer to Appendix B for a comparative vulnerability 
assessment and Victim Initiated Mitigation system estimate. 
Virginia Tech represents the worst school shooting in history. The university has 
made many improvements to security protocols and first response techniques and policies 
since the deadly rampage by a deranged shooter. The data suggests that with the 
implementation of a VIM system, the school would be 84% less vulnerable to Active 
Shooter violence. At the time of the shooting, VT had a student population of 34,500 and 
the shooter had several open buildings and rooms to choose from. In an effort to 
maximize casualties, the shooter chose a series of high occupancy classrooms. Although 
VT receives high praise for a rapid response time to this incident, the facility composition 
worked against potential victim survivability throughout the duration of the incident. 
Students and faculty were unable to securely lock doors until the death toll had already 
reached 32 and an additional 17 injured. In the instance of VT, students adapted to the 
situation and barricaded the final room that the shooter sought entry into. Unable to 
inflict additional casualties, the shooter decided to kill himself before First Responders 
could interdict. With the implementation of a VIM system, all the classrooms that were 
engaged by the shooter would have locked before he made his way through the building. 
His initial shooting in a dorm room across campus would have initiated the system to 
respond and contain and control the remainder of the campus. With the implementation 
of a VIM system, the data suggest that Virginia Tech would be 84% less vulnerable to 
Active Shooter Violence. Please refer to Appendix B for a comparative vulnerability 
assessment and Victim Initiated Mitigation system estimate. 
Ohio State University data suggests a 69% decrease in vulnerability with a VIM 
system implemented as part of a larger security plan. OSU had approximately 63,000 
students enrolled during the shooting that occurred in 2010. The shooter entered his place 
of work and killed one and wounded another before killing himself. Because of the short 
duration of the shooting, the school received an unfavorable Initial Vulnerability Rating. 
An important inference demonstrated by the comparative analysis of this case study is the 
ability of facility upgrades to ensure that the remainder of the campus remains protected 
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from further violence. The VIM system would have immediately locked down the 
campus, allowing first responders to isolate the shooting location, contain and control the 
population and disrupt or block any additional targets throughout the campus. This 
unique shooting situation lead to a suggested 69% decrease in overall vulnerability after a 
VIM system is implemented. Please refer to Appendix B for a comparative vulnerability 
assessment and Victim Initiated Mitigation system estimate. 
In the case of the University of Central Arkansas, the shooters conducted a drive 
by shooting on campus, resulting in the deaths of two students and wounding of another. 
The percent change in vulnerability with a VIM system was unusually high at a 68% for 
this type of shooting. However, like the case of OSU, the university had a high campus 
population of 11,817 students. The implementation of a VIM system would have 
prevented further potential casualties in adjacent buildings by containing and controlling 
the population immediately. The lower percent changes in vulnerability compared to 
other universities where shootings took place in classrooms is due to the location of the 
shooting being in an open area from a moving vehicle. It is difficult to predict how any 
type of system could immediately begin to mitigate the effects of this type of attack. But, 
as stated, the VIM system would protect the remainder of the IHE population, facilitate 
environmental control for First Responders and lower the vulnerability of Active Shooter 
violence to 68 percent. Please refer to Appendix B for a comparative vulnerability 
assessment and Victim Initiated Mitigation system estimate. 
The University of Texas shooting provides an even more unique case of an active 
shooter on an IHE. The data suggests that if a VIM system were implemented at the time 
of the shooting, the vulnerability of the school would have dropped by 38%. It is a much 
lower decrease as opposed to the other universities of high population density. The 
unique characteristics of this case are the fact that the shooter was able to isolate himself 
in a tower, S.W.A.T. tactics did not exist at the time of incident and the Rate of Kill was 
extremely high at 13 killed and 31 wounded. The interdiction of this shooter is perhaps 
the best example of first response in all of the 14 case studies. Victim actions and brave 
first responders were able to stop the shooting. This incident changed the way Law 
Enforcement reacts to active shooter incidents and lead to the development of S.W.A.T. 
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capabilities across the nation. Despite applying police response tactics across universities 
and HOFs across the country, the data still suggests that in order to drastically cut the 
vulnerability of an IHE with a high population a VIM system is a crucial component to an 
effective security plan. Please refer to Appendix B for a comparative vulnerability 
assessment and Victim Initiated Mitigation system estimate. 
In the cases of San Diego State University and the University of Arizona, the data 
suggests a decrease in vulnerability of 29% and 21%, respectively. Both universities gain 
points for security by having robust local Law Enforcement units close to each school, as 
well as Emergency Response Procedures in place. However, shooters in both events were 
able to affect multiple rooms within a four- and ten-minute period, well before law 
enforcement could respond. Facility composition increased vulnerability in both instances 
in every way until the San Diego State shooter gave up and called 911 and the University 
of Arizona shooter committed suicide. Data suggests that the implementation of a VIM 
system alone would reduce Rate of Kill in this instance and the vulnerability to Active 
Shooter violence by an average of 25 percent. Please refer to Appendix B for a 
comparative vulnerability assessment and Victim Initiated Mitigation system estimate. 
The above eight cases represent universities with large populations and densely 
populated outlying communities. This particular demographic makes the Law 
Enforcement task of security much more difficult. The data suggests that a tool, such as a 
VIM system, capable of assisting victims and first responders in disrupting active 
shooters and containing/controlling the student and faculty population will have a 
significant effect on the ability to lower the Rate of Kill and vulnerability to future Active 
Shooter violence. Additionally, it can be inferred that by containing and controlling the 
population and isolating the incident location, First Responders response time should 
decrease and allow for more incidents where First Responders interdict the shooter. In 
these situations, the duration of the incident, assuming the population is 
contained/controlled and isolated from the shooter, is immaterial. The incident may last 
one minute or three hours, as long as the Rate of Kill is minimized based on the victim 
actions through the initiation of the VIM system and based on the First Responder actions 
facilitated by the increased situational awareness gained through the VIM system. The 
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next set of four case studies will outline how smaller universities with smaller campuses 
can still benefit from a VIM system but must be integrated with other mitigation 
approaches as well. 
In the case of Duquesne University, the data suggested a decrease in vulnerability 
of 19%, against a campus population of 10,296 students. The shooting itself took place in 
an open quad of the school against several basketball players. The unique place for the 
shooting, like University of Central Arkansas, tends to lead the data to a lower percentage 
decrease in vulnerability. Implementation of a VIM system would contain and control the 
remainder of the IHE population and prevent a higher potential rate of kill. However, this 
particular data assessed with utility theory cannot predict how many potential victims 
would be present or not in any given open area of the campus. Nineteen percent is a 
significant decrease in vulnerability and it does not negate the use of a VIM system in a 
smaller populated school. However, other forms of Active Shooter mitigation must be 
implemented in order to effectively prevent or mitigate this type of attack. Please refer to 
Appendix B for a comparative vulnerability assessment and Victim Initiated Mitigation 
system estimate. 
The University of Alabama, Huntsville, with a population of 7,600, would have a 
7% decrease in vulnerability with VIM system implementation based on the data set. The 
shooter killed three and wounded three others before turning herself in. The lower 
number of students, the lack of diversity amongst the student population and a well-
trained police force assisted in reducing the Initial Vulnerability Rating. Although the 
VIM system does not drastically lower the vulnerability, police forces do not stay 
constant based on personnel changeover, budget changes and other variables. The 
vulnerability of even a small school can rise and fall from year to year based on 
admissions as well. A VIM system represents a constant security advantage for 
universities. The other variable that reduces percentage reduction in this case is the fact 
that the shooter only affected one room then turned herself in to local authorities. The 
VIM system would, again, shield the remainder of the IHE population until police arrive 
but the data scrutinizes the lower number of students as opposed to other larger 
universities. Despite a small 7% decrease in vulnerability, a VIM system would still be a 
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valid tool for improving security at the University of Alabama, Huntsville. Please refer to 
Appendix B for a comparative vulnerability assessment and Victim Initiated Mitigation 
system estimate. 
Louisiana Technical College receives a 6% decrease in vulnerability based on the 
data set. Much like University of Alabama, Huntsville, its small population of 1,490 
students account for the reduction in initial vulnerability. The shooter killed two students 
in one room before shooting herself. The VIM system would have locked down the 
remainder of the school allowing first responders to account for other students and ensure 
the absence of multiple shooters. The data accounts for the one room simplicity of the 
shooting event and the low student population. However, the data still shows that a VIM 
system would still contribute to a lowered vulnerability and, in theory, would reduce Rate 
of Kill outside of the first classroom engaged. 
The last of the small school case studies that met the predicted analysis of the 
study is the Simon’s Rock College of Bard. With the implementation of a VIM system, 
the data suggests a 3% decrease in vulnerability to Active Shooter violence. Simon’s 
Rock is unique from all the other schools based on the fact it is an early education school 
that admits gifted high school students from Junior or Senior year secondary schools. Its 
total population does not exceed 450 students in any given year. The school has a 9:1 
ratio of students to faculty and is therefore much more supervised than most universities. 
The school also implements more robust security protocols, such as would be observed 
on a high school campus. Many entrance doors of buildings remain locked at all times 
and access to academic buildings is regulated to enrolled students and faculty. The 
shooter conducted his shooting in an open parking lot and the library, which he had 
access to. The VIM system, in this instance, would have locked the shooter out of the 
library, which would have mitigated the death of one student and the wounding of an 
additional student. The significant contribution of a VIM system in this instance would be 
a lockdown of remaining potential victims, immediate notification to first responders and 
potential isolation of the shooter from the targets. Although 3% is a comparatively low 
number when placing it next to Northern Illinois University, it still represents a valid  
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security improvement and two lives that were changes forever. Please refer to Appendix 
B for a comparative vulnerability assessment and Victim Initiated Mitigation system 
estimate.  
The above four cases represent small scale schools with significantly smaller 
student populations and/or circumstances that other than 100% prevention that couldn’t 
be mitigated with swift, trained, armed victim response. Although it may be inferred that 
a VIM system would not have mitigated the exact situations in these cases, the VIM 
system would prevent any additional casualties and to help reinforce tactics and 
procedures already specified by the university and responding units. The VIM system 
serves as a tool that should enhance the training of students or occupants of IHEs and 
HOFs and to serve as a tool to aid first responders at any training level to effectively 
manage mitigate and ultimately resolve the shooting situation. 
The last two case studies and the resulting data represent outlying data that, 
because of the uniqueness of the shooting incident itself and the uniqueness of the 
demographics, set themselves apart from the first twelve studies analyzed. These data sets 
are unrepresentative of the usual findings but still provide interesting insight as to why a 
VIM system may be useful in these two universities. 
The first university, Cal State Fullerton, involves an active shooter scenario that 
spanned over two rooms of a basement, a stairwell, a hallway, an elevator, an open area 
of the library and the outside of the library near a parking lot. During the shooting, two 
victims, after being wounded, wrestled with and pursued the shooter in an attempt to stop 
him only to be shot and killed. In an extreme act of bravery, this case represents the only 
case in the 14 case studies to have immediate action from victims against the shooter. 
Because the shooting takes place over such a large area of the school, with multiple uses 
of doors and areas that could be locked down with a VIM system response, the decrease 
in vulnerability calculates to 117 percent. This number represents that the incident would 
be completely prevented before it started. This is obviously not a reasonable contention 
of this thesis. The VIM system is used to aid victims and first responders to gain rapid 
advantages for survival in Active Shooter situations. The multiple rooms that the VIM 
system would lock down and the number of students, 32,611, account for the skewed 
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number set. What is interesting to note however, is how effective the VIM system is 
projected to be in this instance with the numbers provided for the university with regards 
to demographics and facility composition. Therefore, it can be inferred that regardless of 
training level of the police or other First Responders, Cal State Fullerton would 
significantly benefit from a VIM system based on their unique demographic and complex 
facility composition. Please refer to Appendix B for a comparative vulnerability 
assessment and Victim Initiated Mitigation system estimate. 
The second set of skewed data represents the Appalachian School of Law in 
Grundy, Virginia. The data set represents a -1% change in vulnerability with a VIM 
system, implying that the school would be 1% more vulnerable to Active Shooter 
violence with a VIM system implemented. The uniqueness of this case is a result of the 
demographics of the school population. It is comprised mostly of police officers and 
security personnel within federal agencies who are pursuing a Juris Doctorate. This 
student population is highly trained compared to the average university population, is 
older than the average undergraduate student population and only has a student 
population of 350 students. The data has heavily weighted the ability of the victims to 
mitigate the active shooter. The data suggests that a VIM system may actually inhibit the 
ability of the victims, police officers in this case, from mitigating the shooting. In this 
particular instance, the students did act accordingly to stop the shooter. After the shooter 
was able to kill three and wound three others, students with their issued weapons in their 
vehicles held the shooter at gunpoint and subdued him. That being said, the shooter was 
still able to affect two rooms during the shooting that could have been reduced to one 
with the implementation of the VIM system. Enough cannot be said for the heroes that 
disrupted the shooter’s actions and ultimately detained him, but the fact remains that the 
shooter still enjoyed relative freedom of movement and was able to continue through 
open doors and throughout the building before First Responders could stop him. Since 
this is the only school to not benefit from the implementation of a Victim Initiated 
Mitigation system as per the Utility Theory data set, it is clear that victim actions play a 
large role in this case. It should still be argued that a VIM system would aid in the 
mitigation of this event by containing and controlling the remaining students on the 
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campus and would still allow those victims the opportunity to exit buildings and retrieve 
their weapons, as in this particular case. Please refer to Appendix B for a comparative 
vulnerability assessment and Victim Initiated Mitigation system estimate. 
Although the data in all 14 cases supports the use of a VIM system to varying 
degrees, the overwhelming numbers in the first eight cases is sufficient to argue that the 
use of a VIM system would significantly lower the Rate of Kill in an active shooter 
scenario. To mitigate the remaining six cases, the VIM system would also significantly 
enhance the capabilities of victims to survive and for First Responders to mitigate the 
effects of the shooter after the shooting has begun. At any time prior to a suspected event, 
a victim could initiate the VIM system resulting in an alert and lockdown of the IHE and 
effectively prevent the shooting from ever happening. At the very least it would disrupt 
the shooter’s plan and force them to make decisions about whether to continue the 
shooting and where. This may allow enough time for First Responders to neutralize the 
event altogether. Understanding that the data presented above is simply mathematical 
theory, the contention of this thesis is that the only effective way to immediately lower 
vulnerability on school campuses is with the technological application of a VIM system 
that is capable of containing the IHE population, controlling the population and shooter, 
communicating with the population, the shooter and First Responders, calling local 
authorities immediately and aiding First Responders in developing a plan to immediately 
neutralize the threat. 
4.  Cost Analysis 
The cost associated with implementation of this system will be considerable for 
IHEs choosing to reduce their vulnerability to Active Shooter violence and Rate of Kill in 
potential attacks. However, this cost will vary for each university based on facility 
composition and desired levels of protection and readiness desired by each IHE as 
suggested in the scalable solutions recommendation made in Chapter V of this thesis. 
Ideally, similar to the fire alarm, call boxes should be installed in all areas accessible to 
potential victims that would allow for virtually anyone within the perimeter of the IHE or 
HOF to immediately activate the system. The simple cost analysis for each IHE included 
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below represents an estimate based on an optimal install that would include a call box in 
every room of the university. For the purposes of this cost analysis components, network 
synchronization, software creation, installation and associated facility infrastructure 
upgrades were estimated at a per room cost of $3,000.00 USD. In order to compute a 
total cost for system installation per university, we had to first estimate the total number 
of rooms per IHE. However, the data included in our case study analysis of each IHE 
only contains the number buildings and excludes values for the number of rooms on each 
campus. For the purposes of this research and simple cost analysis, an estimation of 100 
rooms per building will be applied in order to determine the number of required VIM 
units to be installed in each university. Although, the accuracy of this estimation will vary 
for each campus, this cost analysis should provide an overestimation of cost associated 
with VIM system install. Furthermore, the same estimates can be performed with actual 
data at a later date if so desired by the IHE. After determining estimated values for 
associated cost of the VIM system and number of rooms per IHE, this cost analysis 
determines the initial investment required by each IHE to install a VIM system and 
provide its population with the highest possible levels of protection and readiness. 
Furthermore, by assigning a proposed $200.00 USD security fee per student, per 
academic year; a projected pay-off plan and estimated residual income was also created 
as part of this cost analysis. The following table depicts a cost analysis for each case 
study university.  
 
Northern Illinois University 
Number of buildings *100 Rooms = Total Number of Rooms 
* $3,000.00 USD / Unit 
Cost 
Total Price for VIM 
System 
64 6,400 $19,200,000.00 $19,200,000.00 
    
Total Number of 
Enrolled Students 
Total number of 
enrolled students * 
$200.00 USD proposed 
security fee / Year = 
Total Income / Year 
with Security Fee 
* 5 year Payoff Plan 
Amount Owed on VIM 
System Installation after 
five years 




Louisiana Technical College 
Number of buildings *100 Rooms = Total Number of Rooms 
* $3,000.00 USD / Unit 
Cost 
Total Price for VIM 
System 
14 1,400 $4,200,000.00 $4,200,000.00 
    
Total Number of 
Enrolled Students 
Total number of 
enrolled students * 
$200.00 USD proposed 
security fee / Year = 
Total Income / Year 
with Security Fee 
* 5 year Payoff Plan 
Amount Owed on VIM 
System Installation after 
five years 
1,490 $298,000.00 $1,490,000.00 $2,170,000.00 
Cal State Fullerton 
Number of buildings *100 Rooms = Total Number of Rooms 
* $3,000.00 USD / Unit 
Cost 
Total Price for VIM 
System 
29 2,900 $8,700,000.00 $8,700,000.00 
    
Total Number of 
Enrolled Students 
Total number of 
enrolled students * 
$200.00 USD 
proposed security fee / 
Year = Total Income / 
Year with Security Fee 
* 5 year Payoff Plan 
Amount Owed on VIM 
System Installation after 
five years 
32,611 $6,522,200.00 $32,611,000.00 0 (Surplus of $23,911,000.00 at yr. 5) 
University of Iowa 
Number of buildings *100 Rooms = Total Number of Rooms 
* $3,000.00 USD / Unit 
Cost 
Total Price for VIM 
System 
120 12,000 $36,000,000.00 $36,000,000.00 
    
Total Number of 
Enrolled Students 
Total number of 
enrolled students * 
$200.00 USD proposed 
security fee / Year = 
Total Income / Year 
with Security Fee 
* 5 year Payoff Plan 
Amount Owed on VIM 
System Installation 
after five years 
30,500 $6,100,000.00 $30,500,00.00 $5,500,000.00 
Simon’s Rock College of Bard 
Number of buildings *100 Rooms = Total Number of Rooms 
* $3,000.00 USD / Unit 
Cost 
Total Price for VIM 
System 
46 4,600 $13,800,000.00 $13,800,000.00 
    
Total Number of 
Enrolled Students 
Total number of 
enrolled students * 
$200.00 USD 
proposed security fee / 
Year = Total Income / 
Year with Security Fee 
* 5 year Payoff Plan 
Amount Owed on VIM 
System Installation after 
five years 





San Diego State University 
Number of buildings *100 Rooms = Total Number of Rooms 
* $3,000.00 USD / Unit 
Cost 
Total Price for VIM 
System 
120 12,000 $36,000,000.00 $36,000,000.00 
    
Total Number of 
Enrolled Students 
Total number of 
enrolled students * 
$200.00 USD proposed 
security fee / Year = 
Total Income / Year 
with Security Fee 
* 5 year Payoff Plan 
Amount Owed on VIM 
System Installation 
after five years 
32,817 $6,563,400.00 $32,817,000.00 $3,183,000.00 
Appalachian School of Law 
Number of buildings *100 Rooms = Total Number of Rooms 
* $3,000.00 USD / Unit 
Cost 
Total Price for VIM 
System 
4 400 $1,200,000.00 $1,200,000.00 
    
Total Number of 
Enrolled Students 
Total number of 
enrolled students * 
$200.00 USD 
proposed security fee / 
Year = Total Income / 
Year with Security Fee 
* 5 year Payoff Plan 
Amount Owed on VIM 
System Installation after 
five years 
350 $70,000.00 $350,000.00 $850,000.00 
University of Arizona 
Number of buildings *100 Rooms = Total Number of Rooms 
* $3,000.00 USD / Unit 
Cost 
Total Price for VIM 
System 
176 $17,600.00 $52,800,000.00 $52,800,000.00 
    
Total Number of 
Enrolled Students 
Total number of 
enrolled students * 
$200.00 USD proposed 
security fee / Year = 
Total Income / Year 
with Security Fee 
* 5 year Payoff Plan 
Amount Owed on VIM 
System Installation 
after five years 
35,747 $7,149,400.00 $35,747,000.00 $17,053,000.00 
Duquesne University 
Number of buildings *100 Rooms = Total Number of Rooms 
* $3,000.00 USD / Unit 
Cost 
Total Price for VIM 
System 
45 4,500 $13,500,000.00 $13,500,000.00 
    
Total Number of 
Enrolled Students 
Total number of 
enrolled students * 
$200.00 USD proposed 
security fee / Year = 
Total Income / Year 
with Security Fee 
* 5 year Payoff Plan 
Amount Owed on VIM 
System Installation 
after five years 






University of Central Arkansas 
Number of buildings *100 Rooms = Total Number of Rooms 
* $3,000.00 USD / Unit 
Cost 
Total Price for VIM 
System 
118 11,800 $35,400,000.00 $35,400,000.00 
    
Total Number of 
Enrolled Students 
Total number of 
enrolled students * 
$200.00 USD proposed 
security fee / Year = 
Total Income / Year 
with Security Fee 
* 5 year Payoff Plan 
Amount Owed on VIM 
System Installation 
after five years 
11,817 $2,363,400.00 $11,817,000.00 $23,583,000.00 
University of Alabama Huntsville 
Number of buildings *100 Rooms = Total Number of Rooms 
* $3,000.00 USD / Unit 
Cost 
Total Price for VIM 
System 
30 3,000 $9,000,000.00 $9,000,000.00 
    
Total Number of 
Enrolled Students 
Total number of 
enrolled students * 
$200.00 USD proposed 
security fee / Year = 
Total Income / Year 
with Security Fee 
* 5 year Payoff Plan 
Amount Owed on VIM 
System Installation 
after five years 
7,600 $1,520,000.00 $7,600,000.00 $1,400,000.00 
Ohio State University 
Number of buildings *100 Rooms = Total Number of Rooms 
* $3,000.00 USD / Unit 
Cost 
Total Price for VIM 
System 
900 90,000 $270,000,000.00 $270,000,000.00 
    
Total Number of 
Enrolled Students 
Total number of 
enrolled students * 
$200.00 USD proposed 
security fee / Year = 
Total Income / Year 
with Security Fee 
* 5 year Payoff Plan 
Amount Owed on VIM 
System Installation after 
five years 
63,000 $12,600,000.00 $63,000,000.00 $207,000,000.00 
University of Texas at Austin 
Number of buildings *100 Rooms = Total Number of Rooms 
* $3,000.00 USD / Unit 
Cost 
Total Price for VIM 
System 
550 55,000 $165,000,000.00 $165,000,000.00 
    
Total Number of 
Enrolled Students 
Total number of 
enrolled students * 
$200.00 USD proposed 
security fee / Year = 
Total Income / Year 
with Security Fee 
* 5 year Payoff Plan 
Amount Owed on VIM 
System Installation after 
five years 
34,000 $6,800,000.00 $34,000,000.00 $131,000,000.00 
Table 20.   Cost Analyses for Each Case Study University 
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VI.  RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION 
A.  THE HOLISTIC APPROACH 
When analyzing the Active Shooter problem and forming recommendations to 
mitigate the effects of these horrendous acts, certain immutable realities, as outlined in 
the included case studies, must be addressed. First, these acts of extreme violence cannot 
be prevented despite a university’s best effort to do so. Second, there will always be a 
delay between initiation of violence and Law Enforcement response. Third, in the time 
separating the first and last shots fired in Active Shooter incidents the only individuals 
who have the capacity to react are the victims and potential victims. The fourth and final 
immutable reality of these incidents is that with current security configurations within 
U.S. IHEs, the only individual predominantly in control during an Active Shooter 
incident is the shooter himself. In an effort to counter this evolving threat, Attorney 
General Janet Reno and Secretary of Education Richard W. Riley advocated a systematic 
approach to threat assessment as part of a nationwide approach to an overall effort to 
make sure that every school in the Nation has a comprehensive violence prevention plan 
in place.230 However, to date, no federal, state, or independent agency has produced a 
reasonable plan for accomplishing this and, as a result, the student and faculty 
populations of U.S. IHEs remain at risk. Although we do not postulate that we can 
prevent these incidents or to reduce the Active Shooter problem to a zero Rate of Kill, the 
accumulated research and analysis conducted as part of this project has confirmed that a 
holistic approach incorporating preventative measures and improvements in Law 
Enforcement response coupled with a Victim Initiated Mitigation system could 
drastically improve Response Time and decrease Incident Duration. Ultimately, these 
improvements, if implemented correctly, will reduce the Rate of Kill for Active Shooter 
incidents.  
                                                 
230 Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation, The School Shooter: A Threat Assessment 
Perspective, 5. 
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1.  Prevention and Preemption 
Prevention and preemption focused efforts within IHEs are valuable assets and 
must be supported. Without these assets, students will not receive proper mental health 
care and attention required to identify and mitigate violent tendencies before they 
manifest into violent actions. However, we do not think that it is practical to expect an 
already overburdened and typically underfunded aspect of student health to identify and 
prevent extreme acts of violence, such as Active Shooter incidents in an autonomous 
manner. Instead, we present this aspect of security as one element of a holistic approach 
to Active Shooter mitigation. The U.S. Secret Service and U.S. Department of Education 
presented a collaborative document entitled Threat Assessment in Schools: A Guide to 
Managing Threatening Situations and to Creating Safe School Climates which addresses 
this problem and makes useful suggestions for preventing school violence.  
First, a culture of safety in which bullying and other forms of intimidation is not 
tolerated must also be complemented with mutual respect among teachers and 
students.231 Second, U.S. IHEs must establish and empower a Threat Assessment 
infrastructure that is capable of evaluating threats across the threat assessment continuum 
from inquiry to investigation. IHEs should possess internal capacities to identify threats 
and perform formal threat assessment inquiries and, when warranted, have the 
professional relationships and protocols in place to transition to a threat assessment 
investigation carried out by Law Enforcement. Third, students, staff, and faculty must be 
trained to identify and report students and coworkers of concern to the Threat Assessment 
Team. Finally, a central point of contact must be established for the reporting of potential 
threats. This point of contact should be heavily publicized to the entire IHE population 




                                                 
231 United States Secret Service, United States Department of Education, Threat Assessment in 
Schools: A Guide to Managing Threatening Situations and to Creating Safe School Climates, Washington, 
DC, May 2002, 12.  
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information when reports are received. Also, all reports of potential threats must be 
perceived as credible until otherwise dismissed and feedback to the reporting individual 
must be received in order to terminate the threat inquiry.232  
2.  Mental Health Screening and Treatment 
While mental health care and treatment are clearly crucial components to 
identification of potential threats and for treatment of post-traumatic issues resulting from 
acts of extreme violence, these assets have no place in a reasonable Active Shooter 
mitigation plan of action. These resources were never intended to be utilized in a 
mitigating role as evidenced by the 63-day average post trauma response time cited 
earlier in this thesis. Furthermore, limitations placed on IHE mental health resources of 
funding, manning, and privacy acts preclude mental health screening from becoming a 
viable mitigation measure as well. Instead, it is our recommendation that IHE mental 
health resources be reserved for treatment and evaluation of potential threats as identified 
by the proposed Threat Assessment Team and for treating of post-traumatic injuries 
resulting from these events.  
3.  Law Enforcement Response 
A well-trained police force is a cornerstone of any safe society and the IHE 
environment is no different. Regardless of other recommendations put forth as part of this 
thesis, none is more crucial than a well-trained police force. Campus police and local 
Law Enforcement readiness for Active Shooter response must first begin with relative 
and practical training on Active Shooter response. The premier training on this subject 
and the recommendation of this thesis after a review of available training programs is the 
Active Shooter response training for Law Enforcement officers offered through the 
Advanced Law Enforcement Rapid Response Training (ALERRT) organization located 
in San Marcos, TX. This training is designed to encourage participants to implement the 
concepts and principles of appropriate actions in situations that may include Active 
                                                 
232 United States Secret Service, United States Department of Education, Threat Assessment in 
Schools: A Guide to Managing Threatening Situations and to Creating Safe School Climates, 12. 
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Shooters, barricade and hostage situations, and terrorist attacks.233 This training 
represents a fundamental shift from pre-Columbine tactics of cordon, contain the threat, 
and call SWAT. These contemporary lessons taught by Law Enforcement agencies, such 
as ALERRT are focused on First Responder initiative and Law Enforcement officers are 
now taught to form small contact teams if possible and move directly to and neutralize 
the threat. Unfortunately, this level of training is not taught in most police academies and 
most Law Enforcement officers and campus police have not received this level of 
training regarding Active Shooter response. In order to properly prepare our Law 
Enforcement community for the evolving threat of Active Shooters; it is our 
recommendation that Active Shooter response training be incorporated in all basic Law 
Enforcement and campus police training. 
4.  Victim Actions 
In addition to training our police officers, students, staff, and faculty must be 
trained in Active Shooter response as well. Applying an ecological criminology 
perspective to crime in general; assuming offenders exist, in order for a crime to happen 
the victim and the offender must meet in time and space. This concept is best explained 
by the Criminology Triangle.  
 
 
Figure 10.   Criminology Triangle (From 234) 
                                                 




This model demonstrates that offenders are usually influenced or controlled by 
other people known as handlers. Likewise, victims are usually protected by other people 
as well called guardians. Additionally, places are usually controlled by other people 
known as managers.234 Therefore when approaching the Active Shooter problem, 
ALERRT sought to understand how offenders and their victims come together in time 
and place in order to form better recommendations for ways to mitigate the effects of 
Active Shooters. Reasoning that if victims were able to be separated from the offenders; 
crime could not occur, and applying this logic to the Active Shooter problem, their 
resulting recommendation was to focus on victim actions. ALERRT advocates three 
actions: Avoid, Deny, Defend (A.D.D) for potential victim response to Active Shooter 
incidents. First, ALERRT suggests that potential victims should attempt to avoid the 
gunman, exit the Threat Area and continue their escape until they are out of danger. 
Second, if potential victims are unable to escape from the Threat Area, then they should 
enter a room and deny the gunman access to their position by locking and barricading 
doors, covering windows, turning off lights, and silencing audible electronic devices. 
Lastly, potential victims are encouraged to prepare to defend themselves against the 
gunman with improvised weaponry in the event the gunman is able to bypass their 
defensive measures and enter their room. The A.D.D. response for potential victims is 
also endorsed by the Department of Homeland Security as a best practice for improving 
survivability of potential victims in Active Shooter scenarios.235 We also endorse this 
methodology for victim actions in Active Shooter incidents and recommend that this 
program of instruction be implemented and taught during student orientation in U.S. 
IHEs. As discussed in the second hypothesis and throughout all of the supporting case 
studies of this work, without a Victim Initiated Mitigation system, even the best-trained 
police response coupled with aggressive victim actions will fall short of an optimal 
response.  
                                                 
234 Blair, “Response to Active Shooter Events.” 
235 Texas State University, Advanced Law Enforcement Rapid Response Training (ALERRT) Manual, 
1–23. 
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B.  STANDARDIZATION OF ACTIVE SHOOTER RESPONSE 
1.  Victim Initiated Mitigation 
With consideration to the holistic approach to mitigating the effects of Active 
Shooters in U.S. IHEs and HOFs, the crucial missing component to existing capabilities 
is a Victim Initiated Mitigation (VIM) system that incorporates automated control 
measures and complementary response protocols. After a comprehensive review of the 
most lethal case studies of Active Shooter incidents in U.S. IHEs, the only realistic means 
of reducing Response Time and Incident Duration for Active Shooter scenarios is the 
application of facility upgrades that are able to return some advantages to victims and 
potential victims in these situations. Similar to improvements made to fire response in the 
1940s, where fire alarm activation initiates immediate active control measures including 
sprinkler systems, fire extinguishers, and automated alerts, effective Active Shooter 
mitigation in IHEs requires a similar victim initiated response coupled with active control 
measures.  
a. System Components 
A Victim Initiated Mitigation system should consist of five core 
components. First, a VIM system should include an emergency call box that is centrally 
located in all public areas of the university (i.e., classrooms, lecture halls, hallways, 
meeting rooms, outdoor areas, and offices). These emergency call boxes should be 
capable of initiating and maintaining two-way communications with a remotely located 
Incident Command Center (ICC) and be able to provide the ICC with real-time data 
regarding situational awareness of events within the Target Area. The second core 
component of a VIM system is electromagnetic door releases. All door releases in each 
building should be directly networked to all emergency call boxes within that particular 
building. Additionally, all door releases emplaced on the IHE should be directly 
networked to the ICC as well. These electromagnetic door releases would be able to be 
remotely deactivated resulting in door closure from either the emergency call boxes or 
the ICC. The third core component of a VIM system is the Incident Command Center. 
The ICC would consist of a remotely located hardened facility that is constantly staffed 
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and capable of receiving and maintaining two-way communications with all emergency 
call boxes. Additionally, the ICC should also have the capability to receive and monitor 
data received from activated call boxes that improves situational awareness within the 
Target Area. Furthermore, after a call is received, the ICC should be capable of validating 
the threat and, through a series of pre-programmed and planned response protocols, issue 
alerts and notifications to campus police, local Law Enforcement, Emergency Response 
Teams, as well as Fire and Rescue departments. Similar alerts should also be able to be 
sent from the ICC to students, staff and faculty through any networked media device 
alerting them to the nature of the incident and issuing initial guidance. Lastly, in the case 
of an emergency activation, the ICC should maintain the capability to activate other call 
boxes in order to gain situational awareness data and to remotely lockdown other 
adjacent buildings as well.  
The fourth component of a VIM system should include a mobile 
situational awareness device. This device would consist of a handheld unit that is capable 
of being directly networked to any emergency call box located within the IHE. These 
mobile situational awareness devices should be capable of receiving the same real-time 
data as the ICC that increases situational awareness within the Target Area. These 
devices would be issued to first responders, thereby placing this high level of situational 
awareness at the tactical level and in the hands of the First Responders. Additionally, 
these devices would be able to establish and maintain two-way communications with the 
activated emergency call box. Lastly, the fifth core component of a VIM system is RFID 
key fobs and prox readers. Key fobs should be issued to all First Responders with 
capacity to respond to an emergency on the issuing IHE’s campus. Likewise, every door 
on the IHE would have to be equipped with a prox reader that would unlock the door and 
allow for ingress of First Responders.  
b. System Concept Flow 
A VIM system consisting of the components listed above can immediately 
notify Law Enforcement while simultaneously containing the threat utilizing facility 
lockdown and mass alert protocols. With a VIM system, upon threat identification by any 
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member of the IHE population; students, staff, or faculty are able to initiate the 
emergency call via the closest emergency call box. This action would result in two 
simultaneous actions. First, the Threat Area would be immediately locked down as the 
activation of the emergency call box would deactivate all electromagnetic door locks 
located on all doors within the building. This would result in all doors closing to locked 
position. As each door is equipped with a U.S. Fire Code compliant breaker bar or 
equivalent handle, a locked door would entail locked from ingress and not egress. This 
feature would prevent capture of potential victims in disadvantageous positions and 
afford them the freedom to make decisions that are most advantageous to their own 
survival. For instance, locking doors is a proven 100% effective countermeasure to 
Active Shooters thus far, as no active shooter incident has had a shooter to breach a 
looked door and inflict injuries.236 However, the Active Shooter problem is an evolving 
threat and certain threats persist, such as fire that may require potential victims to make a 
decision to exit the room or facility in order to better facilitate their own survival. Any 
proposed system must preserve this freedom of choice for potential victims regarding 
decisions of survivability.  
The second simultaneous action that occurs upon activation of an 
emergency call box is establishment of two-way communications with the ICC. After the 
call has been received by the ICC and two way communications have been established 
with the activated emergency call box, the threat can be verified by the ICC. At this stage 
of the VIM system concept flow, the Threat Area has been locked down and through the 
process of separating potential victims from the shooter, the threat has been effectively 
contained. After the ICC has validated the threat, through a series of pre-programmed and 
planned alerts, the ICC is able to dispatch campus police, local Law Enforcement, and all 
other relevant emergency response personnel. Additionally, in a simultaneous manner, all 
Affected Personnel within the IHE population to include students, staff, and faculty are 
able to receive pre-programmed and approved notifications via any networked media 
device (i.e., cell phone, and any networked TV, computer, tablet, and other video display  
 
                                                 
236 Blair, “Response to Active Shooter Events.” 
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systems). Furthermore, at this point in the VIM system concept flow, the ICC has the 
capability to lock down adjacent buildings within the Affected Area either selectively, by 
zone, or with a complete lock down of the entire campus.  
With facility lock down complete, First Responders are able to respond 
more rapidly and to a more controlled environment. For instance, after facility lock down 
has been initiated, if an Active Shooter exits the room he was in, he will not be able to re-
enter that room or enter any other rooms. Therefore, First Responders are more likely to 
know prior to entering the facility that the shooter is either in the Target Area identified 
by the ICC, or in a hallway. As a result, valuable time is not wasted clearing rooms that 
only contain potential victims. Additionally, population control measures, such as 
instructional messages can be delivered to all persons within the building by the ICC in 
order to better facilitate the Law Enforcement response. First Responders are able to gain 
access to the Threat Zone via individually issued key fobs that unlock the door associated 
with each proximity reader. If needed, First Responders will also be able to employ their 
handheld mobile situational awareness devices in order to gain more situational 
awareness inside of the Target Area prior to entering the room and neutralizing the threat, 
or, if the incident transitions to a hostage or barricade scenario, they will have the 






Figure 11.   Victim Initiated Mitigation (VIM) System Concept Flow Demonstrating the Sequence of Events from Threat 
Identification through First Responder Response in Active Shooter Scenarios 
Victim Initiated Mitigation (VIM) System Concept Flow 
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c. System Upgrades  
The preceding components encompass all of the core components of the 
VIM system. However, as part of the scalable proposal for the VIM system, additional 
components can also be added. One such additional component that adds a fundamental 
utility upgrade is the addition of shot recognition software. Shot recognition software is 
capable of detecting gunfire with extremely low failure rates and we believe that 
integration of this capability with the proposed VIM system would greatly enhance 
system capabilities. The VIM system incorporates shot recognition software as an 
alternate to VIRAL activation. In Active Shooter instances where shots are fired, IHEs 
equipped with the VIM system and shot recognition upgrade would benefit from a 
Shooter Initiated Response and Automated Lockdown (SIRAL). In these instances, the 
VIM system would recognize gunfire and initiate the automated lockdown procedures 
just as if a potential victim had activated an emergency call box. The shooter-initiated 
lockdown represents a fundamental change in Active Shooter response. With this 
proposed upgrade to the VIM system, the shooter’s own actions would also initiate 
mitigation. In addition to the shot recognition upgrade, we are also proposing a non-lethal 
mitigation upgrade as well. In response to gunfire, this non-lethal upgrade would 
temporarily incapacitate Active Shooters. We are only proposing this upgrade to be 
included in conjunction with the shot recognition upgrade. This stipulation recognizes 
that these measures are extreme and must only be employed in dire circumstances. The 
only negative aspect to this proposed upgrade is that these non-lethal measures would 
have to be area weapons, meaning that the non-lethal effects would affect everyone in 
that particular room. However, we feel that in response to gunfire through the use of shot 
recognition software, the temporary discomfort of non-lethal measures is a much 
preferred alternative to additional casualties. With these two additions to the core 
components of the VIM system, although we would never claim to prevent the first shot 
in Active Shooter situations, we could effectively claim to be able to prevent the second 
shot.  
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By hardening IHE facilities through the implementation of a Victim 
Initiated Mitigation system, universities will be able to impose the 5C’s in an immediate 
or timely manner. The Victim Initiated Response and Automated Lockdown (VIRAL) 
offered by the VIM system will contain and control the Active Shooter threat via 
automated and selective lockdown of the Threat Zone and Affected Area within the IHE. 
These features will result in a marked decrease of control for the Active Shooter by 
denying his freedom of movement and limiting all movement within the IHE facility to 
egress only. Additionally, the Key Fob feature of the VIM system allows VIRAL 
activation to increase Law Enforcement and First Responder control during Active 
Shooter scenarios by permitting complete access to all areas of the facility through 
special access protocols. VIRAL initiation also greatly improves communication during 
Active Shooter scenarios with the establishment of an immediate dialogue between the 
Incident Command Center and the Target Area. Additionally, the VIM system also 
affords the ICC the capability to issue an alert and give initial guidance to all students and 
faculty via prepared messages delivered through any emergency call box located on the 
IHE, as well as all networked and personally owned communication devices. 
Furthermore, VIRAL activation utilizing a VIM system allows the ICC to simultaneously 
call campus police, local Law Enforcement, Fire, Rescue and S.W.A.T. resources. 
Additionally, utilization of a VIM system affords First Responders with assets that 
greatly improve situational awareness and greatly assist in the creation of an Immediate 
Action Plan, as well as facilitate a better coordinated and effective response. In an 
unpredictable and disadvantageous environment, such as an Active Shooter scenario, the 
automated and standardized features of a VIM system will afford IHEs the capability to 
significantly reduce the Rate of Kill by effectively removing potential victims from the 
crime scene as indicated by the Criminology Triangle. Through the process of providing 
immediate control measures and placing barriers between potential victims and the 
Active Shooter, IHEs will also be able to assert control over the Active Shooter thereby 
manipulating time as a variable. With potential victims secured behind locked doors and 
separated from the threat, incident duration is no longer a contributing factor to incident 
lethality.  
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2.  Scalable System and Priority of Install 
We recommend a scalable VIM system and also suggest a priority of installation 
for IHEs in their effort to mitigate Active Shooters. Recognizing that many universities 
will not be able to make the initial investment required to install the VIM system as 
recommended for optimal Active Shooter mitigation, we recommend the following scale 
of protection. 
 
VIM System Levels of Protection 
Levels of Protection Components 
Level 1 
Emergency Call Box 
Incident Command Center 
Door Releases 
Mobile Situational Awareness 
Devices 
Key Fobs / Prox. Readers 
Level 2 
Emergency Call Box 
Incident Command Center 
Door Releases 
Mobile Situational Awareness 
Devices 
Key Fobs / Prox. Readers 
Shot Recognition Software 
Level 3 
Emergency Call Box 
Incident Command Center 
Door Releases 
Mobile Situational Awareness 
Devices 
Key Fobs / Prox. Readers 
Shot Recognition Software 
Non-Lethal Measures 
 
Table 21.   VIM System Levels of Protection 
For optimal protection, we strongly recommend installation of the VIM system in 
every room throughout the IHE excluding private rooms (i.e., dorm rooms and 
restrooms). However, if scaling the system components according to the proposed levels 
of protection is not sufficient to meet a university’s budgetary constraints, we recommend 





VIM System Priority of Installation 
Levels of Protection Protected Facilities 
Level 1 High Occupancy Classrooms Lecture Halls 
Level 2 




High Occupancy Classrooms 
Lecture Halls 
Administrative Facilities 





Graduate / PhD Facilities 
All hallways within the IHE 
All public congregation areas 
Table 22.   VIM System Priority of Installation 
3.  Standard Operations for Automated Response (S.O.A.R.) 
The last recommendation of this thesis regarding Active Shooter mitigation in 
IHEs and HOFs is a proposal for a national standard regarding threat reduction. At the 
foundation of this standard would be the Victim Initiated Mitigation system. The VIM 
system would be supported by the preceding recommendations regarding the holistic 
approach. Finally, the proposed national standard should evaluate and compare IHEs 
regarding their vulnerability to Active Shooter threats. This vulnerability assessment 
would be conducted by an objective government agency and advertised much like food 
sanitation scores thereby affording potential customers with the information required to 
make a decision to patron an establishment or not. The proposed Standard Operations for 
Automated Response (S.O.A.R) would encompass three components (prevention and 
preemption measures, Law Enforcement readiness, and Victim Initiated Mitigation 
system implementation) and would rate each IHE according to the following criteria in 
order to establish a Safe School Rating. 
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a. Level 1: Prevention and Preemption Measures 
1. A culture of safety is promoted 
2. Threat Assessment Team is established 
3. Threat Assessment Team is capable of evaluating threats 
4. Threat Assessment Team is capable of initiating threat assessment 
investigations with local authorities 
5. Students, staff, and faculty are trained to identify and report students and 
coworkers of concern to the Threat Assessment Team. 
6. A central point of contact is established for the reporting of potential 
threats.  
7. All reports of potential threats are perceived as credible until otherwise 
dismissed. 
8. Feedback is issued to the reporting individual 
b. Level 2: Law Enforcement Readiness 
1. All Campus police and local Law Enforcement are trained in Active 
Shooter response from an accredited training institution. 
2. IHE conducts an Active Shooter response practical exercise involving 
campus police, local Law Enforcement and all relevant emergency 
response agencies annually. 
3. Campus police and local Law Enforcement are state accredited Police 
Departments 
4. Local Law Enforcement has S.W.A.T. or ERT capability 
5. Campus police communications and Standard Operating Procedures are 
integrated with all local emergency response agencies. 
6. IHE has an Active Shooter response plan of action and this plan is 
integrated with all local emergency response agencies. 
c. Level 3: Victim Initiated Mitigation 
1. Entire IHE population has received A.D.D. training from an accredited 
instructor. 
2. IHE has a VIM system installed and regularly tested.  
3. Annual Active Shooter response practical exercises incorporate VIM 
system activation.  
 144 
4. Safe School Rating 
In accordance with the S.O.A.R. evaluation of U.S. IHEs, colleges and 
universities will be evaluated for vulnerability to Active Shooter threats and graded 
utilizing the following proposed criteria. 
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Safe School Rating (IAW S.O.A.R. Evaluation Criteria) 
Levels of Readiness A B C 
Level 1: 
Prevention / Preemption 
Measures 
Culture of Safety Culture of Safety Culture of Safety 
Threat Assessment Team Threat Assessment Team Threat Assessment Team 







Threat Reporting  Threat Reporting  Threat Reporting  




Campus Police Trained in 
Active Shooter Response 
Campus Police Trained in 
Active Shooter Response 
Campus Police Trained in 
Active Shooter Response 
Local Law Enforcement 
Trained in Active Shooter 
Response 
Local Law Enforcement 
Trained in Active Shooter 
Response 
Local Law Enforcement 
Trained in Active Shooter 
Response 
Annual Active Shooter 
Response Training 
Conducted 
Annual Active Shooter 
Response Training 
Conducted 
Annual Active Shooter 
Response Training 
Conducted 
Campus Police are State 
Accredited 
Campus Police are State 
Accredited 
Campus Police are State 
Accredited 
Local Law Enforcement is 
State Accredited 
Local Law Enforcement is 
State Accredited 
Local Law Enforcement is 
State Accredited 







Active Shooter Plan of 
Action 
Active Shooter Plan of 
Action 
Active Shooter Plan of 
Action 
Level 3: 
Victim Initiated Mitigation 
IHE Population is A.D.D. 
Trained 
IHE Population is A.D.D. 
Trained 
IHE Population is A.D.D. 
Trained 
VIM System VIM System VIM System 
Annual VIM System In-
Service Training Conducted 
Annual VIM System In-
Service Training Conducted 
Annual VIM System In-
Service Training Conducted 
Resulting Score    
Table 23.   Safe School Rating IAW S.O.A.R Evaluation Criteria Taken from 
Recommendation Made As Part of the Holistic Approach to Active Shooter 
Mitigation in IHEs 
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The Safe School Rating outlined above articulates our proposal for evaluation 
criteria by which we believe IHEs can be scored according to their vulnerability to an 
Active Shooter incident. We also propose that this evaluation be conducted by an 
objective government agency and the results should be made available to the public. This 
would allow potential students and parents of potential students to make a better 
informed decision regarding university preference. Currently, no such rating exists and, 
as a result, students and parents select universities based on criteria excluding security 
considerations and the IHE’s capacity to protect its students, staff, and faculty. The 
proposed Safe Schools Rating should be a required item displayed on every IHE’s 
homepage and marketing media with intended distribution to potential students and 
parents. This display should simply consist of a letter grade of A, B, or C. When a 
prospective parent or student inquires about the meaning of this grade, a hyperlinked Safe 
Schools Rating report would explain an IHE’s successes and failures on the university’s 
homepage. This information could also be made readily available to inquiring prospective 
parents and students via other informative means as well. If implemented, the Safe 
School Rating would fundamentally change the manner in which prospective parents and 
students shop for universities and it would greatly improve the consumer’s knowledge 
regarding such a large and important investment.  
C.  DETERRENT EFFECT 
A VIRAL activation of the VIM system would have powerful deterrent effects as 
well. An individual’s will to conduct acts of extreme violence, such as an Active Shooter 
incident is comprised of his motivations and the level of conviction he possesses in order 
to fulfill his motivations. Usually through a series of circumstances or events individuals 
become disaffected with other members of their IHE population. As demonstrated by the 
included case studies, when this occurs, these circumstances and intense feelings may 
become so great that an individual is compelled to act violently. In most cases, this 
decision to act was a result of a cost versus benefit analysis conducted by the individual. 
When an individual reasons that the expected cost of performing violent action is 
relatively low and the expected benefit of the action is relatively high, the individual is 
compelled to act violently. Likewise, an individual who is contemplating violent action is 
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also likely to perform an act of violence when the expected cost of not acting violently is 
relatively high. While this cost versus benefit analysis is not usually based on rational 
thought concerning Active Shooters, it does provide valuable insight into the thought 
process of these individuals leading up to the incident and it helps us to better focus 
deterrent measures. 
An individual’s motivation for becoming an Active Shooter has to be 
overwhelming. Indeed, an individual willing to conduct these types of heinous actions 
must have achieved their breakpoint. An Active Shooter’s breakpoint is thus defined as 
the value assigned to the decision point where action, multiplied by the difference of the 
expected cost versus benefit of conducting the act compared with inaction, multiplied by 
the difference of the expected cost versus benefit of not conducting the act is greater than 
the perceived consequences that the IHE is capable of imposing.237 Only when an 
individual’s situation has eroded to the point where action outweighs inaction despite the 
cost associated with the perceived consequences, has that individual reached his 
breakpoint.  
 
( ) ( ) ( )













= − − − >
ActiveShooter Breakpoint Formula
 
Figure 12.   Active Shooter Breakpoint Formula Demonstrating the Cost vs. Benefit 
Analysis Conducted by Potential Active Shooters Prior to Conducting an 
Act of Extreme Violence 
While the term compellence is not recognized by the modern American 
Dictionary, the root word, compel means, “to force, drive, or constrain; to necessitate or 
                                                 
237 Dr. Michael Jaye, interview by author, Monterey, CA, February 23, 2011. 
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pressure by force.”238 The principal difference between deterrence and compellence is 
that deterrence induces inaction, while compellence makes someone perform against his 
will.239 In short, deterrence is forced inaction, while compellence is forced action. The 
Active Shooter breakpoint occurs within the continuum between deterrence and 
compellence. When the Active Shooter feels he is compelled to act despite the perceived 
consequence of deterrent measures, extreme violent action results. Likewise, through 
careful application of deterrent measures, such as the VIRAL response as part of the VIM 
system, IHEs could potentially manipulate the breakpoint for potential Active Shooters 
and deter their planned violence on their campus.  
Manipulation of the Active Shooter breakpoint can be accomplished through 
changing variables within the breakpoint formula. For instance, by increasing the 
perceived consequences that can be imposed by the IHE and decreasing the expected 
benefit of conducting the violent act, this equation can result in favor of the IHE. As the 
perceived consequence that the IHE is capable of imposing increases, a potential Active 
Shooter’s perception of expected benefit of conducting the act will decrease. For IHEs 
that choose to adhere to the aforementioned recommendations and implement a VIM 
system, potential Active Shooters may perceive accomplishment of their intended goals 
for conducting their extreme violence as less achievable on that particular campus. 
Therefore, this combination of variable changes will result in manipulation of the Active 
Shooter’s breakpoint. This manipulation will not delete the breakpoint, or the associated 
causal factors contributing to the individual’s motivation to conduct the violent act. 
Instead, these variable adjustments will allow IHEs to better deter acts of violence on 
their campus.  
This concept of Active Shooter breakpoint manipulation can be demonstrated by 
adjusting variables within the breakpoint formula. By assigning values ranging from one 
to five for each of the respective variables, one being the lowest and five being the 
highest, breakpoint manipulation becomes apparent. As demonstrated throughout the case 
studies and Active Shooter profiles included in this research, most Active Shooters 
                                                 
238 Houghton Mifflin Company, The American Heritage Dictionary, 388. 
239 Lawrence Freedman, Deterence (Polity Press, 2004), 26–29. 
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contemplated their actions for a considerable amount of time prior to conducting their act 
of extreme violence. Likewise, many of these incidents required prior planning and were 
premeditated. These factors highlight that there is a period of time prior to most Active 
Shooter events where the shooter can be influenced or deterred from conducting their act 
of extreme violence. For most potential Active Shooters contemplating conducting an act 
of extreme violence, values of three for action, expected benefit of conducting the act and 
expected cost of inaction are appropriate. Values of two for cost of conducting the act, 
inaction, and the expected benefit of inaction are also appropriate. Maintaining moderate 
levels of perceived consequence, this breakpoint formula below demonstrates that the 
difference of expected benefit and expected cost for these individuals is relatively small. 
This explains the latent phase where many potential Active Shooters contemplate violent 
actions but do not act on their impulses until a circumstance or event provides additional 
motivation and skews their breakpoint formula to the point where the expected benefit of 
conducting the act greatly outweighs the expected cost despite the perceived 
consequences that the IHE is capable of imposing.  
( ) ( ) ( )
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Potential Active Shooter Breakpoint Formula :
 
Figure 13.   Potential Active Shooter Breakpoint Formula Including Simulated Values 
for Breakpoint Variables 
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) 3(3 3) 2(3 3) 4
( ) 0 0 4
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Manipulated Potential Active Shooter Breakpoint Formula :
 
Figure 14.   Manipulated Active Shooter Breakpoint Formula Including Adjusted 
Simulated Values for Breakpoint Variables 
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When IHEs implement the recommendations presented in this thesis, immediate 
automated and standardized responses coupled with reduced response time and freedom 
of movement adjust variables within the potential Active Shooter breakpoint formula and 
manipulate the breakpoint of individuals contemplating acts of extreme violence. For 
instance, by slightly increasing the perceived consequences that the IHE is capable of 
imposing, the causal effects on other variables manipulate the breakpoint of potential 
Active Shooters and acts of extreme violence are thereby deterred. The deterrent effects 
of a VIRAL activation capability facilitated by a VIMs system in IHEs would greatly 
improve campus security by limiting potential Active Shooter’s expected benefit for 
conducting their act of extreme violence. For individuals contemplating conducting these 
acts, the immediate environmental control imposed through a VIRAL activation would 
greatly reduce a potential Active Shooter’s expectations that he would be able to 
accomplish his goals through violence.  
D.  CONCLUSION 
Troubled by the discrepancy between average duration of Active Shooter 
incidents in IHEs and average response time of campus and local Law Enforcement to 
these incidents, we have conducted our research and analysis and made recommendations 
with the sole intent of increasing advantages to potential victims and First Responders 
who find themselves in these situations. With over 6,500 U.S. IHEs containing 17.8 
million students and 3.6 million faculty and staff members, this is a contemporary threat 
that we could not ignore. Although currently no state or federal agency presents a viable 
plan for effectively mitigating the effects of Active Shooters, we explored all relevant 
literature pertaining to this issue from each agency and explored three unique hypotheses 
in order to present a series of objective recommendations. Although prevention and 
preemption measures are a crucial component to Active Shooter mitigation plans for 
IHEs, many factors preclude this approach from being an effective autonomous means of 
mitigation. This assertion was evidenced by exploring the qualified personnel 
requirements and privacy act concerns associated with this approach. Furthermore, if the 
extensive Active Shooter profiles included in Appendix C demonstrate anything at all to 
the readers of this research, it should demonstrate that there is no profile of an Active 
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Shooter. Although we do feel that preventative and preemptive measures are integral 
components of a holistic plan for Active Shooter response, the obstacles associated with 
this strategy makes it imprudent to recommend this approach as a viable means of 
autonomous Active Shooter mitigation.  
Likewise, as we considered Law Enforcement capacity to interdict Active 
Shooters in IHEs, the case studies included in this research demonstrated the many 
obstacles and constraints that also preclude this from being a viable autonomous strategy 
for mitigating the effects of Active Shooters in IHEs. As demonstrated in each of the case 
studies included in this thesis, regardless of incident duration, campus police and local 
Law Enforcement cannot respond in time to interdict the Active Shooter or to reduce the 
Rate of Kill during these events. Considering the limitations of our first two hypotheses, 
and the many advantages to advocating victim actions during these events, we proposed 
our recommendations for a holistic approach to Active Shooter mitigation while 
emphasizing our third hypothesis that supports the implementation of a Victim Initiated 
Mitigation system.  
In order to test these hypotheses, we carefully selected our case studies based on 
their incident lethality rating and compared each of these universities regarding their 
vulnerability to Active Shooter incidents by assigning a vulnerability rating to each IHE. 
The analytical comparison of these cases overwhelmingly supported implementation of a 
VIM system and supported the holistic approach to Active Shooter mitigation 
recommended in this thesis. The U.S. Department of Education presented its guidance for 
mitigating violence in schools in their publication entitled “Early Warning, Timely 
Response: A Guide to Safe Schools.” Although this document is supported by a litany of 
educational organizations, it lacks a tangible plan for crisis response. In this document, 
the DOE recommends that crisis intervention plans include provisions for immediate, 
planned, and long-term, post-crisis intervention including evacuation procedures, 
effective communication, and external Law Enforcement support. Additionally, the DOE 
recommends training for staff and faculty, as well as standardization and rehearsal of 
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response measures to Active Shooter incidents.240 We believe that the recommendations 
presented in this thesis provide the tangible plan that is currently lacking in all state and 
federal recommendations regarding the Active Shooter problem. Furthermore, the 
VIRAL response and VIM system recommended here is able to re-prioritize the Crisis 
Procedure Checklist recommended by the DOE and accomplish 12 of the 13 required 
items immediately.241 
The recommendations included in this thesis are in keeping with guidance issued 
by the National Clearinghouse for Educational Facilities for Crime Prevention through 
Environmental Design (CPTED) regarding access control measures.242 These 
recommendations also adhere to directives issued by the National Incident Management 
System (NIMS) regarding preparedness, interoperability, standardization of 
communications and capabilities of Incident Command Centers, as well as emergency 
response protocols. The discussions and recommendations made in this thesis attend to 
preparedness questions raised by DHS of, how prepared do we need to be, how prepared 
are we, and how do we prioritize efforts to close the gap? Additionally, much effort was 
placed into recommendations that encompass DHS guidance for strategic, tactical, 
support, and public address communications. Attention given to these considerations has 
produced a proposed system that offers a flexible core mechanism for coordinated and 
collaborative incident management incorporating common terminology and facilitates an 
integrated response.243 As the primary focus of this research is aimed at reducing the 
Rate of Kill of Active Shooters in U.S. IHEs, we feel that the recommendations made in 
this thesis resulting from our case study analysis of factors which contribute to IHE 
vulnerability, if implemented, could have the same notable impact to Active Shooter 
mitigation as implementation of the fire alarm and current fire code has had on 
preventing fire related casualties. 
                                                 
240 Dwyer, Osher, and Warger, Early Warning, Timely Response: A Guide to Safe Schools, 27. 
241 Dwyer, Osher, and Warger, Early Warning, Timely Response: A Guide to Safe Schools, 29. 
242 Tod Schneider, CPTED 101: Crime Prevention through Environmental Design—The 
Fundamentals for Schools (Washington, DC: National Clearinghouse for Educational Facilities at the 
National Institute of Building Sciences, 2010), 1.  
243 Michael Chertoff, National Incident Management System (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of 
Homeland Security, 2008), 9–43. 
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APPENDIX A. LETHALITY RATING 
A. LETHALITY RATING OF SELECTED CASE STUDIES 
1. Lethality General Incident Information Worksheet 
 
General Incident Information 
General Information Location 




Location of Campus 
(City) Location of Incident 
Virginia Tech 
16 April, 2007 Seung Hui Cho 
7:15:00 AM       
&            
9:40:00 AM 
Virginia Blacksburg 
1. West Ambler 
Johnston Dormitory 
(Room 4040)                                     
2. Norris Hall (Rooms 
206, 207, 205, 211, 
204) 
University of Texas 1 August, 1966 Charles Whitman 11:48:00 AM Texas Austin UT Tower 
Cal State Fullerton 12 July, 1976 Edward Allaway 8:30:00 AM California Fullerton Polack Library 
University of Iowa 
1 November, 1991 Gang Lu  Iowa Iowa City 
1. Van Allen Hall                         
2. Administrative 
Building 
Simon's Rock College of Bard 
14 December, 1992 Wayne Lo 10:20:00 PM Massachusetts Great Barrington 
1. School Security 
Area 
2. Library 
San Diego State University 15 August, 1996 Frederick Davidson 2:00:00 PM California San Diego Engineering Building 
Appalachian School of Law 
16 January, 2002 Peter Odighizuwa 1:00:00 PM Virginia Grundy 
1. Office of Dean 
Anthony Sutin 
2. Office of Professor 
Blackwell 
University of Arizona 28 October, 2002 Robert Flores 8:35:00 AM Arizona Tucson School of Nursing 
Duquesne University 
17 September, 2006 1. Derrick Lee 2. William Holmes 2:00:00 AM Pennsylvania Pittsburg 
Student Union 
Ballroom 
Louisiana Technical College 8 February, 2008 Latina Williams 8:36:00 AM Louisiana Baton Rouge Classroom 
Northern Illinois University 14 February, 2008 Steven Kazmierczak 3:05:00 PM Illinois DeKalb Cole Hall 
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General Incident Information 
General Information Location 




Location of Campus 
(City) Location of Incident 
University of Central Arkansas 
27 October, 2008 
1. Kawin Brockton   
2. Kelsey Perry        
3. Mario Tony         
4. Brandon Wade 
9:00:00 PM Arkansas Conway 
Alley between a 
dormitory and the 
Snow Fine Arts Center 
University of Alabama, Huntsville 12 February, 2010 Amy Bishop 4:00:00 PM Alabama Huntsville Shelby Center 
Ohio State University 9 March, 2010 Nathaniel Brown 3:30:00 PM Ohio Columbus Office Building 
Table 24.   Lethality Rating Spreadsheet Depicting General Incident Information 
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1 5 5 35 2 12 174 1566 156 624 16 128 71 142 3.5 3.5 7.5 22.5 17 170 33 363 3071 
University of Texas 
1 5 1 7 1 6 48 432 96 384 96 768 5 10 0 0 20 60 32 320 16 176 2168 
Cal State Fullerton 
1 5 2 14 1 6 23 207 28 112 5 40 5.5 11 0 0 28 84 2 20 7 77 576 
University of Iowa 
1 5 2 14 2 12 7 63 10 40 10 80 5.5 11 0 0 25 75 1 10 6 66 376 
Simon's Rock College of 
Bard 1 5 2 14 2 12 9 81 20 80 20 160 5.5 11 0 0 20 60 3 30 2 22 475 
San Diego State 
University 1 5 2 14 1 6 23 207 5 20 5 40 5 10 0 0 5 15 0 0 3 33 350 
Appalachian School of 
Law 1 5 2 14 1 6 16 144 5.5 22 5.5 44 5.5 11 0 0 5.5 16.5 3 30 3 33 325.5 
University of Arizona 
1 5 2 14 1 6 7 63 25 100 25 200 2.2 4.4 0 0 9 27 0 0 3 33 452.4 
Duquesne University 
2 10 0 0 0 0 12 108 5.5 22 5.5 44 5.5 11 0 0 5.5 16.5 5 50 0 0 261.5 
Louisiana Technical 
College 1 5 1 7 1 6 6 54 5.5 22 5.5 44 5.5 11 0 0 4 12 0 0 2 22 183 
Northern Illinois 
University 1 5 1 7 1 6 54 486 6.11 24.44 5.5 44 1 2 0 0 0.33 0.99 21 210 5 55 840.43 
University of Central 
Arkansas 4 20 0 0 0 0 5 45 1.1 4.4 1.1 8.8 0.45 0.9 0 0 0.45 1.35 1 10 2 22 112.45 
University of Alabama, 
Huntsville 1 5 1 7 1 6 6 54 5.5 22 5.5 44 5.5 11 0 0 5.5 16.5 3 30 3 33 228.5 
Ohio State University 
1 5 1 7 1 6 3 27 5.5 22 5.5 44 5.5 11 0 0 5.5 16.5 2 20 1 11 169.5 
Table 25.   Lethality Rating depicting variables of Incident Effects and associated ordinal values assigned based on their 
propensity to contribute to Active Shooter incident lethality.  
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3. Lethality Rating Chart 
 
*Lethality Rating is a numerical value assigned to each university as a result of Utility Theory application. 
Figure 15.   Lethality Rating Chart Depicting Relative Incident Lethality Utilizing Utility Theory to Compare All Selected 
IHEs Meeting the Perimeters of the Refined Research Scope.  
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APPENDIX B. VULNERABILITY RATING 
A.  INITIAL VULNERABILITY RATING (IVR) WORKSHEET 
University Initial Vulnerability Rating 








      




































20 -578 -1318 123 168 200 47587 2308 293.51 2105 70 152 150 51280.51 
Cal State 
Fullerton 17 -851 -4174 824 405 200 7682 288 10217 35312 136 832 447 51335 
University of 












3317.083 -237 -144.434 0 0 199 0 0 10186.99 563 136 672 372 15064.6388 
University of 
Arizona 7706 -809 -593 176 1890 200 168005 80619 10226 50569 103 448 263 318803 
Duquesne 
University 0 -885 
-








3321 -520 -6231.5 180 338 200 87223 590 10189.94 6058 70 512 104 102034.44 
Ohio State 
University 3306 -1262 -9599 728 1094 200 228 0 10193.6 127144 70 464 -65 132501.6 
University of 
Texas 75 -997 -5296.4 50 63 200 71326 17675 10792.21 60766 70 2080 8049 164852.81 
Table 26.   University Initial Vulnerability Rating Depicting Assigned Vulnerability 
Ratings to Selected Case Study Universities Prior to the Active Shooter 
Incident. 
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B. PREDICTED VULNERABILITY RATING (PVR) WORKSHEET 
 
University Predicted Vulnerability Rating with VIMS 
  Emergency Response Capability 
University 
Environmental Factors  
Local Environmental 
Factors       






































20 -578 -1318 123 168 200 47587 2308 293.51 -987 70 152 255 48293.51 
Cal State 
Fullerton 17 -851 -4174 824 405 200 7682 288 10217 -24920 136 832 622 -8722 
University of 
Iowa 63 -451 -3051.3 1327 4347 200 5490 846 
10160.9













3317.083 -237 -144.434 0 0 199 0 0 
10186.9
9 31 136 672 1112 15272.6388 
University of 
Arizona 7706 -809 -593 176 1890 200 168005 80619 10226 -15839 103 448 438 252570 
Duquesne 
University 0 -885 
-
14776.9 101 105 200 49346 40212 
10182.6








3321 -520 -6231.5 180 338 200 87223 590 10189.94 -1182 70 512 314 95004.44 
Ohio State 
University 3306 -1262 -9599 728 1094 200 228 0 10193.6 35944 70 464 180 41546.6 
Table 27.   University Predicted Vulnerability Rating Depicting Assigned Vulnerability 
Ratings to Selected Case Study Universities with Victim Initiated Mitigation 
System. 
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C. CASE STUDY VULNERABILITY COMPARISON 
1. Virginia Tech University 
 
Virginia Tech University Vulnerability Comparison 
Virginia Tech University Initial Vulnerability Rating 
Chart 






Initial Vulnerability Rating: 83,902.72 Predicted Vulnerability Rating: 13854.72 
 % Decrease in IHE Vulnerability: 84%  
Initial Cost Annual Security Fee Income Payoff Estimate 
$39,900,000.00 $5,730,000.00 6 Yr, 8 Mo. 
 Annual Residual Security Fee Income  
 $5,730,000.00  













2. Northern Illinois University 
Northern Illinois University Vulnerability Comparison 
Northern Illinois Initial Vulnerability Rating Chart 
Northern Illinois University Predicted Vulnerability Rating 




Initial Vulnerability Rating: 57925.92 Predicted Vulnerability Rating: 2137.92 
 % Decrease in IHE Vulnerability: 97%  
Initial Cost Annual Security Fee Income Payoff Estimate 
$19,200,000.00 $5,527,600.00 3 Yr,4 Mo. 
 Annual Residual Security Fee Income  
 $5,527,600.00  
















3. Louisiana Technical College 
Louisiana Technical College Vulnerability Comparison 
Louisiana Technical College Initial Vulnerability Rating 
Chart 
Louisiana Technical College Predicted Vulnerability Rating 





Initial Vulnerability Rating: 51280.51 Predicted Vulnerability Rating: 48293.51 
 % Decrease in IHE Vulnerability: 6%  
Initial Cost Annual Security Fee Income Payoff Estimate 
$4,200,000.00 $298,000.00 14Yr, 1Mo. 
 Annual Residual Security Fee Income  
 $298,000.00  
















4. California State Fullerton 
California State Fullerton University Vulnerability Comparison 
California State Fullerton University Initial Vulnerability 
Rating Chart 
California State Fullerton University Predicted Vulnerability 





Initial Vulnerability Rating: 51335 Predicted Vulnerability Rating: (8722) 
 % Decrease in IHE Vulnerability: 117%  
Initial Cost Annual Security Fee Income Payoff Estimate 
$8,700,000.00 $6,522,200.00 1Yr, 4Mo. 
 Annual Residual Security Fee Income  
 $6,522,200.00  

















5. University of Iowa 
University of Iowa Vulnerability Comparison 
University of Iowa Initial Vulnerability Rating Chart 






Initial Vulnerability Rating: 67343.63 Predicted Vulnerability Rating: 10663.63 
 % Decrease in IHE Vulnerability: 85%  
Initial Cost Annual Security Fee Income Payoff Estimate 
$36,000,000.00 $6,100,000.00 5Yr, 8Mo. 
 Annual Residual Security Fee Income  
 $6,100,000.00  
















6. Simon’s Rock College of Bard 
Simon’s Rock College of Bard Vulnerability Comparison 
Simon’s Rock College of Bard Initial Vulnerability Rating 
Chart 
Simon’s Rock College of Bard Predicted Vulnerability Rating 





Initial Vulnerability Rating: 15078.97 Predicted Vulnerability Rating: 14610.97 
 % Decrease in IHE Vulnerability: 3%  
Initial Cost Annual Security Fee Income Payoff Estimate 
$13,800,000.00 $80,000.00 172Yr, 6Mo. 
 Annual Residual Security Fee Income  
 $80,000.00  















7.  San Diego State University 
San Diego State University Vulnerability Comparison 
San Diego State University Initial Vulnerability Rating 
Chart 






Initial Vulnerability Rating: 216364.6 Predicted Vulnerability Rating: 155544.6 
 % Decrease in IHE Vulnerability: 29%  
Initial Cost Annual Security Fee Income Payoff Estimate 
$36,000,000.00 $6,563,400.00 5Yr, 4Mo. 
 Annual Residual Security Fee Income  
 $6,563,400.00  
















8. Appalachian School of Law 
Appalachian School of Law Vulnerability Comparison 
Appalachian School of Law Initial Vulnerability Rating 
Chart 
Appalachian School of Law Predicted Vulnerability Rating 





Initial Vulnerability Rating: 15064.64 Predicted Vulnerability Rating: 15272.64 
 % Decrease in IHE Vulnerability: (1)%  
Initial Cost Annual Security Fee Income Payoff Estimate 
$1,200,000.00 $70,000.00 17Yr, 2Mo. 
 Annual Residual Security Fee Income  
 $70,000.00  


















9. University of Arizona 
University of Arizona Vulnerability Comparison 
University of Arizona Initial Vulnerability Rating Chart 






Initial Vulnerability Rating: 318803 Predicted Vulnerability Rating: 252570 
 % Decrease in IHE Vulnerability: 21%  
Initial Cost Annual Security Fee Income Payoff Estimate 
$52,800,000.00 $7,149,400.00 7Yr, 3Mo. 
 Annual Residual Security Fee Income  
 $7,149,400.00  
















10. Duquesne University 
Duquesne University Vulnerability Comparison 
Duquesne University Initial Vulnerability Rating Chart 






Initial Vulnerability Rating: 97215.27 Predicted Vulnerability Rating: 78925.27 
 % Decrease in IHE Vulnerability: 19%  
Initial Cost Annual Security Fee Income Payoff Estimate 
$13,500,000.00 $2,059,200.00 6Yr, 5Mo. 
 Annual Residual Security Fee Income  
 $2,059,200.00  















11. University of Central Arkansas 
University of Central Arkansas Vulnerability Comparison 
University of Central Arkansas Initial Vulnerability Rating 
Chart 
University of Central Arkansas Predicted Vulnerability Rating 





Initial Vulnerability Rating: 30684.26 Predicted Vulnerability Rating: 9775.26 
 % Decrease in IHE Vulnerability: 68%  
Initial Cost Annual Security Fee Income Payoff Estimate 
$35,400,000.00 $2,363,400.00 14Yr, 8Mo. 
 Annual Residual Security Fee Income  
 $2,363,400.00  

















12. University of Alabama, Huntsville 
University of Alabama, Huntsville Vulnerability Comparison 
University of Alabama, Huntsville Initial Vulnerability 
Rating Chart 
University of Alabama, Huntsville Predicted Vulnerability 





Initial Vulnerability Rating: 102034.44 Predicted Vulnerability Rating: 95004.44 
 % Decrease in IHE Vulnerability: 7%  
Initial Cost Annual Security Fee Income Payoff Estimate 
$9,000,000.00 $1,520,000.00 5Yr, 8Mo. 
 Annual Residual Security Fee Income  
 $1,520,000.00  


















13. Ohio State University 
Ohio State University Vulnerability Comparison 
Ohio State University Initial Vulnerability Rating Chart 
Ohio State University Predicted Vulnerability Rating with VIM 
System 
    
Initial Vulnerability Rating: 132501.6 Predicted Vulnerability Rating: 41546.6 
 % Decrease in IHE Vulnerability: 69%  
Initial Cost Annual Security Fee Income Payoff Estimate 
$270,000,000.00 $12,600,000.00 21Yr, 4Mo. 
 Annual Residual Security Fee Income  
 $12,600,000.00  



















14. University of Texas, Austin 
University of Texas, Austin Vulnerability Comparison 
University of Texas, Austin Initial Vulnerability Rating 
Chart 
University of Texas, Austin Predicted Vulnerability Rating 





Initial Vulnerability Rating: 164852.81 Predicted Vulnerability Rating: 102217.81 
 % Decrease in IHE Vulnerability: 38%  
Initial Cost Annual Security Fee Income Payoff Estimate 
$165,000,000.00 $6,800,000.00 24Yr, 2Mo. 
 Annual Residual Security Fee Income  
 $6,800,000.00  
Figure 29.   University of Texas, Austin Vulnerability Comparison Charts 
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APPENDIX C. PROFILE OF AN ACTIVE SHOOTER 
Although the U.S. Secret Service utilized the School Shooter Profile developed by 
the FBI and the Classroom Avenger profile developed by McGee and Debernardo to 
construct their template for an Active Shooter profile, through the course of our case 
study research and compilation of additional Active Shooter summaries we have 
concluded that there is no discernible or definable profile by which Active Shooters can 
be identified. The following Active Shooter summaries, which include select examples 
from our case studies as well as other contemporary profiles, validate this assertion. 
A. SEUNG HUI CHO 
Seung Hui Cho was born in Korea on January 18, 1984 to parents; Sung-Tae Cho 
and Hyang Im Cho. Although Korean culture views quietness and calmness as desired 
attributes, Cho’s introverted personality was so extreme even at a young age that his 





Figure 30.   Seung Hui Cho Pictured in the Manifesto Video he mailed to NBC News. 
In 1992, the Cho family moved to the United States and Seung Hui’s withdrawn 
and isolated mannerisms increased as his early development continued to be 
characterized by physical illness and inordinate shyness.245 The continuation and 
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worsening of these characteristics and mannerisms led Cho’s family to seek therapy for 
him at the Center for Multicultural Human Services (CMHS) which is a mental health 
services facility offering mental health treatment and psychological evaluations to low-
income and immigrant individuals. As a result of the ensuing testing and counseling 
performed at the CMHS, Cho was diagnosed with severe Social Anxiety Disorder.246 
According to the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-IV) 
Social Anxiety Disorder is the more common title for Anxiety Disorder 300.23 Social 
Phobia. “Social Phobia is characterized by clinically significant anxiety provoked by 
exposure to certain types of social or performance situations, often leading to avoidance 
behavior.”247  
In March of 1999, Cho’s therapists identified symptoms of depression and shortly 
after the April 1999 shooting at Columbine High School, he was recorded as expressing 
homicidal and suicidal thoughts and tendencies even stating that he desired to repeat the 
Columbine massacre. These events prompted an evaluation by the CMHS where he was 
seen by doctors from George Washington University Hospital and was diagnosed with 
Selective Mutism, and Major Depression, and was prescribed the antidepressant 
Paroxetine 20mg which Cho took for the next year. Other Disorder of Infancy, 
Childhood, or Adolescence, 309.21Selective Mutism, is defined as, “the persistent failure 
to speak in specific social situations where speaking is expected, despite speaking in 
other situations.”248 Depressive Disorder, 296.32 Major Depression is defined as, “a 
clinical course that is characterized by one or more Major Depressive Episodes without a 
history of Manic, Mixed, or Hypomanic Episodes.”249 A Major Depressive Episode is 
defined as, “a period of at least two weeks during which there is either depressed mood or 
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the loss of interest or pleasure in nearly all activities.”250 The antidepressant medication 
Cho received as a result of these diagnoses, Paroxetine, is used to treat Major 
Depression, Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder, Panic Disorder, Social Anxiety, and 
Generalized Anxiety Disorder in adult outpatients.251 At the conclusion of this year of 
treatment, Cho’s doctors reevaluated him and elected to remove Cho from his 
antidepressant medication based on his mental health improvements and improved 
mood.252 
As Cho entered High School in the fall of 1999, his extremely introverted 
characteristics continued. He achieved high scholastic marks from his teachers and was 
viewed as a shy but diligent student. However, serious deficiencies in Cho’s speech were 
noticed by his teachers. In October of 2000, Westfield High School’s Screening 
Committee determined that Cho was eligible for the Special Education Program for 
Emotional Disabilities and Speech Language. As a result, he was afforded special 
accommodations and assistance in order to help him succeed in class without frustration 
and intimidation.253 With this combination of counseling and academic accommodation, 
Cho’s performance in school was exemplary and he achieved high grades and placement 
in honors classes. Despite the positive feedback Cho received, he chose to discontinue his 
therapy at CMHS when he turned 18.254  
Cho was accepted to Virginia Tech for attendance in the fall of 2003 based on his 
GPA of 3.52 and his combined SAT score of 1160. Despite the urging of Cho’s guidance 
counselor, who talked to both Cho and his family and strongly recommended that he 
attend a smaller college close to home, Cho chose to attend Virginia Tech.255 
Additionally, as Cho entered Virginia Tech, due to patient confidentiality, none of his 
                                                 
250 American Psychiatric Association, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders Fourth 
Edition Text Revision (DSM-IV-TR), 349. 
251 Martin A. Katzman, “Current Considerations in the Treatment of Generalized Anxiety Disorder,” 
CNS Drugs 23, no. 2 (February 1, 2009): 103–120. 
252 Virginia Tech Review Panel, Mass Shootings at Virginia Tech, 35. 
253 Virginia Tech Review Panel, Mass Shootings at Virginia Tech, 36. 
254 Virginia Tech Review Panel, Mass Shootings at Virginia Tech, 37. 
255 Virginia Tech Review Panel, Mass Shootings at Virginia Tech, 37. 
 176 
preceding mental health history was transferred to Virginia Tech or included in any of his 
documents as an incoming student.256 However, despite Cho’s obvious social difficulties, 
he continued to excel in school during his first year at Virginia Tech receiving an overall 
GPA of 3.00.257 Unfortunately, as academic requirements increased in difficulty, Cho’s 
scholastic performance declined as well. In the fall semester of 2005, the unobserved and 
non-medicated Cho would become known among students and faculty not only for his 
extremely withdrawn, and shy behavior, but also for his hostile, even violent writings and 
threatening behavior.258 This behavioral trend continued as Cho was removed from his 
Creative Writing class for disruptive behavior and the incident was reported to the Chair 
of the English Department, Dr. Roy. After reviewing the circumstances surrounding the 
incident, Dr. Roy notified the Dean of Student Affairs, Tom Brown, the Cook Counseling 
Center, and the College of Liberal Arts with regards to Cho’s behavior and disturbing 
writings.259 Although Cho was encouraged to seek counseling and was provided with 
private tutoring as an alternative to his Creative Writing class, no further mental health 
referrals or disciplinary actions were taken at this time.260  
At the continued request of his professor, Dr. Roy, Cho finally sought counseling 
on November 30, 2005 and spoke with Dr. Betzel on December 12. No diagnosis was 
made and no referral was given for follow-up services at this time. Later that same day, 
December 12, the Virginia Tech Police Department received a complaint from a female 
sophomore student regarding harassing messages received from Cho, who had previously 
stabbed the carpet in her room with a knife and was currently sending harassing instant 
messages and Facebook posts to her. On December 13, a campus police officer met with 
Cho and instructed him to have no further contact with the female student. While this was 
not the first time Cho had been warned by the campus police to refrain from harassing 
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female students, no criminal charges were filed.261 Later that same day Cho sent a 
message to one of his suitemates indicating that he may commit suicide as a response to 
the day’s earlier events. This communication was reported to the Virginia Tech Police 
and they returned to Cho’s room around 7:00 pm to question him about the 
communication. The officers then took Cho to the Virginia Tech Police Department in 
order to conduct an assessment and pre-screen evaluation by a Licensed Clinical Social 
Worker (LCSW). As a result of this pre-screening, Cho was found to be mentally ill, and 
an imminent danger to himself and others, but was not willing to be treated voluntarily. 
At this point, the screening LCSW was left with no choice other than to involuntarily 
commit Cho to the St. Albans Behavioral Health Center of the Carilion New River Valley 
Medical Center. Cho was admitted by 11:00 pm, 13 December and through a series of 
administrative and professional mistakes, he was discharged at 2:00 pm, the following 
day, December 14, with no further treatment planned.262 After Cho’s hospitalization, his 
alarming and aggressive behavior continued as he wrote a detailed account of a fictional 
character that went on a shooting rampage in a school. On April 17, 2006 (one school 
year prior to the mass shooting incident) Cho was challenged by his professor about his 
writing for its alarming theme and lack of literary quality. After this discussion, Cho 
followed his professor to his office and screamed at him.263 While this incident was 
alarming, it was not uncommon for Cho whose odd behavior, aggressive and violent 
tendencies were becoming well known among both students and faculty members.  
The list of shortfalls and failings regarding the evaluation and treatment of Seung 
Hui Cho was extensive and included lack of information sharing between academic, 
administrative, and public safety entities at Virginia Tech. Additionally, concerns that 
were raised by fellow students, Resident Advisors, and professors were discounted. Cho’s 
abnormal and alarming behavior characterized by multiple complaints regarding 
harassing activities, along with police warnings and hospitalization, highlight some of the 
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systemic failings and errors in judgment that surround the Cho case.264 As these repeated 
incidents of threatening behavior, disturbing writing, and extensive mental health history, 
which should have prompted further preventative actions demonstrate; prevention and 
preemptive measures remain insufficient to reduce the Rate of Kill in Active Shooter 
incidents. This case further validates our first hypothesis and provides a contemporary 
that proves that an effective mental health focused prevention and preemption strategy for 
Active Shooter mitigation is impractical for an already overburdened aspect of student 
health.       
B. ANDERS BEHRING BREIVIK 
Anders Breivik represents a growing unrest in Western Europe. Although not 
affiliated with any one terrorist group, Breivik’s motivations were fueled by the Aryan, 
Christian nationalistic movement which is sweeping across the male youth in countries 
like England, France, Sweden, Finland and Norway. Breivik’s perspective, which 
included an extreme hatred for Muslims, perceived loss of national identity, influence of 
right wing nationalist authors and skewed personal values, motivated him to conduct one 




Figure 31.   Anders Breivik (Oslo/Utoya Island, Norway Shooter) 
This event reminded the world that extremism, at its darkest and lowest levels, is 
not limited in its scope, its duration or its targeted victims. Although Breivik was an 
extreme right wing Christian, a similar event of the same magnitude could have easily 
                                                 
264 Virginia Tech Review Panel, Mass Shootings at Virginia Tech, 53. 
 179 
been carried out by a Muslim or any other extremist group. Breivik’s story is a twisted 
one of hate and discontent.  His actions in Oslo and on Utoya Island demonstrate an 
innate ability to cut into the softest portion of a nation with surgical calculability and 
damage its most valuable resource. Breivik’s youthful connections to Muslim gangs in 
Norway validated his perception that these gangs were seeking to degrade Norwegian 
culture.265  
1.  Background and Lead Up to the Attack on Norway 
Anders Behring Breivik was born in 1979 in Norway. The first year of his life 
was spent in London until his parents divorced and he moved back to Norway with his 
mother. He visited his father and stepmother often in France as a young boy and has been 
cited as criticizing his mother for making him too feminine as he grew up. At the age of 
15, he began to show signs of rebellion and was arrested for placing graffiti on 
government property. This sparked his father to never speak to him again and they have 
not spoken since Breivik was 16. During his teenage years, he began to become more 
extreme in his views about how government should be involved in the lives of its citizens 
and became very critical of politics. He was especially focused on the increasing Islamic 
influence throughout Europe.266 A childhood Muslim friend of Breivik, Arsalan, is 
credited with inciting much Breivik’s hate for Islam.  Breivik developed these feelings as 
a teenager after witnessing Arsalan’s actions while participating in a Pakistani Youth 
gang in Norway.267  
 
                                                 
265 Andrew Berwick, 2083: A Declaration of European Independence (London: 2011), 1389. 
266 Su Thet Mon, “Synes Ikke Selv at Han Bør Strafes,” Nyheter, July 24, 2011, 
http://www.nrk.no/nyheter/norge/1.7724994.  
267 Berwick, 2083: A Declaration of European Independence, 1389. 
 180 
 
Figure 32.   Anders Breivik Shortly Before his Attack on Oslo and Utoya Island 
Counter to initial reports following the attack, which stated that military training 
and experience enabled Breivik’s actions, he did not receive any training from the 
Norwegian Army. In fact, Breivik was found unfit for military service during the 
conscript process at age 18 and was subsequently denied the ability to serve. According 
to reports listed in the New York Times, Breivik lost over 300,000 dollars in the stock 
market one year after being rejected from military service.  Likely feeling depressed after 
these two incidents, he began to show more signs of racism, particularly towards 
members of the Islamic community. Breivik was disturbed by the opportunities offered to 
Muslim men throughout Europe. At 21 years old, he had plastic surgery to his chin and 
forehead in an effort to appear more Aryan. Shortly after this, he acquired employment 
with a customer service department where he was described by his employers as a great 
employee. However, other co-workers observed that he maintained a very arrogant 
demeanor and was easily irritated with Middle Eastern and South Asian customers.268 
In late 2001 and early 2002, Breivik joined an anti-Islamic subsidiary group to the 
English Defense League, as well as a Freemason group. Although he only attended four 
meetings at each union, he utilized his loose affiliation with the two groups to justify 
portions of his manifesto and set the stage for his proposed development of a Knights  
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Templar. Breivik envisioned the organization as one designed to combat the spread of 
Islam throughout Europe and he referred to himself as a “one man cell” in this 
organization.269  
In 2002, Breivik began planning his bombing of the Prime Minister’s office and 
shooting of Utoya Island. He founded a computer internet company in order to provide a 
legitimate surrogate by which he could finance his expected nine years of plans and 
operations in preparation for the attack.  During this time he rented a small farm outside 
of Oslo which he used as a cover to obtain explosive fertilizer mixtures. His detailed 
planning in renting this farm included purchasing fertilizer that could not be used as an 
explosive in order to alleviate any potential scrutiny during large volume purchases. 
However, after receiving his shipment of fertilizer, Breivik’s attack preparation included 
a test fire of the explosives. In early 2011, he purchased a small amount of an explosive 
primer in Poland and, although his name was passed to the Police Directorate, after the 
attacks the police would make a statement implying that nothing out of the ordinary was 
observed in Breivik’s case prior to the attacks.270 
Breivik’s initial plan for weapons procurement included a trip to Prague in 2010, 
where he thought it would be simple and cheap to buy weapons of any type. He soon 
realized that it was significantly more difficult for a non-citizen to gain access to 
weaponry and that it would be equally difficult to smuggle it back to Norway. In 
response, he hollowed out the back seat of his Hyundai hoping to bring back an AK-47, 
Glock pistol, hand grenades and a rocket propelled grenade launcher. After multiple 
attempts to obtain access to the weapons he desired in Prague, he decided to return to 
Norway and apply for weapons legally. As Breivik stated after his arrest, this proved to 
be the first and only “setback” to his operation.271  
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After returning to Norway, Breivik was able to purchase a handgun through legal 
channels because Norwegian law permitted it based on his membership to a pistol club. 
Gun ownership is very difficult in Norway but if citizens are willing to endure the 
extensive administrative process and prove proficiency, over time a citizen, such as 
Breivik with no criminal history is afforded the opportunity to purchase a firearm.  After 
several trips to the pistol club, where he demonstrated his proficiency, Breivik was 
approved to buy a Glock pistol. His rifle, a Ruger Mini-14 was much easier to procure 
because Breivik had already carried a hunting license for many years. He also owned a 
Benneli shotgun that he purchased seven years prior.  These factors helped to establish 
Breivik’s good standing and facilitate his rifle purchase. Although he never received any 
formal tactical training with these weapons, Breivik claims that he used the video game 
Call of Duty: Modern Warfare 2 as a simulator that aided him in carrying out his 
attacks.272 
During his planning and preparation period, Breivik wrote a manifesto that he 
entitled 2083: A European Declaration of Independence. The work drew upon the 
prejudices and hate of extreme, right wing Christian organizations against Islam. He 
called for Christians to help force the Muslims out of Europe and equated these actions to 
the Christian Crusades of the 11th, 12th and 13th centuries. Breivik believed that 
expulsion of Muslims from Europe would require a war and that it would not end until 
2083 and would require great amounts of violence. The attacks on the Norwegian Prime 
Ministers’ office, as well as Utoya Island were intended to start this war and begin the 
forced withdrawal of Muslims from Europe.273  
The choice of targets for Breivik’s massacre was explained during the Police 
Directorate dissection of Breivik’s manifesto interrogation after the incident. Norwegian 
Prime Minister, Jens Stoltenberg, is a member of the Norwegian Labor Party, a social-
democratic party that seeks a strong welfare state. The extreme right wing views of 
Breivik are completely counter to this belief system and Breivik felt that these principles 
were weakening Norway. The car bomb which Breivik detonated outside of the Prime 
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Minister’s office building was largely symbolic but also provided a feint and cover for 
action for his attack on Utoya Island. Utoya became a target because of its affiliation to 
the Labor Party, the geographic isolation of the island itself, its lack of security and its 
population density of unarmed campers. Breivik strategically chose the time of year for 
his attack to incorporate the highest number of campers on the island, which is estimated 
at over 600 on the day of the shooting. Breivik’s extensive planning period and much 
avoidance of Norwegian government control measures further validates our first 
hypothesis that claims that prevention and preemption measures are insufficient to reduce 
the Rate of Kill in Active Shooter incidents.  
C. BILL PHILLIPS 
Bill Phillips was a 60-year-old employee at the Johnson Space Center in Houston, 
Texas who responded to an unfavorable Performance Review on April 20, 2007 by 
killing one colleague and taking another hostage until the incident culminated with 
Phillip’s suicide. Although the company had no plans to terminate Phillip’s employment, 
on the day he received his performance evaluation, he brought a .38 caliber revolver and 
20 hollow point bullets to work. Described as a loner, and someone whose life revolved 
around his work, the poor evaluation sent Phillips into a mad rage that resulted in one 
death and a three-hour hostage situation.274 This unfortunate incident further validates 
our second hypothesis that states that Law Enforcement interdiction of the shooter 
remains insufficient to reduce the Rate of Kill in Active Shooter incidents. 
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Figure 33.   Bill Phillips (Johnson Space Center Shooter) 
D. AMY BISHOP 
Amy Bishop was an associate professor at the University of Alabama–Huntsville 
who responded to her denial of academic tenure by killing three people and injuring 
another three on the University campus on February 12, 2010. Bishop, who killed her 
brother in 1986, had a history of disproportionate and occasionally violent reactions to 
workplace stress. She was formally investigated for a bomb threat and was also arrested 
for assault at an International House of Pancakes restaurant. Bishop was described by her 
colleagues as swinging from feelings of rage to feelings of empathy for her students and 
seemed always “ready to explode.”275  However, despite her alarming and criminal 
behavior, hypothesis one is again validated by this case as prevention and preemption 
measures remained ineffective to reduce the Rate of Kill for this Active Shooter incident 
as well.  
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Figure 34.   Amy Bishop (University of Alabama–Huntsville Shooter) 
E. OMAR THORNTON 
Omar Thornton was a 34-year-old employee of Hartford Distributors in 
Manchester, CT. who blamed his termination due to stealing on racial discrimination and 
responded by killing eight people and injuring another two before he took his own life. 
The incident finally culminated with a 10-minute suicide call to his mother along with a 
call to 911 from Thornton. Although his girlfriend declared that Thornton’s actions were 
in response to workplace racism, it is more likely that Thornton was angered by his recent 
termination due to steeling company property.276 While Thornton had no previous mental 
health history, this brief example further validates hypothesis two that states that Law 
Enforcement interdiction of the shooter remains insufficient to reduce the Rate of Kill in 
Active Shooter incidents.  
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Figure 35.   Omar Thornton (Hartford Distributors Shooter) 
F. SULEJMAN TALOVIC 
Sulejman Talovic was a Bosnian immigrant who, on February 12, 2007 killed five 
people and injured another four people in the Trolley Square Mall in Salt Lake City, UT 
before being shot by responding police officers. Talovic lived with his mother, father and 
three sisters. The mall was the only place he visited as a child and, as he became older, he 
often ate his lunch in his car in the mall parking lot. Although his motive remains largely 
unclear to both his family and police, Talovic stated in 2001 that he was “going to kill 
white people like Serbs.” No indication was given for his selection of the mall as the 
scene of his shooting spree. Witnesses during the shooting stated that Talovic remained 
totally calm and expressionless as he gunned down innocent patrons in the mall with his 
.38 caliber revolver and shotgun. When he was finally killed by responding police 
officers, his intentions to inflict as much harm as possible were revealed when police 
discovered the backpack he was carrying that was full of additional ammunition.277 In 
this case, Law Enforcement interdiction of the shooter did result in decreasing the Rate of 
Kill for this Active Shooter incident. However, five people were killed and four  
 
 
                                                 
277 Mayhugh, “Active Shooters: Behavior, Conditions, and Situations.” 
 187 
additional mall patrons were injured before First Responders could interdict the shooter. 
Additionally, although Talovic made threatening remarks prior to the shooting, no 
preventative action was taken.      
 
 
Figure 36.   Sulejman Talovic (Tolley Square Mall Shoooter) 
G. ROBERT A. HAWKINS 
Robert Hawkins was a depressed 19 year old who responded to the recent loss of 
his job and girlfriend on December 5, 2007 by killing eight people and injuring another 
four in Omaha, NE at the Westroads Shopping Mall. Hawkins was estranged from his 
brother and lived with some of his friends and their mother. Hawkins also had a troubled 
past of adolescent depression and criminal activity. He was diagnosed with depression by 
age six and received medication and therapy. By age 14, Hawkins had threatened to kill 
his stepmother with an axe and had a criminal history consisting of felony drug charges 
and homicidal threats. On the day of his shooting, Hawkins wrote a suicide letter to his 
mother indicating that he intended to kill and harm other people before committing 




Hawkins assault on the Westroads Shopping Mall with an AK-47 Assault Rifle.278 This 
case further validates hypothesis one, which states that prevention and preemption 
methods are insufficient to reduce the Rate of Kill for Active Shooter incidents. 
 
 
Figure 37.   Robert Hawkins (Westroads Mall Shooting) 
H. JAMES VON BRUNN 
James Von Brunn was an 88 year old white supremacist and anti-Semite who, on 
June 10, 2009, acted on his racist views by killing one person and wounding another in 
the Holocaust museum located in Washington, DC. Prior to this incident; Brunn, who 
was upset about current interest rates and economic turmoil, served six and a half years in 
prison after being arrested in 1981 outside of a Federal Reserve Board meeting with a 
shotgun, revolver, and a knife. Brunn’s wife stated that his hatred was eating him like 
cancer. Brunn, who was a U.S. Navy veteran, finally acted on this hatred by killing the 
security guard of the Holocaust Museum who was attempting to open the door for him. 
Brunn died in a prison hospital on January 5, 2010.279 Although Brunn’s associations 
with violent organizations and feelings of extreme hate were known to his family  
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members, this violent act was not prevented. These circumstances also further validate 
hypothesis one, which states that prevention and preemption measures remain insufficient 
to reduce the Rate of Kill for Active Shooter scenarios.   
 
 
Figure 38.   James Von Brunn (Holocaust Memorial Museum Shooter) 
I. JARED LEE LAUGHNER 
Jared Lee Laughner was a 22-year-old anti-government and conspiracy theorist 
who, on January 8, 2011, acted on his views by killing six people and injuring another 14 
before his arrest at Gabrielle Gifford’s event in Tucson, AZ. Laughner was described as a 
“normal kid” by his family and friends until middle school. After being fired from a job 
for changes in his personality, Laughner became mentally distorted with drugs and 
alcohol as he transitioned between normal teenaged activities and obsessions with the 
occult and government conspiracies fueled by his increasing nihilistic views. After 
becoming obsessed with Rep. Gifford’s answer to his question of, “What is Government 
if words have no meaning,” he decided to act on his views by killing her and other 
attendees of her event in Tucson, AZ.280 Although Laughner’s associations with violent 
organizations and irrational feelings were known to his family and friends, this violent act 
was not prevented.  These circumstances also further validate hypothesis one, which 
states that prevention and preemption measures remain insufficient to reduce the Rate of 
Kill for Active Shooter scenarios.   
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Figure 39.   Jared Lee Laughner (Rep. Gabrielle Gifford’s Shooter) 
J. NIDAL HASAN  
Nidal Hasan was a 39-year-old Islamic Army Major assigned to Fort Hood 
military installation in Ft. Hood, TX. Hasan, who had made repeated unsuccessful 
attempts to avoid deployments and terminate his Army service due to his ideological 
opposition of Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom, finally resorted to violent 
actions on November 5, 2009. Nidal Hasan’s Jihadist actions were encouraged through 
multiple supportive and encouraging emails with his Imam. In preparation for his Jihad, 
Hasan began practicing at a local shooting range and distributed his personal items to his 
neighbors shortly before his attack. Hasan killed 13 people and injured another 30 during 
his attack on Ft. Hood before he was finally shot and detained by responding base 
security officers.281 Although Hasan had demonstrated cowardice and refused to fulfill 
his obligations as an Amy officer during a time of combat based on his radical ideology, 
his associations with an extremist religious leader and feelings of extreme hate, although 
known to family and co-workers, were ignored and this violent act was not prevented.  
These circumstances also further validate hypothesis one, which states that prevention 
and preemption measures remain insufficient to reduce the Rate of Kill for Active 
Shooter scenarios.   
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Figure 40.   Nadal Hasan (Ft. Hood Shooter) 
Active Shooter Profile Matrix 
Shooter Contributing Category Contributing Factors 
Bill Phillips 
Workplace 
• Provided self esteem and identity 
• Received poor evaluation 
• Loner 
• Wrote “People call me stupid,” on a 
white board at work. 
Community • No data 
Finances • No data 
Social Network / Religion • No data 
Health / Wellness • No data 




• Conflict with peers and manager 
• Unsuccessful meeting goal of tenure 
• Unsatisfactory quality of work 
Community 
• Conflicts with children / youth 
• Arrested for violence 
• Investigated for bomb threat 
• Case reopened for killing of her 
brother 
Finances • No negative data 
Social Network / Religion • Conflict with social contacts 





• No resilience 
• Mood swings 
• Volatility 
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Active Shooter Profile Matrix 
Shooter Contributing Category Contributing Factors 
Home / Family • Support of husband • Killing of brother 
Omar Thornton 
Workplace • Felt Racial discriminated against 
Community • No Data 
Finances • No Data 
Social Network / Religion • No Data 
Health / Wellness • No Data 
Home / Family • Made 10 minute suicide call to mother 
Sulejman Talovic 
Workplace • No Data 
Community • Bosnian Immigrant 
Finances • No Data 
Social Network / Religion • Hated Serbs, wanted to kill white people, loner 
Health / Wellness • No Data 
Home / Family • Lived with mother, father and 3 sisters 
Robert Hawkins 
Workplace • Recently lost his job 
Community • Criminal record 
Finances • No Data 
Social Network / Religion 
• Recently lost his girlfriend, 
estranged from his parents, lived 
with friends and their mother 
Health / Wellness • Treated for depression, history of violent intentions. 
Home / Family • No Data 
James Von Brunn 
Workplace • Retired 
Community • Prior arrest for threatening actions against Federal Reserve 
Finances • Fixed income 
Social Network / Religion • White supremacist, Anti-Semite 
Health / Wellness • Extreme hatred 
Home / Family • Wife was fearful about Brunn’s hatred 
Jared Lee Laughner 
Workplace 
• Recently fired from Quiznoes 
• High School Drop-out (2006) 
• Fired from dog walking job 
Community 
• Isolated 
• 5 college police incidents (2010) 
• Arrested twice 
Finances • No Data 
Social Network / Religion 
• Obsessed with the Occult 
• Maintained regular friendships until 
break-up with girlfriend 
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Active Shooter Profile Matrix 
Shooter Contributing Category Contributing Factors 
• Atheist 
• Nihilist 
• Anti-government, Conspiracy 
theorist 
• Made frequent comments about 
terrorism and baby killing 
Health / Wellness 
• Mental distortion due to drug and 
alcohol abuse. 
• Severe anger reactions 
• Use of hallucinogens 
• Paranoid thinking 
• Obsessed with lucid dreaming 
• Personality change 
• Conspiracy thinking 
Home / Family • Lived with parents • Only child 
Nidal Hasan 
Workplace 
• Obligations as a soldier conflicted 
with his religious ideology 
• Felt discriminated against 




• Felt discriminated 
Finances • No Data 
Social Network / Religion 
• Increased Muslim religious activities 
• Jihadist intentions were supported 
by religious authorities 
• Received supportive guidance from 
Islamic Imam for Jihadist actions 






Home / Family • Loss of father • Living alone 
Table 28.   Active Shooter Profile Matrix depicting U.S. Department of Homeland 
Security personality analysis for Personal Interactions with Multiple 
Conditions in Multiple Situations for Active Shooters282 
                                                 
282 Mayhugh, “Active Shooters: Behavior, Conditions, and Situations.” 
 194 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 195 
APPENDIX D. OSLO AND UTOYA ISLAND, NORWAY 
A. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
As part of our case study research regarding the Oslo bombing and attack on 
Utoya Island which occurred on July 22, 2011 in Norway, we requested access to the 
responding officers and personnel affiliated with the emergency response in order to 
accurately portray the events of this incident and make useful recommendations for how 
to mitigate future similar attacks. The response and cooperation we received from our 
newfound Norwegian friends and counterparts was not only impressive, but humbling as 
well and deserves special acknowledgment. This research was initially facilitated by the 
Norwegian Special Operations Forces (NORSOF) located in Oslo, Norway. LTC Knut 
Simen Skaret, NORSOF LNO, at the NORSOF and NORSOCOM Headquarters 
facilitated many aspects of this research trip, as well as introduced us to the Commander 
and Deputy Commander of the Norwegian Counter-Terror Unit (DELTA) that is the 
primary unit responsible for the emergency response to the events of July 22, 2011. LTC 
Skaret’s unrelenting support of this trip was crucial to the overall success of this research. 
Additionally the welcome and informal meeting with the NORSOCOM Commander, BG 
Geratru was another wonderful demonstration of support and hospitality that we greatly 
appreciated. 
To the Commander of the Norwegian Counter-Terror Unit (DELTA), Anders 
Snortheimsmoen, his Deputy Commander, Assault Team Leaders and the brave men 
which comprise DELTA; we have never met a more professional and organized unit. 
Your openness and candor in support of our research was truly humbling and we are 
extremely grateful. Your unit’s high esprit décor is direct reflection of its impeccable 
competence and professionalism. In order to facilitate our research we were afforded 
access to and conducted interviews with the Commander of the Joint Operation Center, 
Joint Operational Section Superintendent, as well as dispatch personnel from the Joint 
Operational Center, Tactical Flight Officer from the Police Helicopter Service, Police 
Superintendent for the Norwegian Bomb Squad, Lead Instructor for Counter Terror Unit 
Training, and On Scene Commander for the response to the Oslo bombing. Additionally, 
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we were granted access to the Oslo courthouse in order to witness testimony of the 
shooter, Anders Behring Breivik. Finally, our research was further supported with a 
guided tour of Utoya Island given by the DELTA Deputy Commander and one other 
DELTA officer. This level of support was unparalleled and has no equal to anything we 
have ever experienced in the past. Lastly, we would be remiss without acknowledging the 
support we have received from the Asymmetric Warfare Group, specifically CSM Dan 
Hendrex and COL(P) Robert Karmazin. Thank you for your support and friendship.             
This horrific attack on the city of Oslo and Utoya Island was conducted by a 
ruthless and deranged killer named Anders Behring Breivik who is attempting to utilize 
his actions on July 22, 2011 to promote his manifesto. In a small effort to deny the 
recognition he so greatly desires for conducting these brutal actions we will only refer to 
him as “ABB” for the remainder of this case study.   
B. INTRODUCTION 
On a rainy summer day in downtown Oslo, Norway, a car bomb ripped through 
the H Block of the government district killing eight people and injuring another 98. An 
hour and 26 minutes later, a peaceful island named Utoya, which translates to mean 
Utopia and was considered by many to be the safest place on Earth, was the scene of a 
bloody massacre of young teenage children at a youth summer camp where 69 children 
were killed and an additional 60 were wounded.283 These were not the actions of an 
occupying army or an insurgent force consisting of 100 or more soldiers. Instead, they 
were the actions of a single or “lone wolf” gunman and unfortunately will be regarded as 
not only another successful Active Shooter incident, but also as an example of an 
emerging and dynamic threat of “Solo Terrorism”. The events that occurred on July 22, 
2011 will be forever etched in the minds of the Norwegian people. The viciousness of 
ABB’s political statement which he made in the form of a powerful car bomb detonated 
in downtown Oslo followed by the ruthless massacre of dozens of school aged children 
on nearby Utoya Island conjured up images in the U.S. of the Virginia Tech massacre, the 
                                                 
283 Commander Anders Snortheimsmoen and Deputy Commander Torgrim Solberg of the Norweigian 
National Counter Terrorism Unit, interview by COL(P) Robert Karmazin, MAJ Chuck Ergenbright, and 
MAJ Sean Hubbard; National Police Directorate Headquarters, Oslo, Norway, June 5, 2012.  
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University of Texas Tower shooting and the Columbine High School shooting. This 
event reminded the world that violent extremism is not limited in its scope, its duration or 
its targeted victims and is not bound by borders or religious profiles. 
Initial media response to this incident was extremely harsh and critical of the 
Norwegian emergency response to this incident. The Norwegian National Counter Terror 
unit, known as DELTA, received criticism for its Response Time and selection of 
infiltration methods utilized to reach the island. Norwegian political leadership and 
supervisory police leadership also drew criticism based on their decisions to have key 
personnel on leave prior to the incident, as well as for decisions made during the incident 
itself. However, over the course of this case study, the authors were given the rare 
opportunity through the support of the Norwegian Police Directorate to visit Norway and 
receive firsthand accounts of the events of July 22, 2011. As a result, almost every 
instance of negative media attention or criticism was negated by the firsthand accounts of 
the incident and most importantly through the thorough documentation of training and 
preparedness applied by the Norwegian Police Directorate well before 22 July. This case 
study will outline the Norwegian police organization, actions taken by the Norwegian 
Police to prepare for a similar incident, police actions in Oslo and on Utoya as told by the 
men and women who participated, and their after action analysis of actions they would do 
differently. Finally, this case study will conclude with the author’s recommendations for 
improvement of existing policies and infrastructure capable of mitigating potential future 
attacks, as well as highlight areas in which the Norwegian police forces should sustain 
current operational procedures.   
C. NORWEGIAN POLICE ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGN 
The Norway National Police Directorate is composed of approximately 13,000 
peace officers with varying degrees of specialties. At the district level, 27 regional police 
districts are designated to provide Law Enforcement guardianship to rural and semi urban 
cities and towns throughout Norway. These regional police departments provide the 
officers responsible for daily security of Norwegian citizens. Within this organization, 
several different agencies within the police contribute to its overall readiness. Specialists 
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in fields, such as Counter-Terror, bomb disposal, VIP security, helicopter operations and 
others help keep Norway safe on a daily basis. Norway is credited with a low crime rate, 
as well as relative peace and security despite being an unarmed force.284 In fact, the only 
police officers who are authorized to carry firearms at all times are those classified as 
VIP security, responsible for the movement of Norwegian and international dignitaries. 
Although the Norwegian police are not faced with the rate of complex environmental 
factors that many of the larger U.S. police forces are faced with almost every day, 
perhaps a better metric by which to evaluate the Norwegian police is the consistent and 
extremely low crime rate in a population of almost 5 million. From 2004 to 2009, the 
number of violent crimes reported did not surpass 25,000 incidents each year.285 This 
compares to New York City, with a total population of over 8 million, which experienced 
over 100,000 incidents per year from 2000 to 2010 of major, violent felony offenses. The 
remaining police forces outside of special VIP police must obtain permission from the 
Police Directorate to arm themselves. Even the National Counter Terrorism Unit, known 
as DELTA, must obtain permission to arm themselves for deliberate and sharp missions 
around the country. In most cases, officer weapons are easily accessible to the police. 
However, this organization and difference in policy represents a sharp contrast to most 
police units around the world.286 
Police in Norway must attend a national police academy. Regardless of the 
specialty that a police officer may pursue later in his or her career, all officers receive the 
same baseline training and this facilitates common language and standard operations 
among all police departments.287 After a police officer graduates the basic police 
academy, the average basic police officer receives an annual 40 hours of training to 
reinforce the academy training and provide periodic updates in training and doctrine that 
are published through the police academy.288 
                                                 
284 Interview with Head of CTU Training, Police Headquarters, Oslo, Norway, June 7, 2012. 
285 National Police Directorate, “The Politiet,” 9. 
286 Snortheimsmoen and Solberg, interview. 
287 Interview with Head of CTU Training. 
288 Interview with Head of CTU Training. 
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Among the 27 police districts in Norway, additional training is given to members 
of the police who volunteer and meet the criteria to become the Emergency Response 
Team personnel. ERTs derived out of the Cold War threat from the Soviet Union as a 
more military structured unit designed to combat or manage more complex attacks.289 
These ERTs have since evolved into a team of trained police officers capable of 
responding to any crisis in their respective district. Incidents outside of their outlined 
capabilities can be delegated to the Norwegian military or to DELTA. In addition to their 
annual police training, ERTs receive an additional 120 hours of training throughout the 
year.   
Under the umbrella of the Ministry of Justice and the Police, which is the highest 
department within the Norwegian police organization, the National Police Directorate 
concentrates all national assets capable of responding to national crises within the Oslo 
Police District. These assets include the National Counter Terrorism Unit (DELTA), 
Crisis and Hostage Negotiator Service, Helicopter Service, Bomb Disposal Team, and 
Specially Trained Dogs. The National Counter Terrorism Unit is utilized as a special 
intervention unit to counter threats associated with acts of terror, sabotage, hostage 
situations, and organized crime. The Crisis and Hostage Negotiator Service is utilized to 
conduct hostage negotiation during situations involving terrorism, hostages, and 
kidnappings. The Helicopter Service provides continuous support to Norwegian Law 
Enforcement for a wide variety of missions. The Bomb Disposal Team provides 
continuous national level support with explosives detection dog teams, and explosives 
experts trained with special equipment to mitigate bomb threats, suspicious objects, and 
explosives. The Specialty Trained Dogs service provides dogs utilized for general patrols 
as well and cadaver dogs utilized in avalanche and collapsed structure environments.290 
On July 22, 2011, all of these national assets were utilized first during the response to the 
bomb detonation at the Oslo government center and later at Utoya Island in response to  
 
                                                 
289 Interview with Head of CTU Training. 
290 National Police Directorate, Norway “Police Emergency Preparedness System, Part 1: Norway, 
Emergency Management Manual,” Oslo, Norway, 2007, 67. 
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the mass shooting. Due to the nature and scope of the Norwegian Counter Terrorist 
Unit’s mission and capabilities, they became the first police responders to the Utoya 
Island shooting and are also the force that ultimately detained ABB.291 
 
Figure 41.   Norway Police Organization292 
The strategy, or mission of the Norwegian Police Directorate, is to establish and 
develop the police force, export its resources to the lowest level, as well as manage the 
police training and readiness, all in an effort to prevent and react to crimes and criminal 
behavior that threaten the citizens of Norway.293 This mission is outlined in the 
department pamphlet from June 2010 for the public to educate themselves on the various 
roles and responsibilities of the Norwegian police force. The general theme presented in 
this pamphlet is that the Norwegian police force assumes a professional bureaucracy  
 
                                                 
291 Snortheimsmoen and Solberg, interview. 
292 National Police Directorate, “The Politiet,” 3. 
293 National Police Directorate, “The Politiet,” 7. 
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model and highlights for the Norwegian citizens the high degree of proficiency, 
professionalism and autonomy possessed by the Norwegian police regarding daily 
operations and crisis situations. 
The National Counter Terrorism Unit known as DELTA is the most highly trained 
and proficient police organization within the Norwegian Police Directorate and is 
considered a national asset with the capability of responding from Oslo to any location 
throughout Norway. In order apply for service within DELTA, candidates must first 
complete the basic police academy and possess a good service record. DELTA selection 
is comprised of 8 weeks of intense physical and mental training. If candidates pass, they 
receive advanced training facilitated by team leaders, followed by a one year 
probationary service period in the unit itself. Once a member reaches the probationary 
status within the team, the attrition rate is almost reduced to zero.  This is a true testament 
to the selection of the Counter Terrorist officers.294  
DELTA officers are armed with the latest equipment and conduct detailed 
planning and rehearsals for crisis scenarios. The most famous incident in which this unit 
was known for prior to the Utoya Island shooting was the hostage crisis in the Sandefjord 
Airport that took place in 1994.295 This event took place when armed gunmen took two 
police officers and two civilian’s hostage, prompting the deployment of DELTA. The 
hostages were rescued and one of the hostage takers was killed. It is the only time in 
Norwegian police history that police officers were given the order to shoot to kill.   
This type of accuracy and precision regarding tactical action is also expressed in 
their standard operating procedures for active shooter response. As part of a nationwide 





                                                 
294 Commander Anders Snortheimsmoen, interview, Utoya Island, Norway, June 8, 2012. 
295 “Special Organization,” Norway Police Department, 2008, 
https://www.politi.no/om_politiet/organisasjon/sarorganer/.  
 202 
for active shooter response. Because DELTA is a national asset, it was able to be 
disseminated nationwide and contained the common police language facilitated by a 
national police academy.296 
In addition to DELTA, other specialty teams are also organized under the 
National Police Directorate for response to incidents throughout Norway. The Command 
and Control element of each Norway’s 27 districts is known as the Joint Operations 
Center, or JOC. The JOC, located at Police Headquarters, is in charge of receiving and 
distributing emergency call data and also to facilitate Command and Control of 
emergency incidents. Norway’s police emergency number is 112, the equivalent to the 
U.S. emergency number of 911. Throughout Norway, 112 calls received by JOCs are 
routed directly to an initial switchboard. The trained dispatchers at the Oslo switchboard 
receive an average of 12,000 calls per month. Of those calls, approximately 80% 
terminate at the switchboard because they are determined to be prank, accidental, or non-
emergency calls. The remaining 20% of emergency calls are routed to the JOC for 
dispatch to appropriate emergency responders. Additionally, Norwegian citizens can call 
specific numbers in response to specific threats, such as fire and medical numbers, 110 
and 113 respectively.297 Once the JOC receives an emergency notification, the JOC 
Commander uses prewritten Standard Operating Procedures for the incident. In larger 
instances, such as the 22 July shooting, the Police Chief and his staff will occupy the JOC 
in order to make decisions regarding the. For example, the Police Chief may choose to 
exercise authority by directing the JOC to conduct certain actions or to reallocate assets. 
In addition to its core duties, the JOC must also consider additional assets required for 
particular emergencies. Assets ranging from DELTA, to K9 units, to the Helicopter 
Service unit can be tasked to support an incident and the management of each unit rests 
with the JOC.298 
                                                 
296 National Police Directorate, “Police Emergency Preparedness System, Part 1,” Emergency 
Management Manual, 2007, 67. 
297 Interview with JOC Commander, Oslo Police Headquarters, June 6, 2012. 
298 Interview with JOC Commander. 
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In addition to emergency response calls, the JOC in Oslo maintains a crisis plan 
for every university and school within the Oslo Police District. These plans outline 
emergency response procedures for the university and the district police. The plans 
outline linkup procedures, maps of the campus, infil routes by police and locations for 
triage and medical evacuation. During the course of our case study interview, JOC 
personnel demonstrated the process and the ease of communicating these pre-planned 
actions to universities and schools.299 In the preceding 14 case studies explored as part of 
this research, prepared plans, such as this did not exist in any instance.   
The Helicopter Service unit is comprised of two Euro-Copter 135s and four 
crews, and is responsible for helicopter support for missions throughout the entire 
country. This unit can receive a request from any district in Norway and can be rerouted 
based on priorities of events directed by Oslo Police Headquarters. The EC135 has a 
flight duration of approximately two hours with the ability to refuel at various sites all 
around the country.300 The Helicopter Service unit does not maintain lift capability for 
other police forces and routinely helps to coordinate for military air lift assets when 
available or needed. Primary missions for the EC135s are then relegated to aerial search, 
surveillance, high risk operations, traffic surveillance, and transport of two man 
specialists to remote areas, such as bomb squad.301  As a highly sought after asset in 
Norway, the aircraft and flight crews log approximately 1200 flight hours per year. 
Accordingly, the Helicopter Service unit has requested the Norwegian government to 
provide additional airframes and increase crew support in order to meet increasing 
mission demands.302 The most prominent and contemporary example which illustrates 
the need for additional airframes occurred on July 22, 2011 as circumstances and poor 
scheduling of limited assets precluded Helicopter lift support until 2108, over two hours 
after the incident had ended. 
                                                 
299 Interview with JOC Commander. 
300 Interview with Police Air Services, Police Headquarters, Oslo, Norway, June 7, 2012. 
301 Interview with Police Air Services. 
302 Interview with Police Air Services. 
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A unique component of Norwegian police service is the establishment of the On 
Scene Commander Section. The OSC is a group of seasoned police officers chosen to be 
the overall tactical commander of a crisis scene. The OSC reports to the district JOC and 
has command and control over all response services on scene, to include the fire and 
medical response.303 They operate under three preparedness principles: responsibility, 
subsidiary control and similarity. Responsibility refers to the charge of all responders to 
account for their actions and act responsible no matter how the event unfolds. Subsidiary 
control refers to allowing the subordinate responders to do their job after the scene has 
been organized by the OSC. Finally, similarity refers to the responsibility of the OSC to 
speak common languages to all of the responding personnel and organize them properly 
under one common goal.304   
The OSC operate under 27 different crisis SOPs, mostly designed in accordance 
with U.S. guidance for post September 11, 2001 operations. The OSCs have twice-yearly 
leader forums between fire and medical personnel to discuss, update and educate each 
other on evolving tactics and procedures.305 In addition to active shooter scenario 
training, the Oslo police district conducted a complex bomb exercise in 2006. All 
departments responded to the exercise incident and it helped develop the response SOP 
that was ultimately utilized on July 22. In 2011, prior to the bombing in July, OSCs 
educated all subordinate units on updates regarding bomb response and conducted 
training in support of the changes.306 The OSC is an extremely professional section of the 
police and are capable of executing extremely complex tasks. 
However, the OSC is not ultimately responsible for managing an active shooter 
scenario.  The OSC can contain such an incident with first responders, but the SOP 
requires DELTA to be the prosecuting unit if such an incident should occur.  Although 
first responding police officers may challenge and interdict an active shooter, Norwegian 
                                                 
303 Interview with Oslo Bombing On Scene Commander, Oslo District Courthouse, Oslo, Norway, 
June 6, 2012. 
304 Interview with Oslo Bombing On Scene Commander. 
305 Interview with Oslo Bombing On Scene Commander. 
306 Interview with Oslo Bombing On Scene Commander. 
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SOP prefers the skills of the designated National Counter Terrorist unit over the average 
police officer.307 Unfortunately, as demonstrated by all of the preceding case studies, 
many active shooter scenarios are complete before specialized forces can arrive. The 
OSC section, as well as the police academy, has made efforts to educate first responders 
on how to neutralize active shooter events in the absence of DELTA or ERT assets.308 
These efforts to mitigate the potential effects of Active Shooters were extensive and 
thoughtful and were in practice prior to the events of July 22 and remain a core task in the 
police academy for new police officers.309 
The police bomb squad is an integral piece to every crisis that Norway has to 
respond to. The organization is small and consists of 10 personnel responsible for the 
entire country. The squad also consists of nine trained bomb dogs. For such a small 
organization, the squad responded to 1200 calls in 2010 and 976 in 2011.310 The bomb 
squad was integral on 22 July in clearing the government building and then subsequent 
searches of Utoya Island, the shooters farmhouse and the shooters mother’s house.311 In 
the case of 22 July, like many other calls the bomb squad receives over each year, 
military support from Explosive Ordnance Disposal can be requested to assist in 
clearance. This helps to augment the large number of calls to the low number of bomb 
squad personnel.312 
The Norwegian Police Directorate and its subordinate units are a highly trained 
and professional organization. They operate within a professional bureaucracy model and 
have implemented key standard operating procedures that far surpass many police 
organizations that have been analyzed as part of our case study research. This model  
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proves to be very efficient and although the organization received initial criticism for 22 
July, there were very few mistakes made at the tactical level and operational level and the 
responding forces should be recognized for their adaptability and flexibility. 
D. BACKGROUND AND LEAD UP TO THE ATTACK ON NORWAY 
1. Law Enforcement Preparation 
The Norwegian National Counter Terrorist (DELTA) was established in 1976 in 
order to respond to National Crises. The unit is located in Oslo and is regarded as a 
national asset under the National Police Directorate. Comprised of 72 personnel including 
60 officers and 12 staff members incorporating 10 trained crisis negotiators, DELTA is 
divided into four divisions including Assault, Ropes and Snipers, Combat divers and Boat 
crews, and Breachers. The DELTA motto is, “to serve the public when it is most 
needed.” Although DELTA is a national asset and is utilized for high risk missions, it 
also maintains a 24 hour presence of one patrol car and 2 personnel are roving at all 
times. The Royal Air Force provided dedicated air assets for Delta prior to September 11, 
2001. However, as a result of frequent deployments to Afghanistan in support of 
Operation Enduring Freedom, the Royal Air Force (RAF) no longer has the necessary 
airframes to continue this support. Although support to the DELTA response on July 
22nd was not denied, the RAF could not facilitate rotary lift support within the requested 
time period due to these constraints. The RAF supported DELTA, but arrived at Utoya at 
approximately 1910 hrs. After July 22nd the RAF has been tasked by the Ministry of 
Defense to provide support to the police within a maximum of two hours from the time of 
request until time of departure. This support is to be provided consistently and at all hours 
of every day throughout the year. As a result, the only replacement helicopter assets 







mostly devoted to aerial reconnaissance. DELTA also maintains the ability to transport 
personnel and equipment via civilian aircraft; however this is based on pre-planned 
aircraft routes.313 
In 2010 the Norwegian Police Security Service and Norwegian Defense Research 
Establishment conducted an Internt Grunnlagsdokument (Threat Vulnerability 
Assessment) in order to address security vulnerabilities within Norway and address 
contemporary threats. This assessment was initiated in 2009 and concluded in 2010 with 
the assessment that the most likely threats within the next five years to Norwigean 
security included IEDs such as suicide bombers and coordinated Active Shooter attacks 
with the primary targets of public communications assets. This report was supported by 
the office of the Minister of Justice who in turn tasked DELTA to match its capabilities 
and training to meet this projected threat. In response to this TVA and directive from the 
Minister of Justice, DELTA developed a weighted TVA of contributing threats to the 
identified general threats. Out of this prioritized list, DELTA identified that bombings 
and Active Shootings were to two highest threats to the citizens of Norway. In response, 
DELTA identified capability and resource shortfalls and made every effort to address 
them.314 
2. Shooter Preparation 
ABB was born in 1979 in Norway. The first year of his life was spent in London 
until his parents divorced and he moved back to Norway with his mother. He visited his 
father and stepmother often in France as a young boy and has been cited as criticizing his 
mother for making him too feminine as he grew up. At the age of 15, he began to show 
signs of rebellion and was arrested for placing graffiti on government property. This 
caused his father to never speak to him again and they have not spoken since ABB was 
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16. During his teenage years, he began to become more extreme in his views about how 
government should be involved in the lives of its citizens and became very critical of 
politics. He was especially focused on the increasing Islamic influence throughout 
Europe.315 A childhood Muslim friend of ABB, Arsalan, is credited with inciting much 
of his hate for Islam. ABB developed these feelings as a teenager after witnessing 
Arsalan’s actions while participating in a Pakistani Youth gang in Norway.316 
Counter to initial reports following the attack, which stated that military training 
and experience enabled ABB’s actions; he did not receive any training from the 
Norwegian Army. In fact, ABB was found unfit for military service during the conscript 
process at age 18 and was subsequently denied the ability to serve. According to reports 
listed in the New York Times, ABB lost over 300,000 dollars in the stock market one 
year after being rejected from military service. Likely feeling depressed after these two 
incidents, he began to show more signs of racism, particularly towards members of the 
Islamic community. ABB was disturbed by the opportunities offered to Muslim men 
throughout Europe. At 21 years old, he had plastic surgery to his chin and forehead in an 
effort to appear more Aryan. Shortly after this, he acquired employment with a customer 
service department where he was described by his employers as a great employee. 
However, other co-workers observed that he maintained a very arrogant demeanor and 
was easily irritated with Middle Eastern and South Asian customers.317 
In late 2001 and early 2002, ABB joined an anti-Islamic subsidiary group to the 
English Defense League, as well as a Freemason group. Although he only attended four 
meetings at each union, he utilized his loose affiliation with the two groups to justify 
portions of his manifesto and set the stage for his proposed development of a Knights  
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Templar. ABB envisioned the organization as one designed to combat the spread of Islam 
throughout Europe and he referred to himself as a “one man cell” within this 
organization.318  
In 2002, ABB began planning his bombing of the Prime Minister’s office and 
attack of Utoya Island. He founded a computer internet company in order to provide a 
legitimate surrogate by which he could finance his expected nine years of plans and 
operations in preparation for the attack. During this time he rented a small farm outside of 
Oslo which he used as a cover to obtain explosive fertilizer mixtures. His detailed 
planning in renting this farm included purchasing non-explosive grade fertilizer in order 
to alleviate any potential scrutiny during large volume purchases. However, after 
receiving his shipment of fertilizer, ABB’s attack preparation included processing the 
fertilizer and adding additional ingredients required to create explosive grade fertilizer. 
Later he also conducted a test fire of his homemade explosives. In early 2011, he 
purchased a small amount of an explosive primer in Poland and, although his name was 
passed to the Police Directorate, after the attacks the police would make a statement 
implying that nothing out of the ordinary was observed in ABB’s case prior to the 
attacks.319 
ABB’s initial plan for weapons procurement included a trip to Prague in 2010, 
where he thought it would be simple and cheap to buy weapons of any type. He soon 
realized that it was significantly more difficult for a non-citizen to gain access to 
weaponry and that it would be equally difficult to smuggle it back to Norway. In 
response, he hollowed out the back seat of his Hyundai hoping to bring back an AK-47, 
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attempts to obtain access to the weapons he desired in Prague, he decided to return to 
Norway and apply for weapons legally. As ABB stated after his arrest, this proved to be 
the first and only “setback” to his operation.320  
After returning to Norway, ABB was able to purchase a handgun through legal 
channels because Norwegian law permitted it based on his membership to a pistol club. 
Gun ownership is very difficult in Norway but if citizens are willing to endure the 
extensive administrative process and prove proficiency, over time a citizen, such as ABB 
with no criminal history is afforded the opportunity to purchase a firearm. After several 
trips to the pistol club, where he demonstrated his proficiency, ABB was approved to buy 
a Glock pistol. His rifle, a Ruger Mini-14 was much easier to procure because he had 
already carried a hunting license for many years. He also owned a Benneli shotgun that 
he purchased seven years prior.  These factors helped to establish ABB’s good standing 
and facilitate his rifle purchase. Although he never received any formal tactical training 
with these weapons, ABB claims that he used the video game Call of Duty: Modern 
Warfare 2 and World of Warcraft as simulators which aided him in carrying out his 
attacks.321 
During his planning and preparation period, ABB wrote a manifesto that he 
entitled 2083: A European Declaration of Independence. The work drew upon the 
prejudices and hate of extreme, right wing Christian organizations against Islam. He 
called for Christians to help force the Muslims out of Europe and equated these actions to 
the Christian Crusades of the 11th, 12th and 13th centuries. ABB believed that expulsion 
of Muslims from Europe would require a war and that it would not end until 2083 and 
would require great amounts of violence. The attacks on the Norwegian Prime Ministers’ 
office, as well as Utoya Island were intended to start this war and begin the forced 
withdrawal of Muslims from Europe.322  
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The choice of targets for ABB’s massacre was explained during the Police 
Directorate dissection of ABB’s manifesto interrogation after the incident. Norwegian 
Prime Minister, Jens Stoltenberg, is a member of the Norwegian Labor Party, a social-
democratic party that seeks a strong welfare state. The extreme right wing views of ABB 
are completely counter to this belief system and he felt that these principles were 
weakening Norway. The car bomb which ABB detonated outside of the Prime Minister’s 
office building was largely symbolic but also provided a feint and cover for action for his 
attack on Utoya Island. Utoya became a target because of its affiliation to the Labor 
Party, the geographic isolation of the island itself, its lack of security and its population 
density of unarmed campers. ABB strategically chose the time of year for his attack to 
incorporate the highest number of campers on the island, which is estimated at over 600 
on the day of the shooting.  
E. THE ATTACK 
1.  Oslo Bombing 
  
Figure 42.   Satellite Imagery Depicting Location of Oslo, Norway (Left), Satellite 
Imagery Depicting Location of Bombsite within the Oslo City Center. 
ABB’s extensive planning and preparation culminated with his attack on the 
Norwegian Prime Minister’s building located in H Block of the Oslo city center on July 
22, 2011 where he killed eight people and wounded an additional 98 others in an 
explosion that rocked the entire city. This attack was purposefully conducted during 
Norway’s summer months that are typically regarded as the safest time of year 
throughout Norway, which is already regarded as one of the world’s safest and most 
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stable societies. As a result of this well-known statistic of extremely low crime rates 
during this time, most of the police administration was placed on leave during the month 
of July. Accordingly, with consideration to the historically low crime rates experienced in 
Oslo and fiscal benefits gained by not operating air assets during this time, the Police Air 
Support Unit was also placed on three weeks of leave during July.323 Additionally, Law 
Enforcement, and response agencies throughout Norway were operating at reduced 
security postures as they took advantage of this predictable period of slow operational 
tempo to rest their forces. Although a retrospective view of these administrative decisions 
in light of the events of July 22, 2011 creates negative speculation regarding 
administrative decisions regarding police and emergency service readiness; it is important 
to remember that this had been standard practice for many years and was based on 
historical crime data.324 
Prior to initiating the Oslo bombing, ABB prepositioned a midsize grey van in 
close proximity to the government office buildings located in the Oslo city center. On 
July 22, ABB entered the Oslo city center and approached the Oslo government offices 
from the south traveling north east along Grubbegata until he reached the service vehicle 
entrance to the H Block building and parked his rented Volkswagen Crafter van at the 
base of the building adjacent to the cafeteria. Fortunately, an unknown grey car was 
illegally parked where ABB intended to emplace his Vehicle Born Improvised Explosive 
Device (VBIED). This sub-optimal placement could have potentially prevented the 
explosion from acting as a shaped charge and causing even more extensive damages. 
After emplacing his VBIED, ABB ignited the fuse, exited the van, and proceeded north 
east along Grubbegata to his prepositioned secondary vehicle which was a midsized grey 
van.325 At this time, ABB was disguised as a Norwegian police officer and began driving 
extremely erratically from the bomb sight towards the Utoya ferry site. As a result, a 
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concerned citizen called 112 and provided a vehicle description, license plate number and 
description of concerning behavior to the Joint Operations Center (JOC) approximately 
20 minutes prior to the explosion.326  
At approximately 1527 hours, on July 22, 2011, ABB’s VBIED consisting of a 
homemade mixture of fertilizer and gas amounting to 900 kilograms (estimated 2000 lbs) 
of explosives concealed in his rented large white Volkswagen Crafter detonated in 
downtown Oslo, Norway, at the base of the Prime Minister’s office building. Damages 
resulting from this explosion were extensive and were experienced throughout a 4-5 
block radius. From the bomb crater, the explosion severely damaged the Prime Minister’s 
building causing massive structural damage to this building, as well as four other adjacent 
buildings. Lesser damage including heavy debris and broken windows was experienced 
throughout the 4–5 block radius and the blast was felt much further as well.  As a result, 
the JOC received multiple 112 calls reporting multiple explosions and this generated 
further confusion about the origin of the explosions.  
DELTA was notified of the attack at 1530 and responded immediately with the 
two patrolling officers on duty at that time. The initial On-Scene Commander, who was 
an experienced police officer with prior DELTA background and first hand exposure to 
previous car bomb explosions, correctly identified this explosion as a car bomb and 
potential terrorist attack in his initial request for DELTA support. Although they were not 
the first police officers on scene, these DELTA officers were able to begin to relay on site 
information back to the DELTA HQ that was crucial in development of an Immediate 
Action Plan. As a result, DELTA leadership began to prioritize incident response with 
consideration to potential follow-on attacks.327 This tactic is in keeping with 2010 TVA 
and Police Emergency Preparedness System, Part III SOP.328 From 1530 to 1630, 22 
DELTA officers were recalled and were deployed to the bombsite in order to begin 
clearing the building. Of the 22 operators, six remained back at the DELTA HQ as a QRF 
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for additional potential threats. The district police immediately arrived on scene and 
began to cordon the area. Law Enforcement ensured the arrival of medical personnel, as 
well as the continuing operation of public and private transportation on egress routes 
away from the central blast location.  
As DELTA’s bomb squad, along with other police bomb squads, arrived to the 
bombsite, reports of two additional bombs further complicated the response and resulted 
in a temporary evacuation of forces. The DELTA bomb squad cleared the H Block 
Building and the adjacent building to the south with the helicopter-landing pad on the 
roof. Clearing these buildings of potential explosives became an enormous and extremely 
cumbersome task for the collective bomb units. The buildings were cleared according to 
priority: H Block (Building 1) was cleared first, followed by (Building 2), followed by 
the helo pad building (Building 3), followed by the “Y” building (Building 4) and 
concluding with (Building 5). A fire on one of the top floors of the helo pad building 
ignited and the Oslo Fire Department promptly responded. However, before the fire 
department could gain access to the building, a front-end loader had to be utilized to clear 
the street of debris in order to create a path for the Fire Engine to drive on. As responding 
bomb squads cleared surrounding buildings of potential explosives and police responded 
to reports of a sniper in a church tower, victims requiring medical treatment were 
transported to the Youngstorget where casualties were able to be triaged and the police 
established their Emergency Operations Center (EOC). From here, a security perimeter 
was established around the Affected Area and approximately 1½ hours after the 
explosion police permitted limited press coverage of the bomb site in order to illuminate 
false or speculative reports generated by private citizens with mobile media devices.329    
The blast in downtown Oslo killed eight people and injured an additional 90. 
While the sub-optimal timing of the blast, which coincided with a lull in street traffic and 
many government employees on summer vacation, the explosion did cause extensive 
damage and focus all of the Law Enforcement attention on Oslo. This aspect of ABB’s 
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operation would allow him to move to his final objective, Utoya Island and would also 
further complicate police response to the events which would soon unfold on the island as 
all city assets were obligated to the bombsite.  
2.  Utoya Island Shooting 
  
Figure 43.   Satellite Imagery Depicting The Distance And Geographical Relationship 
Between Oslo and Utoya Island (Left), Aerial Photo Utoya Island (Right). 
Utoya Island is located approximately 42 kilometers northwest of the Oslo city 
center on the beautiful Tyriforden Lake. The island is owned by the Norwegian Labor 
Party (Arbeidernes Ungdomsfylking (AUF)) and is utilized as a summer retreat for 
children of Labor Party members. The beautiful and tranquil Tyriforden Lake and 
surrounding mountains contribute to the beauty and peacefulness of Utoya Island where 
Labor Party Youths have been able to enjoy memorable summer retreats for many years 
prior to the shooting. Before the events of July 22, 2011, Utoya Island was considered to 
be the “safest place on earth,” for its remote location and peaceful surroundings.330     
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Figure 44.   Utoya Island Main Facilities, Numbered for Identification331 
a. Terrorist Actions 
On July 22, 2011 ABB utilized a Mini Ruger .223 caliber rifle and a Glock 19 
9mm pistol to kill 69 innocent children and seriously injure an additional 60. ABB 
prepared for his attack on Utoya Island for nine years. In addition to the preparations he 
made for the Oslo bombing, he also purchased firearms, obtained counterfeit police 
badges, uniforms and credentials from the internet and acquired tactical equipment in 
order to facilitate his attack. The first phase of ABB’s plan for his attack on Utoya was 
the diversionary bombing of the Oslo Government District in the city center which 
resulted in concentrating Law Enforcement reaction in Oslo, as well as provided a cover 
for action for his impersonated police security check on Utoya.332 After detonating the 
VBIED in the Oslo city center, ABB traveled by vehicle to the ferry landing site for 
                                                 
331 Chuck Ergenbright, Utoya Island, Norway, case study research interview and Utoya Island debrief 
with DELTA Operators by COL(P) Robert Karmazin, MAJ Chuck Ergenbright, and MAJ Sean Hubbard, 
June 8, 2012. 
332 Swirt and Saltmarsh, “Oslo Suspect Cultivated Parallel Life to Disguise ‘Martyrdom Operation.’” 
 217 
Utoya Island and boarded the Utoya ferry wearing a police uniform with his weapons, 
additional ammunition, magazines, and tactical supplies in a large duffle bag. He was 
initially questioned by the ferry operator who asked for another form of identification 
before being allowed on the ferry. After providing sufficient credentials as a police 
officer; the ferry operator, who was the husband of Monica Bosei (also known as the, 
“Mother of Utoya”) assisted ABB with loading his equipment into the ferry. Once he 
arrived on the island, ABB was again assisted by the ferry operator with unloading his 
equipment and was introduced to Mrs. Bosei and an off-duty police officer (Trond 
Berntsen). At this time ABB explained that he had arrived to Utoya Island in order to 
inform the campers and staff located on the island of the events which had transpired in 
Oslo and to conduct a routine security check. Although it is believed that Mrs. Bosei and 
Mr. Berntsen were immediately skeptical of ABB’s non-standard uniform and 
credentials, the request for campers to meet at the main building was honored and 
disseminated throughout the island and children began to congregate in ABB’s vicinity.   
At 1653 hours, once he had gathered a large number of children in his 
vicinity, ABB fired his first shots from the trail intersection between the Main Building 
(Building 1), Conference Center (Building 2) and Barn (Building 3), killing Mrs. Bosei 
and Mr. Berntsen first before killing and wounding dozens more children in the first 
minute of his barrage.333 Although the exact route that ABB took is unclear and will not 
be officially divulged until his trial is complete, after inflicting his initial casualties in 
vicinity of the Conference Center, trails ABB utilized and the locations where he inflicted 
casualties have been confirmed by this research. From the trail intersection between 
buildings 1, 2, and 3, ABB proceeded up the hill located behind the barn towards the 
Cafeteria (Building 6). When he arrived at the entrance to the cafeteria, ABB was fearful 
that he could be overwhelmed by the campers if they attempted to swarm him. In order to 
mitigate this, he transitioned to his pistol (Glock 19) for better mobility prior to entering 
through the front door. Once inside, ABB went from room to room down the hallway and 
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finally into the main eating hall killing innocent children ruthlessly and without remorse 
throughout the entire building. In many instances, children were executed as they clung 
to each other for security and comfort.  
 
Figure 45.   Location Where ABB Fired His First Shots and Killed the Initial Utoya 
Island Victims334   
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Figure 46.   Front Entrance to the Cafeteria Where ABB Entered and Killed Labor 
Party Children As They Clung to Each Other335   
From the cafeteria, AAB is believed to have proceeded to the Campsite 
where he continued to kill and injure innocent victims. The campsite is a large open field 
which afforded the victims located in this area no cover or concealment and created easy 
targets. One of these victims was shot in the head by ABB with his rifle. Although his 
injuries were very serious, this young man survived until members of DELTA arrived 
and were able to treat and MEDEVAC him to the nearest hospital. Unfortunately, despite 
great resiliency on behalf of the victim and great courage on behalf of the DELTA 
officers, this young man died in the company of his family shortly after arriving to the 
hospital. From the campsite, it is believed that ABB continued through the extensive trail 
network of Utoya Island to the Bath House (Building 5), proceeding down Lover’s Path 
to the Pump House (Building 7) killing victims and inflicting injuries along his way to 
include executing a group of children who were hiding behind the Pump House. From the 
Pump House, ABB did not follow a systematic route around the island. However, we 
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have confirmed that he continued along the waterfront trail connecting the Pump House 
to the Camp Site where he shot victims as they appeared to him to include another large 
group of children huddled together along this trail. This particular trail is extremely 
narrow with heavy vegetation on the southern side and steep 50–100 foot cliffs on the 
northern side that lead directly into the shallow water below. As ABB continued along 
this trail, many children attempted to negotiate the steep cliffs in order to avoid a deadly 
confrontation with ABB. Some were stranded on the rock face when DELTA arrived; one 
broke his neck and died instantly attempting to dive directly into the water below and 
others were shot by ABB as they attempted to hide or flee. ABB continued along the 
many trails on Utoya Island inflicting further casualties as he proceeded.  
During ABB’s attack, victims on the island did everything they could to 
survive. Many of the victims attempted to play dead as Breivik moved passed them, only 
to be shot and killed later as he walked by and placed what he thought were second shots 
into their heads. The median age of victims on Utoya Island was 18. Although many 
victims attempted to escape by jumping into the water in order to swim away, ABB 
utilized this circumstance as a means to kill more students as they were slowed down by 
the cold water and unable to take cover. A scene from one of the circling news 
helicopters shows ABB on the shore taking aim at a victim that appears to be pleading for 
their life while treading water 20 feet from the shooter. ABB did spare at least two 
victims during the incident. An 11-year-old boy stood up against ABB and exclaimed that 
he was too young to die after the boy had witnessed the murder of his own father. 
Another victim spared by ABB was a 22-year-old male who reportedly begged for his life 
and was bypassed.336  
Again, although his exact route is not confirmed at this time, we do know 
that he was recorded by news helicopters killing and wounding victims as they attempted 
to swim to safety and begged for their lives along the east shore. This site is also in close  
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proximity to the location where ABB was apprehended. In total, ABB continued his 
attack on the innocent children of Utoya Island for one hour and two minutes before he 
surrendered to DELTA officers at 1832.       
 
 
Figure 47.   Summary of Most Significant Casualty Locations Inflicted by ABB on 
Utoya Island.337  
b. Emergency Response 
Initial 112 calls from Utoya, the equivalent of the U.S. 911 emergency 
number, came from campers that reported shooting on the other side of the island. 
Although the Joint Operations Center (JOC) handles an average volume of 12,000 calls 
per month, when the initial 112 calls from Utoya were received, every available resource 
within the JOC was obligated. Furthermore, the Oslo based JOC received these calls 
because children on Utoya were calling their parents who lived in Oslo and relayed the 
emergency messages to the Oslo JOC. Given the extreme circumstances of the Oslo 
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bombing and the fact that Utoya Island is located in the Buskerud district, which is two 
districts removed from standard Oslo police responsibility, these initial calls were 
redirected to the Buskerud emergency dispatch center. After confirming initial reports 
with the Buskerud emergency dispatch center and gaining further awareness of the scope 
of the problem on Utoya Island, the Oslo JOC dispatched DELTA at 1738.338 
One of these emergency calls came from the daughter of the Police Directorate’s 
liaison to DELTA. Unable to connect with the overloaded 112 emergency dispatch 
centers in Oslo and Buskerud, this brave young lady called her father who, in turn, 
provided DELTA with their first alert and authority to respond to the Utoya Island 
shooting at 1728. Without hesitation or official dispatch from the Oslo JOC, the 21 
DELTA operators who were currently conducting clearing as well as search and rescue 
operations throughout the Oslo Government Center, reorganized and began movement by 
vehicle towards Utoya Island at 1730. The official 112 dispatch of DELTA forces to 
Utoya was given eight minutes later and was relayed to the already enroute convoy of 
DELTA operators. Although DELTA had already requested helicopter lift support for the 
Oslo bombing and again in support of their response to the Utoya shooting, this request 
was delayed both times due to unavailability of air assets as a result of summer leave 
schedules. However, the first rotary wing assets arrived on station at the Storøya HLZ at 
approximately 1910. Another important fact regarding the RAF rotary wing support for 
this operation is that current police airframes do not have the necessary lift capacity to 
transport more than two officers per lift.  
Contrary to many initial media reports, Utoya Island was not the summer retreat 
for most Norwegian youths. Instead the summer activities hosted on Utoya were reserved 
only for the Labor Party’s Youth Organization. As a result, the exact location of this tiny 
island was unknown to responding DELTA officers. Without an initial dispatch from the 
Oslo JOC, DELTA’s initial movement was guided by a general consensus of 
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approximate location of the island which was later confirmed by GPS directions retrieved 
by DELTA operators on their personal phones. These directions were later confirmed by 
the JOC. After driving the exact route which DELTA operators utilized in response to the 
Utoya dispatch, the response time achieved by these operators is truly amazing and 
deserving of special recognition. With helicopter lift support unavailable, the decisive 
and correct decision to initiate response via vehicular movement initiated a complex route 
out of the congested city center eventually traveling on divided highway E18 and later 
merging onto divided highway E16 which later becomes a two lane winding road along 
the Tyriforden Lake. The standard travel time for this route is 45 minutes. In a final effort 
to reduce travel Response Time and increase effectiveness on the objective, DELTA 
operators submitted coordinates for an enroute HLZ to the JOC in order to facilitate an 
air infil, but this final request was denied as well due to unavailability of aircraft.  
Continuing their movement by vehicle, this response was further 
complicated by the loss of digital communication at the Buskerud / Akershus district 
boundary line. At this point all police communication transitioned from digital to analog 
infrastructure that presented significant degradation to DELTA’s ability to communicate 
among each other, with adjacent units and with higher headquarters. As a result, DELTA 
responders were unable to notify the Buskerud Police Department of their response 
progress or to confirm a meeting place for transition to boat operations. In fact, adjacent 
unit coordination with the Buskerud Police Department was made so difficult with the 
poor communication infrastructure that one of the DELTA officers who lived in the 
Buskerud district had to call his wife on his cell phone in order to have her relay a 
message to the local police to call the DELTA responders in order to affect link-up. 
However, despite all of the challenges encountered by the DELTA responders 
complicated by traffic congestion associated with the Oslo bombing and heavy rain 
which increased as the responders neared Utoya, these skillful responders reached the 
Utoya ferry landing site at 1800. With consideration to the high traffic volume and 
deteriorating weather conditions, the fact that DELTA responders reached the Utoya 
ferry-landing site within 30 minutes of departing Oslo is truly amazing. However, as a 
result of DELTA’s inability to communicate with the Buskerud Police Department; 
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confusion ensued. As DELTA responders arrived at the Utoya ferry-landing site an 
impressive 30 minutes after departure from Oslo, they learned that the Buskerud Police 
Department had established the actual meeting site 3.9 kilometers further north at the 
base of the Storoya Bridge. Furthermore, the Utoya ferry was unavailable because it had 
been utilized by escaping victims from the island. These circumstances required the 
convoy of DELTA responders to leave the Utoya ferry landing site located only 680 
meters east of Utoya Island and within audible distance of the ongoing attack in progress 
and travel an additional 3.9 kilometers north to the actual meeting place.  
 
 
Figure 48.   Route Taken by DELTA Responders from the Oslo City Center to Utoya 
Island with Enroute and Emergency HLZs Identified339  
After arriving at the actual meeting place, DELTA responders affected 
link-up with the Buskerud Police Boat Unit, loaded equipment and personnel into the 
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boat, designated a nearby open field as an emergency HLZ and initiated boat movement 
towards Utoya Island. However, at the approximate halfway point between the departure 
site and Utoya Island, water began to mix with the fuel in the boat’s engine causing it 
stall. This unfortunate circumstance most likely resulted from the heavy load of 
equipment and personnel coupled with the angle at which the boat was required to idle 
while the first team of DELTA responders boarded due to the shallow and unimproved 
boat ramp. Soon after the first boat stalled, two additional civilian boats were acquired by 
the two remaining teams of DELTA responders. These teams moved directly to the 
stranded boat, cross-loaded personnel and equipment between the other two boats and 
continued movement towards Utoya Island. As the two teams of DELTA responders 
neared the island, unsure about obstacles and water depths along the shoreline, the 
response team leader made the decision to disembark at the ferry-landing site instead of a 
non-standard location.340  
Initial reports given to DELTA as they departed Oslo indicated that the threat they 
faced on Utoya Island consisted of three to five heavily armed shooters, wearing police 
uniforms, with scoped rifles actively engaged in continuous shooting. For this reason, the 
DELTA assault leader ordered his two teams to envelope the island in two different 
directions. The first DELTA team arrived by boat at the Utoya Island ferry landing site at 
1826 followed by the second DELTA team arriving by a separate boat two minutes later. 
At approximately 1831 twenty one total DELTA officers were assembled on Utoya 
Island and initiated their assault. Team 1 responded to initial victim reports stating that 
the shooter was located on the north end of the island. In accordance with this 
information, Team 1 initiated their movement north from the ferry landing site. As Team 
2 approached the ferry landing site, team members saw victims falling into the water and 
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movement south along an unimproved trail along the eastern border of the field in front 
of the Main Building. Team 2 continued their movement down the improved trail towards 
the School House.341  
As Team 2 approached the School House, 48 teenagers were huddled 
together inside, remaining quiet and calm. For this reason, it was not assumed that a 
shooter was located inside of the School House, so as Team 2 secured the exterior of the 
building and prepared for entry, the decision was made not to utilize diversionary 
devices. Prior to entering the School House, the team member located on the right side of 
the building noticed the distinctive white and black checkered pattern of the reflective 
tape worn at the mid-calf level on the legs of all Norwegian police uniforms in a cluster 
of trees located approximately 35 meters southeast of the School House. This individual 
alerted his assault team leader and the decision was made to maneuver on this location. 
At this time, ABB jumped to his feet and fled down the trail, discarded his rifle and 
returned towards the DELTA assault team with his arms in the air stating that he wished 
to surrender. As ABB appeared to the DELTA Team 2 members, he was wearing a 
tactical vest, which initially appeared to be a suicide bomb vest as all pockets were full 
and white wires were protruding out of the vest towards his collar. These circumstances 
combined with knowledge of the earlier Oslo bombing and initial reports stating that the 
attackers on Utoya Island were in possession of explosives validated the assaulters’ initial 
suspicions that ABB was wearing a suicide vest. ABB was had his Glock 19 pistol 
holstered in a tactical thigh holder with the bolt slide-locked to the rear. As DELTA 
officers began to maneuver on ABB, he continued to move closer to the officers despite 
their demands for him to submit and assume a supine position. Just prior to firing on 
ABB, the DELTA EOD officer located on his flank identified that the wires were IPOD  
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wires and alerted the other team members that ABB was not wearing a suicide vest. At 
this point, DELTA officers moved into ABB’s position and subdued him at 1832, an hour 
and two minutes after initiating movement from Oslo.  
After detaining ABB, DELTA officers moved him to the main building on 
Utoya and conducted a 2½-hour tactical interrogation. During this interrogation, ABB 
further complicated the response by claiming that he was one of three terrorist cells. ABB 
stated that the first cell was located in Oslo and was responsible for the bombing.  The 
second cell was responsible for the attack on Utoya Island and the third cell was 
responsible for a “future attack that would be hell on police.” At this point, the DELTA 
command team stated that ABB was willing to give more information in exchange for an 
expedient arrest and movement to jail. As a result of this information and the complexity 
of this response, the island was not rendered safe until the next morning and was the 
result of a thorough sweep utilizing search and rescue personnel and assets combined 
with thermal imaging. As the deliberate clearing of Utoya Island was being conducted, 
DELTA officers raided ABB’s farm (Valstad Farm-Asta) located just south of Rena, 
Norway. Additionally, Delta officers also raided ABB’s mother’s residence at Hoffsveien 
18, Oslo, Norway.     
As the events of July 22, 2011 came to an end and the multiple operations 
conducted by the Norwegian Counter Terrorist Unit (DELTA) concluded in the early 
morning hours of July 23, 2011; the casualties were counted and damages were assessed 
from this terrible event. The resulting damage on the island was catastrophic for the 
Norwegian people. ABB had killed 69 campers, the youngest having just turned 14 and 
during his hour and a half rampage, he wounded another 60 more. ABB was ordered to 
solitary confinement by the Ministry of Justice and initially not allowed to have an open 
trial where media would be involved. ABB immediately requested to make a statement as 
a way to continue the message that he wanted to convey with his acts of terrorism. In a 
surprise move by the Norwegian government, he was denied access to anyone other than 
his lawyer and after four weeks of solitary confinement, he was ordered into another four 
weeks of solitary confinement. The Norwegian justice system drew harsh criticism 
regarding the treatment of ABB and many in the national media, as well as Norwegian 
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citizens felt that the conditions of his detainment and trial proceedings were too harsh and 
not in keeping with provisions of the Norwegian Justice System. The Prime Minister, 
despite having been a target of the attack, is quoted as saying, “the proper answer to 
violence is more democracy, more openness, but not naivety.”342 As a result of these 
criticisms and sentiments shared by members of the Norwegian government, ABB’s trial 
is now very public and ABB is treated very humanely as he responds to questions and 
converses with judges in his tailored suit and unshackled hands as he appears much more 
like a businessman then a murderer of 77 innocent people. After attending the trial and 
witnessing ABB’s testimony that is given in a courtroom specifically built to house this 
trial which is secured by some of the very officers that subdued him on Utoya Island and 
conducted search and rescue operations in Oslo, it is apparent that this situation is only 
advantageous to ABB. This current configuration of courtroom proceedings provides a 
world stage on which ABB is able to promote his ideology and encourage more violence.  
F. NORWEGIAN POLICE AFTER ACTION ANALYSIS 
The tragedy that occurred in Norway on July 22, 2011 affected every Norwegian 
citizen and generated an international outcry of sympathy. However, these events also 
generated tough questions, critical reviews, demands for emergency response 
improvements. In the analysis of this event conducted as part of the research, the National 
Counter Terrorism Unit (DELTA) believes that all police responders acted accordingly 
and as quickly as they could have. In this particular instance, the bombing that was 
intended as a diversion, actually decreased DELTA Response Time by placing 22 
members of the Counter Terrorist unit in full kit and forward deployed to the bombsite. 
Without this circumstance, the DELTA response to Utoya may have been further 
delayed. 
The DELTA initial evaluation contains recommendations to emplace dedicated 
helicopter lift assets within the DELTA compound and staff the crews in order 
sufficiently support 24-hour standby operations. Although call out time may have still 
been delayed; lift assets would have negated the need for procurement of civilian boats 
                                                 
342 Stoltenberg, “Address by Prime Minister in Oslo Cathedral.” 
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and reduced the risk of infiltration but utilizing a flyover and picking a landing zone or 
area for a fast rope insertion. In addition to this infiltration method, DELTA recommends 
a more robust boat patrol capability around populated islands or harbors.  Just because 
the shooting took place on an island does not mean it will take place in the same location 
again. Police forces must be prepared to react to any area in Norway and must have the 
means to simply get them there.343 
In addition to infiltration methods, DELTA recommends redundant 
communications and dispatch systems. Due to the blast at the Oslo Government Center, 
the central server was disabled and 112 calls were delayed or prevented from getting to 
the JOC. This, in turn, delayed critical dispatch information to all emergency responders. 
Although they do not have the technical expertise to recommend a new system, they 
recommend a backup server or a relocation of the current server to a more secure 
location.344 Lastly, DELTA recommends an upgrade to existing map data devices for 
first responders.  Many of the officers had iPhones or equivalent devices but did not have 
map datum uploaded.  They believe with this upgrade or capability housed in a different 
device, the confusion in finding Utoya Island would have been eliminated and they could 
have reduced their response time further.345   
The remainder of the DELTA actions and the remaining units deployed to support 
the bombing and shooting were in keeping with the SOPs already established by the 
Norway Police. Prior to both of these incidents, the Norwegian Police Directorate ordered 
a review of the active shooter program. They were tasked in 2006 to prepare the police 
services for such an attack and they made the police academy the main proponent for the 
training and evaluation. Active shooter techniques and response were added to Part II of 
the Police Emergency Preparedness System and all police forces went through training in 
2009.346  The entire training for active shooter response was standardized the same year  
 
                                                 
343 Interview with Anders Snortheimsmoen, Police Headquarters, Oslo, Norway, June 7, 2012.  
344 Interview with Snortheimsmoen. 
345 Interview with Snortheimsmoen. 
346 Interview with Snortheimsmoen. 
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at the national police academy where all new recruits receive the training. In 2013, a 
national level active shooter exercise will commence that updates all districts on response 
and preparedness to these scenarios and will draw upon the events of 22 July.347 
G. RECOMMENDATIONS 
Although DELTA leadership stated that, given the particular circumstances and 
constraints of July 22, 2011, they do not believe that they could have reacted differently 
to the situation, and the authors agree with this assertion; a holistic recommendation 
including the proposed VIM system would greatly enhance emergency response to future 
similar incidents. As part of the holistic recommendation for Norway, certain immutable 
realities, as demonstrated in this case, as well as the preceding case studies must be 
addressed. First, these acts of extreme violence cannot be prevented despite a country’s 
best effort to do so. Second, there will always be a delay between initiation of violence 
and Law Enforcement response. Third, in the time separating the first and last shots fired 
in Active Shooter incidents, the only individuals who have the capacity to react are the 
victims and potential victims. The fourth and final immutable reality of incidents, such as 
this is that with current security configurations within Norway, the only individual who is 
in control during an Active Shooter incident is the shooter himself. In an effort to counter 
this evolving threat, we feel that the following recommendation of a holistic approach 
including implementation of the proposed VIM system would greatly reduce Norway’s 
vulnerability to threats, such as this. Although we do not postulate that we can prevent 
these incidents or to reduce the Active Shooter problem to a zero Rate of Kill, the 
accumulated research and analysis conducted as part of this project has confirmed that a 
holistic approach incorporating preventative measures and improvements in Law 
Enforcement response coupled with a Victim Initiated Mitigation system could 
drastically improve Response Time and decrease Incident Duration. Ultimately, these 
improvements, if implemented correctly, will reduce the Rate of Kill for potential Active 
Shooter incidents in Norway.  
                                                 
347 Interview with Snortheimsmoen. 
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The first component of a holistic approach recommendation for Norwegian 
preparedness for future attacks similar to the events of July 22, 2011, includes prevention 
and preemption efforts capable of providing proper mental health care and attention 
required to identify and mitigate violent tendencies before they manifest into violent 
actions. Additionally, these efforts must also inform and integrate with a Threat 
Assessment infrastructure that is capable of evaluating threats across the threat 
assessment continuum from inquiry to investigation.348  The second component of a 
holistic approach recommendation for Norwegian preparedness is a continued focus on 
maintaining a well-trained police force through standardized Active Shooter response 
training and common policies. Additionally, it is important to note that the authors 
believe that arming the Norwegian Police is a priority. It is imperative to a first 
responding law enforcement officer to have a weapon immediately available at the time 
of the incident. Not having a weapon only increases the Response Time at the most 
crucial time. In addition, a police officer who finds himself on the scene of an Active 
Shooter situation without a weapon is reduced to another potential victim rather than a 
trusted law enforcement officer. The authors of this research also recognize the cultural 
sensitivity to this recommendation and were are truly humbled to see how the Norwegian 
society operates without weapons in contrast to so many other countries around the 
world, and Norway should continue to be commended in its efforts to lower crime and 
violence in its current capacity. 
The third component to a holistic approach recommendation for Norwegian 
preparedness is standardization for Active Shooter response through Victim Initiated 
Mitigation. With consideration to the preceding components of the holistic approach 
recommendation for mitigating the effects of Active Shooters in Norwegian IHEs and 
HOFs, the crucial missing component to existing capabilities is a Victim Initiated 
Mitigation (VIM) system that incorporates automated control measures and 
complementary response protocols. After a comprehensive review of the events of July 
22, 2011, the only realistic means of reducing Response Time and Incident Duration for 
                                                 
348 United States Secret Service, United States Department of Education, Threat Assessment in 
Schools: A Guide to Managing Threatening Situations and to Creating Safe School Climates, 12. 
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Active Shooter incidents within Norway is the application of facility upgrades which are 
able to return some advantages to victims and potential victims in these situations.  
A Victim Initiated Mitigation system consisting of five core components as 
presented in the recommendation portion of this thesis would be capable of immediately 
notifying Law Enforcement while simultaneously containing the threat utilizing facility 
lockdown and mass alert protocols. With a VIM system, upon threat identification by any 
member of the IHE or HOF population; students, staff, faculty or HOF employees or 
patrons are able to initiate the emergency call via the closest emergency call box. This 
action would result in two simultaneous actions. First, the Threat Area would be 
immediately locked down as the activation of the emergency call box would deactivate 
all electromagnetic door locks located on all doors within the building. This would result 
in all doors closing to locked position. As each door is equipped with a breaker bar or 
equivalent handle, a locked door would entail locked from ingress and not egress. This 
feature would prevent capture of potential victims in disadvantageous positions and 
afford them the freedom to make decisions that are most advantageous to their own 
survival.  
The second simultaneous action that occurs upon activation of an emergency call 
box is establishment of two-way communications with the JOC. After the call has been 
received by the JOC and two-way communications have been established with the 
activated emergency call box, the threat can be verified by the JOC. At this stage of the 
VIM system concept flow, the Threat Area has been locked down and through the 
process of separating potential victims from the shooter, the threat has been effectively 
contained. After the JOC has validated the threat, through a series of pre-programmed 
and planned alerts, the JOC is able to dispatch Law Enforcement and all other relevant 
emergency response personnel. Additionally, in a simultaneous manner, all Affected 
Personnel within the IHE or HOF are able to receive pre-programmed and approved 
notifications via any networked media device (i.e., cell phone, and any networked TV, 
computer, tablet, and other video display systems). Furthermore, at this point in the VIM 
system concept flow, the JOC has the capability to lock down adjacent buildings within 
the Affected Area either selectively, by zone.  
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With facility lock down complete, First Responders are able to respond more 
rapidly and to a more controlled environment. For instance, after facility lock down has 
been initiated, if an Active Shooter exits the room he was in, he will not be able to re-
enter that room or enter any other rooms. Therefore, First Responders are able to know 
prior to entering the facility that the shooter is either in the Target Area identified by the 
JOC, or in a hallway. As a result, valuable time is not wasted clearing rooms that only 
contain potential victims. Additionally, population control measures, such as instructional 
messages can be delivered to all persons within the Affected Area in order to better 
facilitate the Law Enforcement response. First Responders are able to gain access to the 
Threat Zone via individually issued key fobs that unlock the door associated with each 
prox reader. If needed, First Responders will also be able to employ their handheld 
mobile situational awareness devices in order to gain more situational awareness inside of 
the Target Area prior to entering the room and neutralizing the threat, or, if the incident 
transitions to a hostage or barricade scenario, they will have the capability to initiate and 
maintain two way communication with the Target Area and the shooter. 
H. CONCLUSION 
The culture of the Norwegian people and the fact that the Norwegian society 
enjoys such a simple and stable balance make the Norway shooting a much more difficult 
incident to cope with. Additionally, the whole of the Norwegian Police Directorate and 
National Counter Terrorism Unit are extremely well prepared to deal with Active Shooter 
threats. However, as demonstrated by this case, as well as all of the preceding case 
studies included as part of this research, there will always be a separation of time between 
the first and last shots fired in all Active Shooter incidents despite Law Enforcement 
capacity to respond. Therefore, flexible and adaptive recommendations focused on 
enabling Victim Initiated Mitigation of these types of threats is the only way Norway will 
be able to effectively mitigate and defeat future lone wolf attackers who desire to commit 
acts of Solo Terrorism. 
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APPENDIX E. VIRGINIA TECH SUPPORTING FACTS 
A. INCIDENT TIMELINE 
The following timeline of events is abbreviated from the full timeline included in 
the Virginia Tech Review Panel Report to Governor Kaine. This timeline highlights the 
events immediately leading up to the incident and includes a detailed summary of events 
occurring during the shooting. The information included in this timeline was gained 
through numerous interviews, written sources and police reports that were compiled and 
analyzed by the Virginia Tech Review Panel.  
 
Timeline of Events as Described by the Virginia Tech Review Panel Report  
Date (2007) / 
Time Event 
February 2 Cho orders a .22 caliber Walther P22 handgun online from TGSCOM, Inc. 
February 9 Cho picks up the handgun from J-N-D Pawnbrokers in Blacksburg, across the street from the university. 
March 12 
Cho rents a van from Enterprise Rent-A-Car at the Roanoke Regional Airport, 
which he keeps for almost a month. (Cho videotapes some of his subsequently 
released diatribe in the van.) 
March 13 
Cho purchases a 9mm Glock 19 handgun and a box of 50 9mm full metal jacket 
practice rounds at Roanoke Firearms. He has waited the 30 days between gun 
purchases as required in Virginia. The store initiates the required background 
check by police, who find no record of mental health issues. 
March 22 
Cho goes to PSS Range and Training, an indoor pistol range, and spends an hour 
practicing. 
Cho purchases two 10-round magazines for the Walther P22 on eBay. 
March 23 Cho purchases three additional 10-round magazines from another eBay seller. 
March 31 
Cho purchases additional ammunition magazines, ammunition, and a hunting 
knife from Wal-Mart and Dick’s Sporting Goods. He buys chains from Home 
Depot. 
April 7 Cho purchases more ammunition. 
April 8 Cho spends the night at the Hampton Inn in Christiansburg, Virginia, videotaping segments for his manifesto-like diatribe. He also buys more ammunition. 
April 13 
Bomb threats are made to Torgersen, Durham, and Whittemore halls, in the form 
of an anonymous note. The threats are assessed by the VTPD; and the buildings 
evacuated. There is no lockdown or cancellation of classes elsewhere on campus. 
In retrospect, no evidence is found linking these threats to Cho’s later bomb threat 
in Norris Hall, based in part on handwriting analysis. 
April 14 
An Asian male wearing a hooded garment is seen by a faculty member in Norris 
Hall. She later (after April 16) tells police that one of her students had told her the 
doors were chained. This may have been Cho practicing. Cho buys yet more 
ammunition. 
April 15 
Cho places his weekly Sunday night call to his family in Fairfax County. They 
report the conversation as normal and that Cho said nothing that caused them 
concern. 
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Timeline of Events as Described by the Virginia Tech Review Panel Report  
Date (2007) / 
Time Event 
April 16  
0500 In Cho’s suite in Harper Hall (2121), one of Cho’s suitemates notices Cho is awake and at his computer.  
0530 
One of Cho’s other suitemates notices Cho clad in boxer shorts and a shirt 
brushing his teeth and applying acne cream. Cho returns from the bathroom, gets 
dressed, and leaves. 
0647 Cho is spotted by a student waiting outside the West Ambler Johnston (WAJ) residential hall entrance, where he has his mailbox. 
0702 Emily Hilscher enters the dorm after being dropped off by her boyfriend (the time is based on her swipe card record). 
0715 
Cho shoots Hilscher in her room (4040) at WAJ. He also shoots Ryan Christopher 
Clark, an RA. Clark, it is thought,most likely came to investigate noises in 
Hilscher’s room, which is next door to his. Both of the victims’ wounds prove to 
be fatal. 
0717 Cho’s access card is swiped at Harper Hall (his residence hall). He goes to his room to change out of his bloody clothes.  
0720 
The VTPD receives a call on their administrative telephone line advising that a 
female student in room 4040 of WAJ had possibly fallen from her loft bed. The 
caller was given this information by another WAJ resident near room 4040 who 
heard the noise. 
0721 
The VTPD dispatcher notifies the Virginia Tech Rescue Squad that a female 
student had possibly fallen from her loft bed in WAJ. A VTPD officer is 
dispatched to room 4040 at WAJ to accompany the Virginia Tech Rescue Squad, 
which is also dispatched (per standard protocol). 
0724 The VTPD officer arrives at WAJ room 4040, finds two people shot inside the room, and immediately requests additional VTPD resources. 
0725 Cho accesses his university e-mail account (based on computer records). He erases his files and the account. 
0726 VT Rescue Squad 3 arrives on scene outside WAJ. 
0729 VT Rescue Squad 3 arrives at room 4040. 
0730 
Additional VTPD officers begin arriving at room 4040. They secure the crime 
scene and start preliminary investigation. Interviews of residents find them unable 
to provide a suspect description. No one on Hilscher’s floor in WAJ saw anyone 
leave room 4040 after the initial noise was heard. 
0730–0800 
A friend of Hilscher’s arrives at WAJ to join her for the walk to chemistry class. 
She is questioned by detectives and explains that on Monday mornings Hilscher’s 
boyfriend would drop her off and go back to Radford University where he was a 
student. She tells police that the boyfriend is an avid gun user and practices using 
the gun. This leads the police to seek him as a “person of interest” and potential 
suspect. 
0740 VTPD Chief Flinchum is notified by phone of the WAJ shootings. 
0751 Chief Flinchum contacts the Blacksburg Police Department (BPD) and requests a BPD evidence technician and BPD detective to assist with the investigation. 
0757 Chief Flinchum notifies the Virginia Tech Office of the Executive Vice President of the shootings. This triggers a meeting of the university’s Policy Group. 
0800 
Classes begin. Chief Flinchum arrives at WAJ and finds VTPD and BPD 
detectives on the scene and the investigation underway. A local special agent of 
the state police has been contacted and is responding to the scene. 
0810–0925 Chief Flinchum provides updated information via phone to the Virginia Tech Policy Group regarding progress made in the investigation. He informs them of a 
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Timeline of Events as Described by the Virginia Tech Review Panel Report  
Date (2007) / 
Time Event 
possible suspect, who is probably off campus. 
0811 BPD Chief Kim Crannis arrives on scene. 
0813 Chief Flinchum requests additional VTPD and BPD officers to assist with securing WAJ entrances and with the investigation. 
0815 
Chief Flinchum requests the VTPD Emergency Response Team (ERT) to respond 
to the scene and then to stage in Blacksburg in the event an arrest is needed or a 
search warrant is to be executed. 
0816–0924 
Officers search for Hilscher’s boyfriend. His vehicle is not found in campus 
parking lots, and officers become more confident that he has left the campus. 
VTPD and BPD officers are sent to his home; he is not found. A BOLO (be on 
the lookout) report is issued to BPD and the Montgomery County Sheriff’s Office 
for his vehicle. Meanwhile, officers continue canvassing WAJ for possible 
witnesses. VTPD, BPD, and the Virginia State Police (VSP) continue processing 
the room 4040 crime scene and gathering evidence. Investigators secure 
identification of the victims. 
0819 Chief Crannis requests BPD ERT to respond for the same reason as the VTPD ERT. 
0820 A person fitting Cho’s description is seen near the Duck Pond on campus. 
0825 The Virginia Tech Policy Group meets to plan on how to notify students of the homicides. 
0852 Blacksburg public schools lock their outer doors upon hearing of the incident at WAJ from their security chief, who had heard of the incident on police radio. 
0900 The Policy Group is briefed on the latest events in the ongoing dormitory homicide investigation by the VTPD.  
0901 
Cho mails a package from the Blacksburg post office to NBC News in New York 
that contains pictures of himself holding weapons, an 1,800-word rambling 
diatribe, and video clips in which he expresses rage, resentment, and a desire to 
get even with oppressors. He alludes to a coming massacre. Cho prepared this 
material in the previous weeks. The videos are a performance of the enclosed 
writings. Cho also mails a letter to the English Department attacking Professor 
Carl Bean, with whom he previously argued. 
0905 Classes begin for the second period in Norris Hall. 
0915 Both police ERTs are staged at the BPD in anticipation of executing search warrants or making an arrest. 
0915–0930 
Cho is seen outside and then inside Norris Hall, an engineering building. He 
chains the doors shut on the three main entrances from the inside. No one reports 
seeing him do this. 
0924 
A Montgomery County, Virginia deputy sheriff initiates a traffic stop of Hilsher’s 
boyfriend off campus in his pickup truck. Detectives are sent to assist with the 
questioning. 
0925 A VTPD police captain joins the Virginia Tech Policy Group as police liaison and provides updates as information becomes available. 
0926 Virginia Tech administration sends e-mail to campus staff, faculty, and students informing them of the dormitory shooting. 
0931–0948 A VSP trooper arrives at the traffic stop of the boyfriend and helps question him. A gunpowder residue field test is performed on him and the result is negative. 
0940–0951 
Cho begins shooting in room 206 in Norris Hall, where a graduate engineering 
class in Advanced Hydrology is underway. Cho kills Professor G. V. Loganathan 
and other students in the class, killing 9 and wounding 3 of the 13 students. Cho 
goes across the hall from room 206 and enters room 207, an Elementary German 
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Timeline of Events as Described by the Virginia Tech Review Panel Report  
Date (2007) / 
Time Event 
class. He shoots teacher Christopher James 
Bishop, then students near the front of the classroom and starts down the aisle 
shooting others. Cho leaves the classroom to go back into the hall. Students in 
room 205, attending Haiyan Cheng’s class on Issues in Scientific Computing, 
hear Cho’s gunshots. (Cheng was a graduate assistant substituting for the 
professor that day.) The students barricade the door and prevent Cho’s entry 
despite his firing at them through the door. Meanwhile, in room 211 Madame 
Jocelyne Couture-Nowak is teaching French. She and her class hear the shots, and 
she asks student Colin Goddard to call 9-1-1. A student tells the teacher to put the 
desk in front of the door, which is done but it is nudged open by Cho. Cho walks 
down the rows of desks shooting people. Goddard is shot in the leg. Student 
Emily Haas picks up the cell phone 
Goddard dropped. She begs the police to hurry. Cho hears Haas and shoots her, 
grazing her twice in the head. She falls and plays dead, though keeping the phone 
cradled under her head and the line open. Cho says nothing on entering the room 
or during the shooting. (Three students who pretend to be dead survive.) 
0941 
A BPD dispatcher receives a call regarding the shooting in Norris Hall. The 
dispatcher initially has difficulty understanding the location of the shooting. Once 
identified as being on campus, the call is transferred to VTPD. 
0942 The first 9-1-1 call reporting shots fired reaches the VTPD. A message is sent to all county EMS units to staff and respond. 
0945 
The first police officers arrive at Norris Hall, a three-minute response time from 
their receipt of the call. Hearing shots, they pause briefly to check whether they 
are being fired upon, then rush to one entrance, then another, and then a third but 
find all three chained shut. Attempts to shoot open the locks fail. 
The police inform the administration that there has been another shooting. 
University President Steger hears sounds like gunshots, and sees police running 
toward Norris Hall. 
Back in room 207, the German class, two uninjured students and two injured 
students go to the door and hold it shut with their feet and hands, keeping their 
bodies away. Within 2 minutes, Cho returns. He beats on the door and opens it an 
inch and fires shots around the door handle, then gives up trying to get in. Cho 
returns to room 211, the French class, and goes up one aisle and down another, 
shooting people again. Cho shoots Goddard again twice more. A janitor sees Cho 
in the hall on the second floor loading his gun; he flees downstairs. 
Cho tries to enter room 204 where engineering professor Liviu Librescu is 
teaching Mechanics. Librescu braces his body against the door yelling for 
students to head for the 
window. He is shot through the door. Students push out screens and jump or drop 
to grass or bushes below the window. Ten students escape this way. The next two 
students trying to escape are shot. Cho returns again to room 206 and shoots more 
students. 
0950 
Using a shotgun, police shoot open the ordinary key lock of a fourth entrance to 
Norris Hall that goes to a machine shop and that could not be chained. The police 
hear gunshots as they enter the building. They immediately follow the sounds to 
the second floor. Triage and rescue of victims begin. A second e-mail is sent by 
the administration to all Virginia Tech e-mail addresses announcing that “A 
gunman is loose on campus. Stay in buildings until further 
notice. Stay away from all windows.” Four loudspeakers out of doors on poles 
broadcast a similar message. Virginia Tech and Blacksburg police ERTs arrive at 
Norris Hall, including one paramedic with each team. 
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Date (2007) / 
Time Event 
0951 
Cho shoots himself in the head just as police reach the second floor. Investigators 
believe that the police shotgun blast alerted Cho to the arrival of the police. Cho’s 
shooting spree in Norris Hall lasted about 11 minutes. He fired 174 rounds, and 
killed 30 people in Norris Hall plus himself, and wounded 17. While the 
shootings at Norris Hall were occurring, police were taking the following actions 
in connection with the shootings at 
WAJ: 
• Officers canvass WAJ for possible witnesses. 
• VTPD, BPD, and VSP process the room 4040 crime scene and gather 
evidence. 
• Officers search interior and exterior waste containers and surrounding areas 
near WAJ for evidence. 
• Officers canvass rescue squad personnel for additional evidence or 
information. 
• Police officials assign the additional responding law enforcement personnel. 
At Norris Hall, the first team of officers begins— 
• Securing the second floor. 
• Triaging the 48 gunshot victims and aiding survivors in multiple 
classrooms. 
• Coordinating rescue efforts to remove survivors from Norris Hall. 
• Gathering preliminary suspect or gunman descriptions. 
• Determining if additional gunmen exist. 
0952 
The police clear the second floor of Norris Hall. Two tactical medics attached to 
the ERTs, one medic from Virginia Tech Rescue and one from Blacksburg 
Rescue, are allowed to enter to start their initial triage. 
0953 The 9:42 a.m. request for all EMS units is repeated. 
1008 
A deceased male student is discovered by police team and suspected to be the 
gunman: 
• No identification is found on the body. 
• He appears to have a self-inflicted gunshot wound to the head. 
• He is found among his victims in classroom 211, the French class. 
• Two weapons are found near the body. 
1017 A third e-mail from Virginia Tech administration cancels classes and advises people to stay where they are. 
1051 All patients from Norris Hall have been transported to a hospital or moved to a minor treatment unit. 
1052 
A fourth e-mail from Virginia Tech administration warns of “a multiple shooting 
with multiple victims in Norris Hall,” saying the shooter has been arrested and 
that police are hunting for a possible second shooter. 
1057 A report of shots fired at the tennis courts near Cassell Coliseum proves false. 
1242 University President Charles Steger announces that police are releasing people from buildings and that counseling centers are being established 
1335 A report of a possible gunshot near Duck Pond proves to be another false alarm. 
1601 President George W. Bush speaks to the Nation from the White House regarding the shooting. 
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Date (2007) / 
Time Event 
1700 The first deceased victim is transported to the medical examiner’s office. 
2045 The last deceased victim is transported to the medical examiner’s office. 
Evening 
A search warrant is served for the residence of the first victim’s boyfriend. 
Investigators continue investigating whether he is linked to the first crime; the 
two crimes are not yet connected for certain. 
Table 29.   Abbreviated Timeline of Events as Described by the Virginia Tech Review 
Panel Report 
B. MESSAGES ISSUED BY VIRGINIA TECH 
Messages issued by the Virginia Tech University Policy Group to the 
Community in Response to the Norris Hall Shooting 
Time Message 
0950 “A gunman is loose on campus. Stay in buildings until further notice. Stay away from all windows.” 
1015 
“Virginia Tech has cancelled all classes. Those on campus are asked to remain where they 
are, lock their doors, and stay away from windows. Persons off campus are asked not to 
come to campus.” 
1050 
“In addition to an earlier shooting today in West Ambler Johnston, there has been a multiple 
shooting with multiple victims in Norris Hall. Police and EMS are on the scene. Police have 
one shooter in custody and as part of routine police procedure; they continue to search for a 
second shooter. “All people in university buildings are required to stay inside until further 
notice. All entrances to campus are closed.” 
1130 
“Faculty and staff located on the Burruss Hall side of the drill field are asked to leave their 
office and go home immediately. Faculty and staff located on the War Memorial/Eggleston 
Hall side of the drill field are asked to leave their offices and go home at 12:30 p.m.” 
1215 
“Virginia Tech has closed today Monday, April 16, 2007. On Tuesday, April 17, classes will 
be cancelled. The university will remain open for administrative operations. There will be an 
additional university statement presented today at noon.  
“All students, faculty and staff are required to stay where they are until police execute a 
planned evacuation. A phased closing will be in effect today; further information will be 
forthcoming as soon as police secure the campus. 
“Tomorrow there will be a university convocation/ ceremony at noon at Cassell Coliseum. 
The Inn at Virginia Tech has been designated as the site for parents to gather and obtain 
information.” 
Table 30.   These Messages Were Issued to the Virginia Tech Community in Response to 
the Norris Hall Shooting by the Virginia Tech University Policy Group.349 
                                                 
349 Virginia Tech Review Panel, Mass Shootings at Virginia Tech, 97. 
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